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ABSTRACT
In what follows I argue for an epistemic bridge principle that allows us to move from
real mathematics to ideal mathematics (and back again) without losing anything that is
characteristic of either methodological class.
Mathematics is a collection of actions performed in the pursuit of mathematical un-
derstanding. The actions are the processes of proving claims that come in such forms as
lemmas, theorems, or conjectures. These proofs can be accomplished through a variety
of means including (though not limited to) logical deduction, geometric intuition, diagram-
ming, or computer assistance. What is common to each of these is the characteristic of being
convincing to a sound mathematical mind. Even though what in particular makes each of
these methods of proof convincing differs, that they are convincing is enough to usher forth
mathematical understanding.
The chapters of this dissertation explore (i) a new naturalistic metaphysics for under-
standing “where mathematics comes from”, (ii) recent psychological findings in the the na-
ture of mathematical reasoning, (iii) the concatenation of two historical forms of reasoning
(real and ideal), (iv) the possibility of an epistemic bridge between real and ideal meth-
ods, and (v) the implication of this new bridge principle for the long-standing concern that
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems shake the foundation of modern mathematics.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
“One cannot inquire into the foundations and nature of mathematics without delving into
the question of the operations by which the mathematical activity of the mind is conducted.
If one failed to take that into account, then one would be left studying only the language in
which mathematics is represented rather than the essence of mathematics.”
– L.E.J. Brouwer
I would like to thank my mother, Beth, my father, Mike, and my lovely wife, Elise, for all
of their help throughout this process. Without them, I would not have been able to achieve
what is here presented.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Mathematics as Social Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2 Mathematical Cognition & The Division Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Psychologistic Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 The Division Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Ideal Mathematical Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3 Epistemic Instrumental Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Ideal Proof and Metaphor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4 Real Mathematical Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.2 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.3 Epistemic Instrumental Aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4 Metaphor in Real Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5 An Epistemic Bridge Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2 The Grounding of Conceptual Metaphor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.3 A Natural Ordering on Conceptual Metaphor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.4 An Epistemic Bridge Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6 A Small Corollary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.2 Against Go¨del . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166




“I realize that in this undertaking I place myself in a certain opposition to views
widely held concerning the mathematical infinite and to opinions frequently de-
fended on the nature of numbers.”
– Cantor
1.1 Overview
In what follows I argue for an epistemic bridge principle that allows us to move from
real mathematics to ideal mathematics (and back again) without losing anything that is
characteristic of either methodological class.
Mathematics is a collection of actions performed in the pursuit of mathematical un-
derstanding. The actions are the processes of proving claims that come in such forms as
lemmas, theorems, or conjectures. These proofs can be accomplished through a variety
of means including (though not limited to) logical deduction, geometric intuition, diagram-
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ming, or computer assistance. What is common to each of these is the characteristic of being
convincing to a sound mathematical mind. Even though what in particular makes each of
these methods of proof convincing differs, that they are convincing is enough to usher forth
mathematical understanding.
For the moment I understand proof as a sequence of thoughts convincing to a sound
mind (following Go¨del) since, whatever is going on in any given proof methodology, it better
be happening in the head. While many philosophers and mathematicians agree that proof
is something that cannot but be a psychological process, there has been a serious lack of
philosophical investigation into the implications for either the practice of mathematics or
mathematical epistemology of such a view. Prima facie a psychologistic notion of proof
seemingly denies any sort of mathematical ontology wherein mathematical objects exist in
some platonic realm or are otherwise “located” somewhere in real or logical space. Instead,
mathematics is something that exists as a purely mental activity. In this first chapter I argue
for both a satisfying notion of psychological proof as well as the “location” of mathematical
knowledge, namely in the collective heads of the mathematical community. These can be
found in the following second and third sections.
Briefly (as I will say much more about this in chapter 2), a major upshot to locating
the source of mathematics and mathematical understanding in the head is that we can
empirically test all kinds of fundamental mathematical abilities scientifically.1 Otherwise,
we are left dealing with mysterious mathematical “forms” that upon which we have no
legitimate grasp. The now growing body of psychological literature dealing in mathematical
1As will come to pass, Lakoff and Nun´ez build on this notion that mathematics is located squarely in the
head. However, the research leading up to L & N’s groundbreaking work would not be possible without the
evidence presented shortly.
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understanding supports my positive upshot. The ability to use our best scientific tools to
investigate something so deliciously human like mathematics promises a real glimpse into
the underlying state of the brain that makes the pursuit possible.
After arguing for this psychologistic notion of proof, we will then be in the position to ask
what specifically about the various methods of mathematics makes a given proof convincing
(and so leading to mathematical understanding). To start on such a journey it will be helpful
to make a distinction between two broad classes of proof, namely the real and ideal. We
might think of the class of real methods as the one containing neither a determined syntax
nor a specified logical level, deductive gaps, and self-evident steps. On the other hand, we can
consider ideal methods as those that have determined syntax and logical levels, syntactically
encoded logical rules, and both logical and mathematical axioms.
While this distinction is (at the moment) simply arbitrary between historically loaded
classes of mathematical methodologies, I turn in chapter 2 to a careful study of the distinction
– the so-called Division Problem (or DP). The DP is a way of tracing both the history of
mathematics itself, as well as the rise of modern mathematical practice. Take, for example,
the notion of mathematical rigor. Ideals of rigor have changed throughout the history of
mathematics – especially so during the development of axiomatic systems of proof in the
19th century. Mathematicians of the time were losing confidence in geometrical intuition,
which founded conceptions of geometric rigor since the emergence of Euclid’s Elements.
The problem was that arguments drawn from geometrically intuitive sources were found to
be faulty or outright false.
The 18th century mathematician Johann Lambert realized that “lapses in rigor were
principally due to the tacit smuggling of undeclared ... elements of our intuitive grasp of
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geometrical figures into the inferences of geometric proofs” [45]. The solution was obvious to
him: “[geometric] proof should proceed solely on the basis of ... the syntactic character of the
expressions occurring in it, and in abstraction from its subject matter” [45]. Lambert was an
early influence on mathematicians working in the 19th century concerned with mathematical
rigor [45].
These writers, e.g. Pasch, Frege, or Peacocke, moved away from intuition and toward
syntactic proof methods so as to formulate gap-free proofs. For example, Pasch’s axiomatiza-
tion of projective geometry allows a deduction from axioms to conclusions without geometric
intuition. The same goes for Frege’s Begriffsschrift, in which he developed a second order
logic and using which he attempted to prove various mathematical propositions. The idea,
beginning around the time of Lambert and continuing through to contemporary times, is
that when we can give an explicit proof that is free of intuitive gaps (or any other gap for
that matter), the resulting proof will be rigorous.2 These intuition-free proofs will then be
both convincing and allow us to gain mathematical knowledge.
The distinction made by DP is a call for concern about not only the rigor of a given
mathematical methodology, but also how well such a methodology serves to convince the
mathematician. While the project of the second chapter is largely historical, I turn in the
third chapter to a careful analysis of the class of ideal proof methodologies and in the fourth
to the class of real proof methodologies. Characterizing the class of ideal proof is an attempt
to identify which elements of the class lead to convincing proofs. As has been fleetingly
touched upon above, the crisis of the 18th and 19th centuries leading to the adoption of formal
2By gap I mean to point to those inference steps that are either (i) claimed to be so obvious that they do
not require explicit mention, (ii) inferences based in some sense of mathematical “intuition”, or (iii) steps of
a proof that cannot be given an explicit presentation.
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methods of proof suggests that ideal methods are in the unique position of being “more”
convincing that previous proofs relying on geometrical intuition. The third chapter partially
serves to analyze this claim. It will also serve to unify well known formal methodologies into
a class for which there are definite identifying characteristics. Having criteria for admission
into the class will also be useful when confronted with a novel proof methodology. We will
be able to analyze any new method to see if it contains the necessary conditions for ideal
method.
While ideal proof methodologies have taken the spotlight in much of the philosophical
literature on what plausibly constitutes rigorous proof, the so-called real methods are con-
stitutive of the majority of everyday mathematical practice. In the fourth chapter I analyze
real proof in order to characterize the members of the class. Identifying characteristic fea-
tures promises the same as does the identified features of ideal proof. Such an approach is
also a direct critique of the underlying reasoning driving the formal shift of the 18th and 19th
centuries.
The day to day practice of much of mathematics consists in the messy discovery of
proofs for various lemmas, theorems, and claims. The discovery is messy insofar as the
mathematician may not necessarily be in possession of a proof that falls within a particular
mathematical theory. Nor may she have explicitly stated a set of consistent set of math-
ematical (or logical) axioms from which to start. Furthermore, a given proof may require
support from ideas in wildly differing areas of mathematics. Along with all of this, the
mathematician’s own intuitions may drive inferences within the developing proof. In this
way the resulting proof will have been discovered in a way that is not readily formalizable
into any given “regular” syntax: the proof will not be easily (or, perhaps, at all) translated
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into any given formal language.
By developing a collection of characteristic features, the fourth chapter reign in all of the
seemingly tumultuous practices leading to real mathematical proof under a single umbrella.
After corralling these features, I will then move to arguing for a notion of rigor, which will
give legitimacy to the knowledge that is attained through the many common mathematical
practices.
Following the third and fourth chapters, which can be understood as a mated pair, we
come to the penultimate chapter. In the fifth I argue for the claim that we began with earlier,
namely an epistemic bridge principle between real and ideal methods of mathematical proof.
All of the work up to this point is in service of the claim that not only is there an epistemic
bridge from real proof to ideal proof (as Hilbert taught us), but also there exists an epistemic
bridge from ideal proof to real. The idea, which will require spelling out along the way, is
that we (as working mathematicians) are able to preserve all of the virtues of real methods
(some of which were previously pointed out) in the process of formalizing, and we are able
to do the same when translating from formal methods into real.
A worry about such a move is that there seems to be no significant content in purely
formal representations of mathematical proof. So, claiming that there is no loss of messy
content when moving from ideal methods to real seems prima facie to be a kind of category
error. While at first this seems to be an insurmountable challenge, over the course of charac-
terizing both real and ideal methods – along with a firm grasp on the source of mathematical
knowledge (namely, psychological) – we will arrive at my unintuitive thesis in good standing.
Finally there is the final chapter in which I take stock of all that has happened as well
as argue for a small corollary following from my thesis. I argue for a new reading on the
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efficacy of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems on ideal mathematics in light of the epistemic
transparency among real and ideal methods. I argue that insofar as the incompleteness the-
orems are devastating only to ideal methods, and since the envisioned (by Go¨del) epistemic
position of ideal methods does not exist, the incompleteness theorems lack any legitimate
bite to the power of ideal mathematics.3
Before we get into deep controversial territory, let’s begin by considering the place mathe-
matics holds in human understanding. In the rest of this chapter I first consider mathematics
as a deeply rooted social practice, and then offer why we should take up a social construc-
tivist metaphysics instead of the other, mainstream contenders. These two sections together
serve as firm foundation as we move deeper into the epistemological weeds.
1.2 Mathematics as Social Practice
In this section I defend the claim that mathematical objects are socially constructed.
Above we saw that the overarching goal of this dissertation is epistemological: I argue for an
epistemic bridge principle that allows us to move from real methods to ideal and back again.
The constructivist claim to be defended in this section serves to determine the ontological
status of mathematical objects in general. After having an understanding of the place where
this knowledge “resides” we will (in chapter 2) determine from where mathematics – and
mathematical knowledge – come (namely, from the head).
Now, to say that some thing is “socially constructed” is generally to mean that some
3As is commonly understood in the literature on Go¨del (and from Go¨del’s own musings for that matter),
the Incompleteness Theorems only apply to ideal proofs and methods since the kind of self-referential state-
ments required for the Theorems to work out are both fully decidable in real proof, and false. I will show
that the Incompleteness Theorems will be deflated – even in the case of ideal methods.
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thing is the output of a set of social practices. A characterization of the project of social
constructivism follows from Hacking’s [?]:
I shall mean various sociological, historical, and philosophical projects that aim at
displaying or analyzing actual, historically situated, social interactions or causal
routes that led to, or were involved in, the coming into being or establishing of
some present entity or fact.
The constructivist project is primarily metaphysical insofar as the analysis of social interac-
tions is meant to give an account of the underlying nature of some idea, object or practice.
So, without a social practice leading to the creation of an idea, say, that idea would not
exist. This has the further implication that whatever is created through social interaction
could not have existed otherwise. In light of this contingency claim (things exist contingent
on social practice), the thesis of this section can be made into the following stronger version,
CM (constructed mathematics):
CM – Mathematical objects are socially constructed, and so exist only given a
coherent mathematical practice.
Before defending CM let’s consider the primary alternatives to a constructivist view of
mathematics. After all, we might think that CM will not hold up to the challenges of
objectivity, necessity, and timelessness.4 That is, we think of mathematics as being a purely
objective science that is not prone to the issues that arise from subjective views about
the nature of mathematics. Similarly, we consider the truths arrived at as both necessary
4These challenges are setup in Cole (2008)
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and as continuing on throughout all of space and time. How is it, then, that a view of
the metaphysics of mathematics that is localized in mathematical practice can satisfy these
criteria that seem to require something stronger than the puny existence of mere mortal
mathematical practitioners?
1.2.1 Alternatives to CM
CM seems to be a kind of antithesis to the sort of metaphysical picture that we desire
when meeting Cole’s challenges. It is not at all clear on first light that human-centered prac-
tice will yield the kind of objective standards required for supporting the further character-
istics of necessity and timelessness. With this working objection to CM in mind let’s briefly
survey contenders to CM, namely the platonist, nominalist, and fictionalist approaches. Pla-
tonism in mathematics is generally considered a baseline approach to mathematical meta-
physics. We often hear comments like “if you push hard enough all mathematicians are
platonists” or “I’m a closeted platonist” or even the hopeful “One day I want to be a pla-
tonist about mathematics” from our colleagues when pressing them on their beliefs on the
existence of mathematical objects.
The platonist line is that mathematical objects exist in an abstract realm separated
from our physical realm, and that when we are doing mathematics we are reaching up us-
ing mathematical reasoning to them and discovering their properties and relations. In this
way our mathematical theorems and propositions are literally true and about these abstract
mathematical forms. While originating with Plato, the platonist view has taken hold, be-
ginning with Frege, as an anti-psychologistic position. Psychologism, it was thought, yields
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all the wrong answers for the challenges of objectivity, necessity and timelessness. The neo-
platonist view, conversely, allows us to meet these challenges in easy fashion. If we think that
mathematics should be an objective science, then platonism explains that every mathemat-
ical statement and proposition is simply about an externally existing mathematical object:
the references of our propositions are independently existing objects. So, mathematics is
objective in this light.
Platonism seems capable of supporting the claim that mathematics is necessary (for some
suitably strong understanding of necessity). Our mathematical claims are simply about the
ideal mathematical objects. So, what we know about mathematics must be essential (and
hence necessary) to the mathematical objects themselves.5 One candidate for such a necessity
claim may be the truth value of the proposition. Finally, timelessness of mathematical claims
follows from platonism since the existence of these mathematical forms do not require human
minds for their existences. So, our propositions will retain their necessary characteristics
eternally regardless whether their are human minds to consider them.
The platonist view seems a sure-fire option right out the gate. After all, the theory
not only provides a possible solution to the Cole challenges, but it also paints a picture of
mathematics that allows for the field to be pure (in the sense of only relying on reasoning as
the primary tool of inquiry), as well as making room for the phenomenology of mathematical
research. By this latter statement I mean that we think of mathematical practice as a form of
discovery and creativity. While using reasoning to reach up to the forms, we are discovering
which propositions are literally true (false) and thereby recreating the mathematical realm
5This is a controversial claim, and something about which I deal with in depth further down in this
section and in subsequent chapters.
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for everyone to see immediately.
While this metaphysical picture seems like just what we need, it merely seems that way.
Platonism is not suitable as an explanation for why mathematics is objective, necessary or
timeless. My concern is the usual Benacerraf one of justification. By this I mean that the
realist picture as typically developed gives us no means through which we can justify our
propositions. By design, platonism posits eternal mathematical objects in a realm that is
physically disconnected from our own. Because of this we have no access to this realm –
either physically or epistemically. Even if we suppose that such a realm exists and in that
realm every single mathematical proposition in our world has a referent, there is no way in
which we can have sufficient access to that realm which will serve as meaningful foundation
for our claims. I take it that not only do we want our mathematics to actually be true, we
want to know why the claims are true. Platonism (and supporters old and new) are not
able to give us a plausible story for how we can access the ideal realm. Without such a
story none of the solutions to the Benacerraf challenge are well-founded. At best we are left
with the need to have some kind of irrelevant faith that our mathematical propositions refer
appropriately. That seems deeply misguided.
A second approach to the metaphysics of mathematics is the nominalist thesis. Nom-
inalists hold that mathematical propositions should be given predicative interpretations.
This so-called face-value interpretation posits that when we make mathematical claims we
are speaking about the object. For example “17 is prime” should have the form Pa where
“17” is the object and “prime” the predicate. Furthermore, the position stipulates that
mathematical objects – in our case 17 – do not exist, and yet, “17 is prime” is literally true.
Holding such a pair of seemingly mutually inconsistent statements makes it appear as though
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nominalists have a tenuous grasp on the metaphysical content of mathematical objects.
However, an option that side steps the inevitable fall into obscurity that would result
from a robust version of the briefly painted view above is to hold that we should paraphrase
our mathematical claims. For example, the proposition “17 is prime” should be paraphrased
to “If there were numbers, then 17 is prime”. This kind of if-thenism popularized by Hilbert
(1899) gets us out of issues surrounding the actual existence of mathematical objects. In-
stead, nominalists are able to hold onto the claim that mathematical objects do not exist
while maintaining the literal truth of mathematical propositions.
While I sympathize with the nominalist denial of mathematical objects actually existing,
the strategy of paraphrasing seems to miss ordinary (and professional) meanings of mathe-
matical expressions. That is, paraphrasing “17 is prime” using “If there were numbers, then
17 is prime” misses our inclination that “17 is prime” simply means “17 is prime”. In the
literature many paraphrasing options have been proposed for nominalist accounts. Each of
these paraphrases seem to – in their own particular ways – capture something akin to what
is meant in our ordinary mathematical expressions. None of them, it would seem, are able
to capture everything that we mean.
A second (and more problematic) concern is that nominalism cannot meet the challenge
of timelessness. The argument is straightforward, namely if mathematical objects do not
exist, then they are purely mind-dependent. If they are mind-dependent and minds are
finite things, then mathematical objects are finite things. Hence, mathematical objects are
not timeless. While a quick syllogism, it is unclear how a nominalist could avoid such a
worry. After all, the face-value interpretation offered by the theory has little else to rest
its mathematical content on other than mathematical minds. So, the theory ultimately
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fails to offer a story that we need in a metaphysics of mathematics. In light of these two
problems with nominalism, let’s will now turn to the last major metaphysical position,
namely fictionalism.
Fictionalism about mathematical objects is the view that propositions are about abstract
objects, but since no abstract objects exist these mathematical propositions are not true.
I do not mean to say that on a fictionalist account mathematical propositions are false,
but instead that they are neither true nor false. The situation is akin to claims made in
the course of an episode of Doctor Who. Even though the Doctor makes intelligible claims
about the T.A.R.D.I.S., his claims lack truth values since no T.A.R.D.I.S. actually exists.
In our pet example, “17 is prime” is an intelligible mathematical claim, yet it lacks a truth
value since both “17” and “prime” do not actually exist.
A famous criticism of the fictionalist position is the indispensability argument (Quine and
Putnam), which says that if fictionalism is right, then mathematics is untrue. Mathematics
is indispensable in our best physical theories. Hence, our best physical theories are untrue.
But, we want our best physical theories to be true. So, to maintain that our best physical
theories are true, it must be the case that mathematics is true. While an interesting critique
of fictionalism, I will avoid dwelling any more on the worry since so much ink has been
spilled in the literature already. We can see the indispensability argument as an attack that
fictionalism does not satisfy challenge that mathematics be necessary. I instead focus on a
charge that fictionalism does not meet the objectivity challenge.
We want our mathematics to be objective. This is to say that we want mathematics to be
justified not by personal judgment, community biases, or value commitments, but instead
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by faithfulness to mathematical facts.6 Given that the mathematical facts are the true
mathematical propositions, the objectivity challenge is a claim that mathematics should be
justified in mathematical truth – not value commitments. My worry that fictionalism does
not satisfy the objectivity challenge, then, can be made more fine grained into the worry
that fictionalism justifies mathematics through value commitments. As the theory has been
naively developed, mathematical propositions are about abstract entities, but those objects
do not actually exist. Since they do not exist, they cannot have a truth value assignment. If
our useful mathematical fictions do not have the usual truth valuations as their underlying
semantics, then the fictionalist must have a different understanding of what justifies a given
mathematical proposition.
A common option in the literature is to appeal to inter-theoretical consistency, i.e. what
justifies a mathematical proposition is whether the proposition is consistent with all other
propositions of the theory. However, this option is simply pushing back the goal posts. At the
end of the day, consistency is a claim that that a set of propositions together will not imply
a contradiction. Consistency, then, is couched in terms of the truth values of propositions as
well as the implication of those propositions. If the fictionalist takes this option, then they
will still need to give an account of consistency that does not rely on truth valuations. If the
fictionalist still champions inter-theoretical consistency, then at best they can only hold that
our mathematical theories seem consistent in some relatively small subset of propositions
because together those propositions seem to yield conclusions that do not conflict with one
6The exact definition of “objectivity” is still quite contentious. For example, a notion of objectivity could
be as stated here, namely a faithfulness to the facts. However, other proposed definitions include “an absence
of normative commitments with preference for value-free ideals” or as “freedom from personal biases”. Each
of these options have their value as well as negative consequences. I claim here that choosing any of these
perspectives will be enough for my critique against fictionalism. So, I choose to proceed with the definition
that most obviously makes trouble for fictionalist metaphysical theories.
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another in that particular set (story) used. It follows, then, that on the fictionalist theory,
mathematics is justified through a commitment to values that may or may not generalize in
all cases. It is in this way that fictionalism fails to satisfy the objectivity challenge.
At this point we have collected the major approaches to mathematical metaphysics and
have seen that they each fail to satisfy at least one – if not more – of the Cole challenges.
To each of the criticisms above one may be tempted to reject that the challenges are of
any real consequence to our metaphysical concerns. If such is the case, then each of the
theories remain unscathed and can continue slugging it out in the trenches. However, in
what follows below, namely a defense of CM, we will see that there is no need to abandon
the well-motivated challenges set by Cole. If a robust constructivist thesis can answer each
of objectivity, necessity, and timelessness, then it will be the case that we have good rea-
son to finally reject either platonism, nominalism, or fictionalism as a potentially preferred
metaphysics of mathematics. To that end, let me now motivate CM.
1.2.2 Motivating CM
Why think that mathematics and mathematical objects are socially constructed? After
all, social constructivism is usually reserved for issues in areas such as gender, sexuality,
ethics, race, or religion. Commonly across disciplines the thesis that race, for example,
is socially constructed, and the raced individuals are as well. Social constructivism has
also blazed trails in the sciences as a way of explaining the effect of scientific research on
humans and social life as well as how social pressures effect scientific research. Even though
constructivism is gaining ground on many fronts, mathematics seems somehow removed from
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what makes constructivism viable for the areas aforementioned.
This seeming difference demarcates a division between two theses of social constructivism,
the weak and strong variants respectively. A weak social constructivist thesis is to say that
human representations of reality are social constructs. So, the representations of race (to
continue our example from above) are socially constructed. A strong constructivist thesis
goes further by holding that the objects for which we have socially represented are themselves
socially constructed. Now, recall CM.
CM – Mathematical objects are socially constructed, and so exist only given a
coherent mathematical practice.
CM is a relevant formulation of the strong thesis. The strong thesis is the only metaphysically
interesting version as weak forms are not primarily concerned with any ontological claims to
which our socially constructed representations are referring. If we were only concerned with
defending the weak thesis, then whichever claims made would relatively uninteresting given
that we would not have made any headway into the nature of mathematical objects. Further-
more, by defending a strong thesis, we will then be able to make interesting epistemological
claims about mathematical knowledge justified in these socially constructed objects.
My defense of the strong thesis CM comes in two horns. The first horn is an argument
from the phenomenology of mathematical practice, and the second an argument that CM
satisfies Cole’s challenges. Before beginning my defense, however, it should be noted that
for what is to come in the remaining sections of this chapter – as well as in the rest of the
manuscript – I claim that mathematics as actually practiced matters before everything else
is considered. That is, mathematics as it should be (idealizations) are only reasonable areas
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of research once we get a hold on what is actually happening. This places me firmly along
an “epistemic naturalist” line of thought.7
The Phenomenological Argument
To take the first horn first, the argument from phenomenology is controversial in the
literature. A common way to formulate the argument is as follows:8
1. Mathematical phenomenology must be given sufficient significance in philosophical
accounts of mathematics.
2. Practicing mathematics includes both the feeling of discovery and of creativity.
3. CM does justice to both the feeling of discovery and of creativity in mathematics.
4. Hence, CM is preferable over each of platonism, nominalism, and fictionalism in the
philosophy of mathematics.
I take premise 2 as uncontroversial. That mathematics is both a practice of discovery
and creativity is a claim made in every metaphysical and epistemological account in the
philosophical literature as well as an ubiquitous feature of reports from mathematicians. Let
me begin, then, with a defense of the first premise. At the outset there is concern that if too
much weight is placed on the first claim, then it will come out as obviously false.9 While not
made precise in [?], the concern may be that if we think that the phenomenology of practicing
mathematics is all there is to mathematics, then we quickly fall into a subjectivist view of
7More on this will be said shortly.




mathematics. Conversely, if no significance is attributed to the feeling of doing mathematics,
then we will be left analyzing a practice that seems devoid of human interaction. There
are many reasons why we care about mathematics, and to not give weight to a nontrivial
motivating feature for most mathematicians presupposes some kind of lifeless character of
mathematics.
Given that the extremes presented above are non optimal, we must give mathemati-
cal phenomenology some place in our philosophical treatment of mathematics. It would
be arbitrary to simply stipulate a relative importance that would be sufficient for the phe-
nomenological argument above to go through. Instead – and perhaps more reasonably – if
we view social constructivism as a kind of epistemic naturalism about mathematics, then we
will be able to accurately position the feeling of practicing mathematics in our philosophical
reasoning. By epistemic naturalism I mean to invoke the view that reality contains nothing
“supernatural” (for example, see the worries about platonism above), and where a scientific
method should be used to investigate all areas of reality. Insofar as social constructivism
about mathematics (and CM) claims that mathematical objects are the product of social
construct, investigating ontological and epistemological claims about mathematics amounts
to analyzing human mathematical activity.
Part of this activity is the discovery and creation of new theorems, lemmas, modes of
presentation, and areas of research (to name a few). Below I will say more in defense of
the third premise of the phenomenological argument, namely that CM captures the feeling
of discovery and creativity in mathematics, but for now we need only suppose that both
are features of mathematical practice. Allowing discovery and creativity into mathematical
practice is to place importance on the means through which new mathematics is generated.
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Following Paul Halmos:10
“[Mathematics] is a creative art because mathematicians create beautiful new
concepts; it is a creative art because mathematicians live, act, and think like
artists; and it is a creative art because mathematicians regard it so.” (1967)
From this we gather that practicing mathematicians see what they are doing as not only
deeply creative but also artistic in nature. Mathematical practice, then, is in part a phe-
nomenological practice taking into account both aesthetic and pioneering sensibilities. The
sensibilities are pioneering insofar as part of what makes something creative is its sense of
discovery of new and previously unrevealed aspects to the field. In this way mathemati-
cians both create and discover new mathematics. Without these artistic feelings of doing
mathematics, it is unclear that mathematics would have achieved much more than what is
necessary for practical application.11 Hence, in order to understand mathematics, math-
ematical phenomenology must be given sufficient significance in philosophical accounts of
mathematics.
Now that we have seen justification for the first premise – and along the way some justi-
fication for the second – let’s turn to the third premise, namely that CM does justice to both
the feeling of discovery and creativity in mathematics. To understand the justice done by
CM let’s first consider another facet of the epistemic naturalist line taken. A central tenet of
this naturalist perspective is that the limited focus on the front-end formal end products12
10This quote originated in Halmos’ December, 12, 1967 lecture for the University of Illinois’ Centennial
Year celebrations. It was first published in The American Scientist ((1968): 375-389)
11I am here referencing the opening quotation of this chapter.
12In forthcoming chapters a division will be made between so-called back end informal mathematical
method, and the front end formal products. This division will inform a natural bridge between real and
ideal methodologies.
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should be extended so as to include empirical research into strictly non-formal aspects of
mathematical practice. Proposed areas in this extension that promise to yield philosophical
payouts include digitalization (the reliance on computer-assisted methods), complexity (de-
grees of complexity to be controlled in mathematical understanding), feasibility (capabilities
of human reasoners), and induction.13 We will see that CM does justice to each of the first
three (in later chapters I have much to say about the case of induction) areas that seem to
involve both discovery and creativity.14
Taking digitalization first, this aspect of mathematical practice involves the use of com-
puters in proof development, proof execution, and calculation (of many kinds). Computer
assisted methods place machines as either the primary prover or otherwise as an indispens-
able tool in nontrivial aspects of proof. While I say much more about the increasingly
ubiquitous use of digital processes within mathematical practice in the third chapter, we
need here simply note that the use of computers requires a loss of control that the human
mathematician would have otherwise had over a given proof. This loss stems from the re-
liance on varying factors such as underlying algorithmic quality, software concerns, hardware
limitations, and output interpretation.15
However, even with this loss of control, there is clear evidence that mathematical discov-
ery and creativity is found. Most noticeably the development of effective algorithms may
require (and often do require) deeply creative solutions by the programmer. In order to
write an algorithm that will output information that is indeed relevant to a given proof,
the programmer seeks to solve a problem. In the case of mathematics, the solution sought
13Kerkhove and van Bendegem (2008)
14I don’t mean to imply that these are the only extensions relevant to philosophy. Instead, these are a
few that are regularly alluded to in the greater literature with more to be discovered and analyzed.
15ibid
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is mathematical. The mathematician – in writing their code – seeks to efficiently encode
a repeatable process that operates in much the same way that the mathematician herself
operates. In this way the output of the computer running the new algorithm will be in a
form (hopefully) that is intelligible to the investigator. Then, when analyzing the output,
the mathematician will be in the right relation to the output to continue along with discov-
ering what she would have not otherwise discovered from the proof were the computer not
available to extend her abilities.
Writing novel algorithms is a practice based in the methods that are widely accepted
amidst mathematical communities. The algorithms that are written (from above) are writ-
ten in such a way as to capture the kinds of reasoning that are presumably agreed upon
within the community. So, algorithms must be dependent upon socially constructed math-
ematical practice. CM captures this sense of creativity inherent in algorithmic design and
implementation since it states that mathematical objects exist only given coherent math-
ematical practice. If the algorithms are coded manifestations of these practices, then the
algorithms are social constructs. So, if creativity is a feature of mathematical practice, then
CM does justice to the feeling of creativity in the case of digitalization. As goes discovery,
a similar line of reasoning leads us to the conclusion that if discovery is also a feature of
mathematical practice, which is widely affirmed, then CM also does just to the feeling of
discovery for digitalization.
Moving on to complexity, which is again the notion that there are degrees of difficulty
that must be attenuated when attempting mathematical understanding with topics such as
weather prediction or decision problems, it is often the case that mathematicians must accept
solutions to a degree of certainty. Degrees of certainty are then quantified as the probability
21
to which some solution is correct. There are many types of probabilistic proof methods
employed by working mathematicians today, and each have their own creative solutions for
achieving high degrees of certainty. As an example a specific type of probabilistic proof,
which harkens to the above discussion of digitalization within mathematics, is the method
of interactive proving. Consider the following formulation of this method from [?]:
... an interactive proof comprises the interplay between a ‘verifier’ and a ‘prover’.
The latter is held to convince the former, upon procedural questioning, of the
correctness of an underlying assertion. The prover belongs to a family of checking
devices, Turing machines or sequences of these, that are capable of establishing
the probable correctness of solutions for very large classes of problems. [T]he
verifier ... [is] more typically a human mathematician and computer user, [and]
is computationally bound. The class of interactive proof systems consists of
proof systems in which the verification procedure for mathematical statements is
interactive and randomized, rather than being non-interactive and deterministic,
as in classical proof systems.
The idea here is as above wherein a computer (or, more accurately, daisy-chained groups of
computers) are utilized to make calculations – or otherwise formal deductions – that extend
beyond the reasonable abilities of a person, and a mathematician is delegated to the role of
verifier or proof checker. The verification process is limited by the constraints governing the
verifier from the outset, namely human timescale limitations. Because of this it is nearly
impossible for a mathematician to verify every calculation or inference step completed by
computer. The impossibility is obviously evident in theoretical cases involving numbers of
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inferences approaching the infinite, but, and even in very large (though still finite) cases,
the impossibility for a given mathematician to verify all instances of computer output is
unreasonable. After all, the use of digital practice is meant to counteract the relatively few
inferences any given mathematician is capable of performing.
Interactive proof, then, involves a verification procedure in which a mathematician ran-
domly chooses to check a given inference step. After having performed a significant number
of checks, the verifier slowly becomes more and more certain that the output of a computer
prover is increasingly probable through subtle interactions. The interactive component of
interactive proof is where CM again gets the phenomenology right. Now that we have a
basis for understanding how both algorithm writing is a creative process and that CM gets
that feeling right, we are also able to see that CM gives the right story for the interactive
component. To see this consider the following case study, namely the method of recognizing
primes up to a particular n:
Pseudo Primes – In order to recognize that a given number, n, is prime we
can check whether n is a pseudo prime. A pseudo prime is a composite number
that has an arithmetical property, P , that also happens to be shared with actual
prime numbers. So, when we write algorithms to check for such pseudo primes,
we can be absolutely certain that numbers not satisfying P will not be candidates
for primehood.16
Now, computers will run algorithms that check for all numbers up to a given integer n
that satisfy the arithmetical property P . Two mathematicians, Michael Rabin and Gary
16This case study is largely inspired from Kerkhove and van Bendegem (2008) p. 429.
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Miller, in 1980 devised a method for verifying to a high degree of certainty that numbers
not satisfying P are indeed not prime while all those that do are actually prime. As it
turns out, using this interactive strategy for verification yields a probability of (1
4
)k for k
numbers strictly smaller than the proposed prime n that falsifies n’s chance at primehood.
And, conversely, Rabin and Miller’s simple arithmetical test yields the probability that n
is actually prime of n−1
n
. After running many tests for a given n you can arrive at near
99.99· · ·% certainty that the computer has indeed found a prime number. CM captures the
phenomenology of both creativity and discovery in cases such as these through both the
methods of writing effective algorithms (like above) as well as through the use of verification
methods that are deemed plausible in the wider mathematical community. The check that
Rabin and Miller use is a simple arithmetical test that is both convincing and compelling to
all initiated. These methods then allow for the literal discovery of brand new primes.
Let’s now consider the extension of feasibility. Feasibility is the notion that mathemati-
cians as humans have limitations – physical, cognitive, and temporal. This is to say that
mathematicians can only work so much of each day, be able to reason effectively only for
so long, and eventually die. Because of these problems, mathematicians are forced to rely
on their mathematical communities through collaboration, the use of computers, and appeal
to the authority of previously proved claims. Furthermore, humans are prone to error. In
a private conversation with Dirk Schlimm, it was estimated that at any given moment up
to nearly 20% of entries in mathematical journal are flawed to the extent that they have
not proven their guiding claims! All of this is to say that mathematical practice relies on
a community of practitioners to both complete projects and for the advancement of ideas
generally. Utterly ridiculous is the notion that some mathematician be required to prove
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every mathematical statement since the beginning of mathematical thought just to proceed
onto something new. We are not ideal reasoners. Instead we rely on a whole host of inroads
for groundbreaking work in mathematics.
CM satisfies this feeling of practicing mathematics. If not obvious, CM is simply the
notion that mathematics is the output of a community effort. As such, the thesis is able
to account for what it feels like to practice math in highly social and psychological-based
environments. Insofar as there is no appeal to ideal discourse, CM captures every aspect of
this extension.
Let’s take stock. At the beginning of this chapter I proposed a metaphysical thesis about
mathematical objects that take a social constructivist line. In what follows, CM – together
with a flavor of epistemic natural and a psychologistic picture of mathematical cognition –
will be the basis upon which the thesis of this dissertation will rest, namely that there is
an epistemic bridge from real methods to ideal (and back). Of course, CM is not the only
metaphysical theory on the block. So, in the next section we noted the many ways in which
mainstream metaphysical theories purport to inform our understanding of mathematical
ontology as well as why each of them seem to fail in that project. I don’t mean to say that
there fixes to some – if not all – of my worries with these theories are impossible, but to my
knowledge none have been proposed that do not immediately raise further concerns.
Instead, I have offered a phenomenological argument which concludes that CM is best
suited as the preferred metaphysics for the philosophy of mathematics since it does justice
to the feelings of discovery and creativity in mathematical practice. This argument is only
one horn in fully accepting CM as our preferred metaphysics. In the next section I both
develop the three Cole challenges as well as offer partial solutions that are available to the
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social constructivist. It is my purpose in only giving brief insights into potential solutions to
these challenges in what remains because subsequent chapters reinforce the conviction that
CM is capable of satisfaction.
Satisfying Cole’s Challenges
Cole’s challenges are that mathematics should be objective, necessary, and timeless.
Each of these seem insurmountable for a social constructivist. However, they merely seem
that way. In this section I will further develop the challenges as well as offer a glimmer of a
solution that will be born in subsequent chapters.
The challenge of objectivity is to develop a metaphysics of mathematics that preserves
the sense in which mathematics is not tied to the subjective whims of the mathematician.
A common, and indeed the right, conception is that mathematics is somehow separate from
any particular reasoner. The objects that we deal in as well as the proofs that are offered
appeal to things that are not private to anyone. The challenge for CM, is to specify exactly
how it is that objects created through interpersonal mathematical practice can achieve the
impersonal benchmark that is objectivity.
My solution to this puzzle is to take a broadly psychologistic perspective on the founda-
tions of mathematical reasoning and understanding.17 Roughly, the idea to be spelled out
is that recent work in the cognitive literature implies that each and every one of us has an
ability to use metaphor when thinking about the world. We use metaphor for everything
from predicting turns of events to thinking about the objects and ideas around us. In mathe-
matical terms, we can use metaphor as a guide through which to build up an idea of number.
17This is the first section of the next chapter
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Then, once we consider a rigorous method of reasoning (logic), we are off and running in
building up a number theory. Using this number theory we build the rest of mathematics.
Because our mathematics is built through ubiquitous use of metaphor, our mathematics will
not be tied to any one person or group. In this way CM will be able to satisfy the challenge
of objectivity.
The challenge of necessity can be interpreted as the challenge to have a sufficiently robust
metaphysical account that aligns with our various modal and epistemic notions of necessity
and possibility. In the case of mathematics, following Fine (2002), we may think of a “propo-
sition’s being mathematically necessary ... as its being both metaphysically necessary and
a mathematical truth.” Concerning the issue whether metaphysical and epistemic necessity
are diverging forms of necessity, CM offers a resounding NO! A brief outline to be considered
is that CM places all of mathematics within the community. CM, then, offers a restriction
of what is legitimately necessary to just mathematical communities. Any claim about the
necessity of a given statement is judged solely on what matters to us as mathematicians. Of
course, much more needs to be said on this topic, but I leave that discussion for subsequent
chapters. For now it is enough to see that CM offers a compelling line of thought concerning
these issues, and as such will be available to answer the challenge of necessity.
Finally I turn to the issue of timelessness. The challenge is to defend a metaphysics
that aligns with our notion that mathematical truths should be timeless. That is, whatever
mathematical statement is true now should be true throughout all of space and time. For
example, 1 + 1 = 2 is true now and will be so forever. Furthermore, the inclination of
timeless truths aligns with our modal reasoning about the way the world could have been.
The truths of mathematics, it is thought, are necessarily true, i.e. the true statements of
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mathematics are true across all possible worlds.18 For these reasons (and plausibly more),
any metaphysics must provide a solution to the timelessness challenge.
CM implies a potentially unintuitive – though correct – view about the nature of timelessness
generally, and of a metaphysical commitment to the unintuitive interpretation. As will be
expressed in great detail in the third and fourth chapters, CM allows for an instrumental
based interpretation of mathematical methods. The idea, in short, is that all of our best
methods, whether formal or informal, are used in service of achieving mathematical under-
standing and knowledge. This is to say that our tools of mathematical investigation are
necessarily finite since we, the user, are finite. To suggest that our mathematical tools allow
us to approach truths that are infinite is to make a category mistake about what is possible
for humans to comprehend. The solution that CM offers to the challenge is to reduce it to
human timescales. The solution, then, is that mathematics is timeless across human mathe-
matical communities, but no longer. When we cease to exist as a species, our mathematical
tools will cease to exist. Hence, the truths arrived at using such tools will as cease to exist.
As unintuitive as this proposed solution seems, the fact that it underlies mathematics as
it is actually practiced instead of some idealization is enough for now to show that CM has
an answer for the last (all) of Cole’s challenges.
1.3 Conclusion
CM should be our preferred metaphysics of mathematics. Not only do other, main-
stream contenders fall short in a variety of ways, but they also do not seem to approach
18I defer here to the talk of possible worlds not because I intend to take up the inherent worries involved
with modal reasoning here, but because such talk is a useful heuristic for getting my point across.
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a reasonable interpretation of mathematical practice. Instead, they make claims about the
way mathematics ought to be. CM, on the other hand, has options available for satisfy-
ing the challenges set forth by Cole (2008) as well as does justice to the phenomenology of
practicing mathematics.
Upon this foundation, I now move on to consider a cognitive perspective of mathematical
understanding that will further support the epistemic thesis of this manuscript as well as
provide a robust solution for CM satisfying the challenge of objectivity. Following this (and
in the same chapter), I explicate the historical developments of the so-called Division Problem
which spans the gap between real and ideal methods in mathematical practice.
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Chapter 2
Mathematical Cognition & The
Division Problem
“Numbers are the free creation of the human mind.”
– Richard Dedekind
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I introduced and partially defended a social constructivist view
of the metaphysics of mathematics, and mathematical practice. Among other concerns, the
constructivist picture painted left us potentially unsatisfied with a metaphysical view that
appears fully subjective about mathematics. Clearly, however, there is a consensus among
philosophers (and mathematicians alike) that mathematics is an objective endeavor.1 My
very briefly proposed solution was that recent advances in mathematical cognition research
1If any consensus occurs in philosophy, it is surely about the objectivity of math!
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will save the day. Exactly how was left for later thought.
The time has come to pick up the leads on this question. In the coming section I consider
what recent work in the cognitive sciences can tell us about the source of mathematical
ability in the brain. I will start with work that concerns mathematical abilities in non-
humans. After this I delve into studies that take as subjects early mathematical practices
and abilities in humans before moving on to literature dealing explicit with mathematics
as it is practiced by working mathematicians. A reason for starting at one end of the
mathematical ability spectrum and moving through to the extreme opposite is to show that
while not expressly human, mathematics requires a kind of intelligence only available in
particular circumstances. Another purpose is that – once we move to primarily human
reasoners – we will see that mathematics is something that seemingly requires a community
with which to engage. Finally by learning about the cognitive abilities underlying full blown
mathematical practice, we will encounter the limits of mathematical reasoning ability for
humans. Together, each of the groups of studies considered will support a conclusion that
mathematics, while socially constructed, is an objective practice.
Our limited abilities are of central importance when we move on to the second idea
presented in this chapter. Following a psychologistic notion of proof I will introduce the so-
called “Division Problem”. The division problem first introduces the issue of central concern
for this dissertation, namely the connection between real and ideal methods in mathematics.
In this section I gain my inspiration from the many attempts to construct a non-arbitrary
division between the two classes of reasoning as famously named by Hilbert. As such I
will largely be surveying the literature concerning the division. However, using what is
gained from the previous section on psychologistic proof, I suggest a novel interpretation
31
and solution for the puzzle.2
Moving forward, these two sections (as well as the arguments contained therein) will
support the overall epistemic project of developing an epistemic bridge principle allowing a
mathematician to move between real and ideal methods without issue. It will come to pass
that having a psychologistic understanding of mathematics will serve to unite both seemingly
disparate methodologies under a single cognitive flag.
2.2 Psychologistic Proof
In this section I defend the claim that mathematical proof is essentially psychologistic.
By psychologistic I mean that mathematical proof is a cognitive event involving mathematical
reasoning, which is fundamentally a kind of neural activity. Given that I am not a cognitive
scientist, and that I take a naturalist approach to the philosophy of mathematics, I below
defend a psychologistic view of mathematical practice inspired by examples and studies
from the contemporary psychological literature. Along the way I will draw inspiration from
literature on the mathematical abilities of non-human animals, the development of math in
young humans, and then finally the jump from the use of simple number systems to full
blown mathematical practice.
A note of warning before we begin: this literature is regularly updating. As such I do not
mean to suggest that what is here presented is the final word from where mathematics comes
in the brain. Instead, what is to come serves as plausible evidence that mathematics happens
in the head and nowhere else. Furthermore, one may wonder where the philosophical import
2(Hint: what distinguishes real from ideal method is the availability of respective methods in our cogni-
tion.)
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of the below presented empirical research lies. It is my contention that the empirical studies
give us better understanding of where mathematics happens in the brain, the lineage of our
shared mathematical abilities, and how society shapes our mathematical understanding. The
philosophical questions, such as the nature and possibility mathematical understanding, or
the possibility of such knowledge, are all better informed by empirical research. The cognitive
studies inform a realistic (non mysterious) picture of how we actually have mathematical
abilities, and the philosophical work to be done is to evaluate these facts in service of the
many historically vexing questions plaguing the philosophy of mathematics.
2.2.1 Mathematics as Schema
The title of this subsection alludes to the gaining popularity of thinking of higher order
mathematical reasoning ability as the use of mathematical metaphors (as currently popu-
larized by Lakoff and Nun˜ez) as well as the modest extension that I here argue. My claim
is that mathematical reasoning is deeply cognitively and evolutionary based. The following
examples from recent research in the field add to Lakoff and Nun˜ez’s work by adding ele-
ments of both formal and visuo-spatial reasoning that is not fully explained by metaphorical
reasoning alone. Schematizing mathematical cognitive abilities effectively sidesteps concerns
such as Dirk Schlimm’s (2013) whereby metaphorical reasoning only accounts for the so-
called front end of mathematics instead of the messy back end work. However, and before
getting into the weeds immediately, let’s start by investigating where mathematics comes
from in the head.
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Mathematics in Non-Human Animals
To begin I defend the claim that mathematics and mathematical ability in humans
stems from a deep evolutionary line beginning in non-human animals. From these early
beginnings we can trace some of the underlying cognitive sources that give rise to the more
complicated forms of mathematical reasoning regularly practiced by mathematicians. In
what follows I begin with a short review of the literature that concludes that non-human
animals have the mental resources for both numerical representation and arithmetical op-
eration. With this as a foundation I present the results of a 2007 study comparing the
mathematical abilities of rhesus monkeys to college students. This result supports the claim
to be defended as well as a secondary claim that mathematics is not something only available
to human reasoners.
Historically the claim that both human and non-numan animals exhibit non-verbal nu-
merical sums and values using similar cognitive mechanisms has been established in such
studies as Dehaene (1992, 1997), Brannon (2005), Hauser (2004), Pica et. al (1997), and
Gallistel (1990, 1992). In a similar vein Cordes et al. (2001), Jordan (2006), Meck et al.
(1983), Platt (1971), Whalen et al. (1999), Barth et al. (2006), Brannon (1998, 2005, 2006a,
2006b), Emmerton et al. (1997), and Moyer (1967) that both groups can estimate numerical
values of arrays as well as determine inequalities of disparate values. These studies show
that there is a strong case for an evolutionary system of numerical representation. The usual
results show that there is a “mental-analog” system, i.e. representations of numbers are
proportional to the numerosities of, say, beers, represented.
The notion of analog representation is one familiar to anyone interested in data manage-
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ment or simple bookkeeping. The idea behind this kind of representation is that animals
create direct analogies between relevant features of a system to be modeled (number of beers)
and the physical system itself (the actual beers). An immediate consequence of this kind of
analog bookkeeping is that if an analog representation is adequately chosen, then arithmetic
operations on the mental analogs correspond to operations on the physical systems. For
example, suppose that I consume six beers out of a twelve pack. Assuming that I have a
one-to-one correspondence between beer bottles and natural numbers, then it is of no conse-
quence to know that I have six beers remaining. My arithmetic ability to subtract six from
twelve corresponds to the physical conditions of drinking the six beers from the pack. That
is, my mental-analog of the system corresponds accurately.
My illustration of analog representation goes beyond what the studies above purport
about the abilities of non-human animals. Having a cognitive system of numerical represen-
tation does not immediately imply that non humans have the requisite cognitive capacity
to complete algebraic operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication, or division.
Rather, all of the work iterated above allows for the conclusion that (at most) non-human
animals have the ability to recognize ordinals and potentially low-level addition. Addition is
an ability to combine two or more representations to conclude a third. However, subtraction
involves the ability to understand a kind of negated representation, and multiplication a
kind of iterated additive operation. While ubiquitous in human language and reasoning pro-
cesses it is unclear whether these “higher” representational states are available to non-human
animals.
There is some scientific evidence that non-humans have some non-verbal arithemetic
ability. Studies from Flombaum et al. (2005), Hauser et al. (1996), Santos et al. (2005),
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Beran (2004, 2006, 2007), Olthaf (2000), and Boyson et al. (1989), give us reason to think
that rhesus monkeys, ravens, elephants, chimpanzees, and some other animals with similar
cognitive development have the ability to expect some to grow larger or smaller (within
a relatively accurate range) when adding or subtracting from elements already available to
them. While compelling early evidence that non-humans are capable of non-verbal arithmetic
it has not been until Cantlon and Brannon’s (2007) study directly comparing the non-verbal
abilities of rhesus monkeys to the same abilities in college students that we have conclusive
evidence that monkeys can perform nonverbal arithmetic.
The goal of the Cantlon and Brannon study was to directly compare results of nonverbal
arithmetic using identical tasks and stimuli. The setup of this study had two rhesus monkeys
and fourteen college students be presented with two sets of dots on touch screens that were
separated by delays. After the dots were presented, both subjects were required to choose
between two arrays. The first array had dots equal to the sum of the two previous sets of
dots, and the second acted as a distractor containing a different sum of dots. The results
were that the monkeys performed comparably to the college students! More specifically,
across 40 different addition problems, which took the form of “1 + 7”, “2 + 6”, or “3 + 5”
with possible answers being 6, 8, or 12 (for example), humans had an accuracy average of
94% whereas the rhesus monkeys yielded an accuracy average of 76%. An interesting result
from these tests, however, is that the average response time for answering the questions
was 940ms for humans and 1,099ms for the monkeys, which is not a significant difference!
Similarly, for both humans and rhesus monkeys, accuracy decreased at a consistent rate as
the numerical sum increased.
The results from this study provide compelling evidence that nonhuman animals, namely
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rhesus monkeys, have the cognitive resources to nonverbally add sums together. This, to-
gether with the studies above whose results imply that humans and animals represent nu-
merosities as mental analogs, imply that both humans and nonhumans share cognitive sys-
tems for nonverbal arithmetical abilities. While the Cantlon and Brannon study only tests
the abilities of rhesus monkeys, it is a fair assumption to think that other animals exhibiting
nonverbal numerical understanding (chimpanzees, elephants, ravens, etc.) should also have
the ability to perform nonverbal arithmetic.
While not made explicit in the Cantlon and Brannon study, whichever cognitive struc-
tures in our brains responsible for nonverbal numerical representation and arithmetical abil-
ity appears to be the result of an evolutionary lineage from earlier cognitive structures of
nonhuman animals. It is my hypothesis that as one looks down the line of cognitive develop-
ment from humans to, say, ravens, accuracy averages of arithmetic operations will decrease.
If it is the case that this trend is linear, then we will have even stronger evidence of the
non-uniqueness of human mathematical ability. From this there is good reason to think that
mathematical objects and mathematical ability are not things metaphysically distinct from
cognitive processes, but, instead, fully dependent. Mathematics is in the head!
Now that we have seen some evidence that mathematics and mathematical ability are
both not unique to humans and also abilities that exist in the heads of humans and non-
humans alike, let’s turn to the stage of mathematics between nonverbal ability and full
blown higher order mathematics. In the following section I consider studies that trace the
development from purely intuitive to formal reasoning methods in humans.
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Development of Mathematics in Humans
Above I presented significant evidence to the claim that both humans and nonhumans
have the ability to nonverbally represent numerals using mental-analogs as well as the ability
to perform nonverbal addition tasks. Completing the tasks involved in the various tests
required the use of numerical representations in the mind. Here I bridge the gap between
an underlying nonverbal arithmetic ability in humans and the formal shift (movement to
abstraction) that occurs as we develop our mathematical abilities. I claim that, contrary to
the historical view in the cognitive literature, the development of higher level mathematical
ability depends on both natural language ability and formally irrelevant perceptual and
nonverbal cues.
Cognitive development in humans, generally, has historically been taken to be a kind of
shift from the mostly literal to the primarily abstract. For example, we begin life seeing
some object as a particular shape that contains some kind of liquid, and, as we develop,
we develop the ability to see a glass of beer on the table understanding all sorts of abstract
things about it, i.e. that it tastes good. While not a precise example, researchers such as
Gentner & Toupin (1986), Gentner (1988, 2003), Keil & Batterman (1984), Keil (1989),
Piaget (1952), Rattermann & Gentner (1998), and Vygotsky (1962) all come to the same
conclusion that we rely on perceptual details and context features less, and increasingly rely
on abstract features not necessarily tied to a context as we develop. More specifically, there
is a great tradition in thinking that as we develop our mathematical abilities, we perform a
similar shift to abstraction, c.f. Chi et al. (1981), Chi & VanLehn (2012), De Lima & Tall
(2008), Novick (1988), and Tall (1995, 2008).
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However, there is some evidence in Keil et al. (1998), Bulloch & Opfef (2009), Simons
& Keil (1995), and Varma & Schwartz (2011) that flips this shift so that as we develop we
move from the abstract to perceptual details that are formally irrelevant when reasoning
about mathematics. Further evidence supporting this reversal of the commonly held belief
of cognitive development is found in Braithewaite et al. (2016). In this study the researches
found that effects of symbol spacing (the distances between symbols and how they were
grouped) and the ease of calculation increased with as they tested students from higher and
higher grade levels. The tests showed that as the test subjects were increasingly older, they
would prioritize elements that were grouped together over the correct order of operations in
somewhat complex arithmetical operations.
The Braithewaite study, along with those from Fischer & Shaki (2014), McCrink & Opfer
(2014), Dehaene et. al (1993), Van Galen & Reitsma (2008) Wood et al. (2008), Moyer &
Landauer (1967), and Varma & Schwartz (2011), suggest that as we develop more and more
sophisticated mathematical abilities we rely more and more heavily on visuospatial tools
rather than mere formal elements. For example, in Dehaene et al. (1993), we see that
answers to mathematical sums involving small numbers are more easily given with the left
hand than the right (and vice versa). This suggests that participants in the studies relied on
mental number lines that place smaller numbers to the left and larger numbers to the right.
Then, the participants respond assuming this represented number system instead of relying
purely on formal rules.
One might wonder which underlying mechanisms may be responsible for this shift from
formal to formally irrelevant procedures in mathematical reasoning. Braithewaite (as well as
many other researchers in this area) tend to identify mechanisms such as syntactic parsing
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(evaluation of mathematical expressions is guided by their syntactic structure), perceptual
grouping (evaluation begins with simpler sub expressions), and opportunistic selection (eval-
uation is prioritized to the easier to evaluate sub expressions). These can all be identified
in various areas of the brain. For example, Dehaene’s (1999) locates approximate number
size representations in the inferior parietal cortex, visual representations of numbers in the
ventral area of the temporal/occipital border region, and aural representations of number
words in the left hemisphere of the perisylvian area – all areas associated with natural lan-
guage. Insofar as the Braithewaite study suggests significant use of visuospatial reasoning
even in arithmetic calculations, we may conclude that the link of the brain areas listed with
natural language ability connects the development of natural language with the development
of mathematical reasoning.
That is to say that as we develop natural language abilities, which begins with learning
syntactic rules and manipulations and then broadening to the usage of metaphorical abilities,
the areas responsible for mathematical reasoning take a similar trajectory. However, it is
not clear that mathematical ability is essentially linked to natural language development
(Giaquinto (2001)). Studies involving specific individuals with no natural language ability
whatsoever (!) give evidence in the opposing direction. Even though this may be evidence
to the contrary, it has been suggested that such studies involve savant-type mathematical
abilities that may not be applicable to the general case (Dehaene (1999)). Other research,
specifically from Talmy (1988, 2003), Fillmore (1982, 1985), Rosch (1981, 1999), Johnson
(1987), Lakoff (1987, 1993), Lakoff & Johnson (1980, 2003), Lakoff & Nu´n˜ez (1997), Nu´n˜ez
(2000), Reddy (1979), Sweetser (1990), and Fauconnier & Turner (1998, 2002) all yield
important research in the link between natural languages and the kinds of metaphor used
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in reasoning. Putting aside the outlier cases, then, it is clear that natural language abilities
and mathematical reasoning abilities tend to go hand in hand.
Higher Level Mathematical Ability
In this section I make a shift away from discussing the source of mathematical cognition
to mathematical inference itself. That is, the previous two sections were concerned with,
among other things, the abilities of nonhuman animals and humans to mentally represent
numerosities, calculate simple arithmetical sums and differences, and the location in the
brain of the underlying systems responsible for such abilities. Here I move to the cognition
of mathematics. What is below presented yields a picture of mathematical inferences that
covers the many arenas in which we reason about mathematics – areas such as Euclidean
and projective geometry, topology, analysis, calculus, and logic (to name a few). The idea is
that to give a cognitive account of mathematics tout court, we must have an account of the
“inferential organization” of mathematics.
For the past two decades a trend in the cognitive literature is to treat mathematical
reasoning in much the same way as everyday reasoning. That is, through an understanding
of cognitive mechanisms involved in areas such as child language development, american sign
language, generalizations of polysemy, generalizations of inference patters, and other seem-
ingly disparate sources of evidence (c.f. Gibbs (1994), Sweetster (1990), McNeill (1992),
Nu´n˜ez (2004), Nu´n˜ez & Sweetster (2001), Taub (2001), Johnson (1997), Lakoff & Johnson
(1980, 2003), Lakoff (1993), Lakoff & Turner (1989), Narayanan (1997) and Yu (1998)), there
is plausible reason to think that conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending are essen-
tially involved in contemporary higher level mathematical reasoning ability. For example,
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Marghetis and Nu´n˜ez (2013) studied the functional role of cognition in mathematical prac-
tice. In the study, Marghetis and Nu´n˜ez argue for a strong connection between the figurative
language and physical manifestation of practicing mathematics and the deep mathematical
conceptual systems lying below.
A mechanism studied here was the use of motion and conceptual metaphor and how
this cognitive mechanism reflects the shared mathematical conceptual systems, which, it is
argued, are shaped by shared rich social practices and problem-solving needs. Marghetis
and Nu´n˜ez were thus involved in an investigation of whether conceptual systems generate
inferences that are different than inferences resulting from formal definitions and axiomatic
reasoning. Conceptual Metaphor is the use of cross-domain conceptual mappings, which
allow the mathematician to conceptualize a mathematical notion using various cognitive
and physical domains. Inferences from the source domain are then mapped to the target
domain. In the case of the (2013) study, the researchers tested whether dynamic language
indicated dynamic thought in mathematics, i.e. whether dynamic language was mapped
onto dynamic thought. In other words, physically gesturing when considering upward or
downward sloping lines, continuity, increasing or decreasing functions, and intersections,
serves to determine underlying dynamic thought. The results of the study showed that (i)
all of the participants had a shared gesturing “vocabulary” when mentioning each of the
notions above, (ii) dynamic thought is ubiquitous in rigorous proving, and (iii) dynamic
gesturing was ubiquitous in the same proving activity.
Of course, this study does not show that such use of conceptual metaphor is essentially
tied to theorem proving. For example, we might wonder whether conceptual metaphor
merely accompanies mathematical reasoning, or if it actively shapes our inferences. This
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question was again answered using historical means in the Marghetis and Nu´n˜ez (2013), but
ample evidence comes from the work on cogntive mechanisms listed above. From them we
are able to conclude that conceptual metaphor actively shapes our mathematical inferences.
To get a better handle of what is involved in this process consider the following conceptual
metaphor, namely the Basic Metaphor of Infinity, which has been championed by (Lakoff &
Nu´n˜ez (1999, 2004)). Before I briefly outline the example (which has seen much ink spilled
in the literature to date), let me say that in the following chapter I will pay much more
time to examples that rely on this metaphor (among others). We will see that the cognitive
processes involved in ideal proof methods are the same involved in real proof methods.3
The Basic Metaphor of Infinity, or BMI, begins with an acknowledgment that since an-
cient times two understandings of infinity have been motivated. The first, potential infinity,
starts by counting the natural numbers and then imagining that you proceed counting with-
out stopping. So, potential infinity is the understanding of infinity without end. The second,
actual infinity, asks us to consider the set of all natural numbers, or, in symbolic notation,
N. So, even though we could never ultimately enumerate all of the natural numbers, actual
infinity is the understanding of an infinitely completed object. Of course, given the course
of this note so far, it is easy to see that actual infinity literally does not exist. So, actual
infinity must be a mathematical metaphor. Our use of metaphor allows us to conceptualize
the set of all natural numbers. We can conceptualize a process with an end!
Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez call this conceptualization process the BMI. They claim that the way
we are able to understand actual infinity is by mapping an iterative process with end onto
the domain of processes without end. That is, we map our understanding of finite iteration
3The notions of real and ideal will be made more precise below.
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onto potential infinity. The result is actual infinity. Again, I will say much more about
this particular metaphor in subsequent chapters, but, for now, we need only see that actual
infinity is important in modern mathematics for perhaps half of the results obtained. Given
that this metaphor is used in results like infinite sets, points at infinity, infinite series, infinite
unions, etc., we would be lost in mathematical practice without its availability. In short,
conceptual metaphor actively shapes mathematical inference.
A now famous concern with the conceptual metaphor approach to mathematical cogni-
tion has been laid bare in Dirk Schlimm’s (2013). In it he worries that the cognitive analysis
presented by Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez offer us a glimpse only into the front end of mathematical
reasearch, and fails to adequately account for much of the work in the back end of mathe-
matical practice. By front and back end Schlimm is meaning to make a distinction between
mathematics-as-presented (in textbooks or journals, say) and mathematics-as-developed in
practice. His concern is that when claiming that mathematical inferences are “shaped” by
conceptual metaphor we are only talking about the way in which we communicate math-
ematical results to the uninitiated or to students. We use shared socially motivated ways
of speaking so that we may better get across the meaning of the mathematical expressions
themselves. What is lacking, per Schlimm, is an account of where conceptualizations fit when
discovering new mathematical ideas or objects, in mathematical creativity, or in mathemat-
ical intuition. All of these, of course, are elements of the back end of practice (or where
mathematics is developed).
I attack this criticism fully in chapters 3 and 4. However, a glimpse of an answer to
Schlimm’s charge is that there is no single conceptual metaphor used in the development
of new mathematical ideas. Often times it will be the case that sometimes incompatible
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conceptual schemas will be used in novel creation. Through the use of historical episodes
involving the development of sets, for example, we will see that a deep concern of whether the
mathematical idea comes first or the concept does. It is my contention that a combination
of mathematical cognitive ability combined with a deeply socially set practice will provide
room for a Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez-style approach to answer “where mathematics comes from?”.
Before this solution can be fleshed out, we need first to understand the criterion of objectivity
of mathematics as well as a non-arbitrary distinction between the so-called real and ideal
methods of mathematical practice.
2.2.2 Mathematics is Objective
In the previous chapter I claimed that a social constructivist metaphysics of mathe-
matics is imbued with all of the characteristics we seek from such an account. A central
characteristic is that of objectivity. The worry for a constructivist account is that if the
location of mathematics and mathematical objects is merely in the heads of the community
of mathematicians, then in what sense can there be real objectivity for the claims made in
mathematics! In this section I defend an understanding of objectivity that (i) aligns with our
common sense understanding of objectivity, (ii) is informed by all of the work in cognitive
science about mathematical cognition, and (iii) satisfies the social constructivist objectivity
constraint. To do so I begin with the development of a version of objectivity that com-
plies with a common understanding. I then show using two case studies from the history of
mathematics that such a conception is not adequate before proposing a new definition that
satisfies my claim above, namely one that is informed by cognitive science and conforms to
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both a constructivist and common sense view.
To begin let’s consider the features indicative of a common notion of objectivity. When
we ascribe objectivity to mathematics we usually mean something that synthesizes a few
related phenomena. A first plausible candidate is that mathematics in totem is something
whose results are not privy to whims or attitudes of particular attitudes. This is to say
that regardless of one’s own proclivities, once some theorem (or otherwise) is proven, that
the result is a fact is not subject to whether one believes the truth of the theorem or not.
The result stands on its own as being true. This understanding of objectivity is persistent
in both mathematical literature and in general attitudes about mathematics. An example
that illustrates the objectivity of mathematics in the sense can be seen in the vast number
of proofs of the Pythagorean Theorem. Elisha Scott (1968) located 367 unique proofs up to
the time of publication that proved this fundamental results of Euclidean Geometry. These
proofs range from purely symbolic to diagrammatic and can be found in almost every major
branch of mathematics. Given this wealth of proof, this notion of objectivity stands – once
proven true, the theorem is true regardless the person or community encountering it. This
leads to the first definition of objectivity:
O: Objectivity (of mathematics) is the resistance of mathematical truth to indi-
vidual biases.
This definition does a lot toward a general understanding of objectivity. However, O lacks
a key feature in what we usually mean by objectivity. As is evident in the example of the
Pythagorean Theorem, that the theorem is immune to individual misses a key insight that
the theorem – once proven true – will remain true. That is, our understanding of objectivity
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should not be one in which the Pythagorean Theorem is true for a particular finite period
of time, but, rather, that once true the theorem is always true. Always true is a feature
of objectivity that implies that our mathematical results are in some sense eternally (or
necessarily) true. There is no relevant epoch during which mathematical truths are true and
others when they are not. This leads to a strengthening of our first definition, namely:
O+: Objectivity (of mathematics) is the resistance of necessary mathematical
truth to individual biases.
It is this formulation that best describes an understanding of objectivity as it is used in the
case of mathematics. Of course, I do not mean to suggest this definition covers all cases where
we might want to talk about the objective truth of a claim, but, then again, I am only talking
about mathematical claims. So, there are a few things to observe about this definition, which
seems to capture our normal understanding of objectivity. The first is that a “resistance to
individual biases” suggests that these mathematical truths are somehow separate from any
one reasoner. That means that our metaphysics must account for mathematical objects
and mathematical truths as existing uniquely from any given mathematical brain. Secondly,
if mathematical truths are necessary, then they must exist in every possible world where
mathematics is a possibility. Together these observations make a case for espousing some
kind of neo-platonism about mathematics. Given that I have rejected this move previously,
to neat massage O+ into a constructivist framework seems both untenable and misguided.
Instead, I propose a new definition of objectivity. To do so, however, I first will offer
an argument that shows the problematic nature of O+. The argument is a kind of reduc-
tion using two case studies. Both cases are pulled from the history of mathematics, namely
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Cauchy’s “Fallacious” theorem, and Cantor’s development of the definition of set. If we
assume O+ is the best definition, then both of the case studies below show that mathematics
is not objective.
Case 1: Cauchy’s Theorem
Cauchy, who is credited with rigorously developing analysis and the foundations of mod-
ern calculus, wrote the seminal Cours d’analyse in 1821. In it he proved many of theorems
that are considered foundational for notions such as continuity and limits. Among these,
however, he included a theorem about limits that a famous cohort, Abel, complained “admits
exceptions”. The theorem is as follows:
Thm – The limit function of a convergent sequence of continuous functions is
itself continuous.
This theorem says that “if all the terms of a converging sequence are continuous, then the
limit of this sequence (also a function) should be continuous as well.” While this is true in
almost every instance, there are counterexamples (it was even known in Cauchy’s time that







sin(3x) + · · ·
In Abel’s example each term and the partial sums are continuous, and as the sequence
approaches infinity the sequence converges to a function. In other words, Abel’s example
satisfies (Thm). However, it turns out that Abel’s equation is discontinuous at any odd
multiple of pi. That is, it seems as though Cauchy was wrong.
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While you may wonder why this case study has been chosen, given that Cauchy seems
to have been wrong, is Cauchy’s own vigorous defense of (Thm). Cauchy defended the truth
of this theorem from the date of publication in 1821 up through 1853 at a lecture at the
French Academy of Sciences. Lakatos (1978) has proposed that Cauchy’s support of this
so-called “fallacious” theorem can be contributed to an idiosyncratic inferential structure
not consistent with modern calculus. More specifically, Cauchy’s understanding of variable,
function, and continuity were all dynamic as opposed to static. This means that Cauchy’s
understanding of continuum was a dynamic one consisting of an infinite number of moving
points. Cauchy himself used this idiosyncratic notion to attempt to undermine Abel’s own
Fourier series. While I will leave the more technical details of Cauchy’s rebuttal to the side
for now (I’ll come back to this and the next case study in the next chapter), the point to
notice is that the inferential schema used by Cauchy to prove (Thm) involved an idiosyn-
cratic conceptual metaphor about the continuum. If we understand continuum using the
same schema as Cauchy, then (Thm) is not fallacious – indeed it is true.
Case 2: Cantor’s “Sets”
Cantor, the first to develop set theory is the subject of our second case study. We will
see shortly why this study was chosen, but first let me reiterate his many definitions of “set”
in full. The first is the earliest from his (1882):
I call a manifold (a totality, a set) of elements which belong to some conceptual
sphere well-defined, if on the basis of its definition and as a consequence of the
logical principle of excluded middle it must be seen as internally determined both
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whether some object belonging to the same conceptual sphere belongs to the
imagined manifold as an object or not, as well as whether two objects belonging
to the set are equal to one another or not, despite formal differences in the way
they are given.
It is important to notice how much the use of the imagination and of “conceptual sphere”
comes into play in this, a mathematical definition, of the notion of set. This is evident in
Cantor’s next definition in his (1883):
By a “manifold” or “set” I understand in general any many which can be thought
of as one, that is, every totality of definite elements which can be united to a
whole through a law.
Following this definition, which he used for the following 12 years, lead to the possibilities
of counterexamples. With this in mind he revisited his definition to form the following in
(1895) and (1899):
By a “set” we understand every collection to a wholeM of definite, well-differentiated
objects m of our intuition or our thought. (We call these objects the “elements”
of M .)
When ... the totality of elements of a multiplicity can be thought without contra-
diction as“being together”, so that their collection into “one thing” is possible, I
call it a consistent multiplicity or a set.
Now that we have the full range of Cantor’s own definitions for “set”, immediately we
see that that the use of imagination and conceptual schema are prevalent throughout his
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thinking on the subject. Interestingly, after his (1899), the definition of “set” continued
to diverge to the point that many mathematicians were using the notion of a set in their
own idiosyncratic ways. Most notable for these disparate notions of sets are the many set-
theoretic paradoxes that arise depending on one’s understanding of “set”. To use Gregory
Moore’s (1982), there appears “a potpourri of set-theoretic principles which some accepted
and others denied in the early period of set theory, and there is always someone, somewhere
– with a big nose, who knows – and they’ll trip you up and laugh when you fall.”
Returning now to the main thread, if our understanding of objectivity is as stated in O+,
then mathematics is not objective. If we think that mathematical truth should not be effected
by the personal biases of any one mathematician, then the first case study involving Cauchy’s
extended defense of his “fallacious” theorem should be enough to show that mathematics
does move by the whims of particular agents. You may, however, want to dismiss the Cauchy
example of a case where a mathematician happened to be wrong, and that the objectivity
of the mathematical claims held through. Such a conclusion may be justified if such an
occurrence only happened a few times in the history of mathematics. However, the second
case study of Cantor’s set definitions proves such a move problematic. In the Cantor case, not
only do we see one reasoner changing the definition of a fundamental mathematical objects
using highly idiosyncratic means (imagination), but also we should consider that even today
there is no one agreed upon definition of set. Given that set theory is the foundation for
practically all of mathematics, it follows that underlying every objective (in the O+ sense)
mathematical claim is a highly idiosyncratic notion of set. With this, allowing our definition
to follow O+ means that none of our mathematics is objective.
Similarly, if we think that our mathematical truths are necessary, then mathematics is
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again not objective. This is implied from the second case study. Again, given that there
is no agreed upon notion of set, and there seems no likely plausible candidate, how can we
have necessary mathematical truths dependent on an underlying shaky foundation. Quite
simply, we cannot. So, it follows that if O+ is our definition of objective, then mathematics
is not objective. Clearly we want our mathematics to be objective. Given all of the cognitive
scientific research above, and an understanding that the metaphysics underlying is of a social
constructivist nature I propose the following new definition of objectivity:
O!: Objectivity (of mathematics) is the shared communal lineage and conceptual
metaphors producing mathematical truths.
This new definition satisfies our underlying social constructivist metaphysics as well as
the deep cognitive basis of our shared mathematical reasoning ability. Under this defini-
tion we can easily account for the changes in Cantor’s definitions of “set” (as well as the
many subsequent) as well as for Cauchy’s sustained defense of (Thm). Furthermore, O!
implies something shared by common understandings of objectivity, namely that the truths
of mathematics will be truths for as long as there are human mathematical reasoners.
2.3 The Division Problem
In this final section I present the Division Problem, which can be seen as motivating
everything that has come earlier as well as everything to come. Crudely stated, the Division
Problem is a puzzle as to how to non-arbitrarily construct a meaningful division between
proof methodologies for which we have clear understanding and those for which we lack
understanding. Put another way, the problem is find a clear cut divide between finitary and
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infinitary mathematical reasoning. In what follows I develop the problem using historical
accounts, namely the formalist shift in the 19th and early 20th centuries, before proposing
a place where such a division may reside. It will be clear, moving forward, that even my
division will include elements that seem to straddle either side of the dividing line. Such a
vague boundary will turn out not to be problematic for my overall account, but, instead, a
characteristic feature. However, before I can offer my solution, let’s first become clear on
the problem.
Beginning with the development of Euclidean geometry and extending all the way through
to the early parts of the 19th centuries, mathematicians shared the common understanding
that Euclidean geometry represented the exemplar of clear and evident mathematical rea-
soning. However, with the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry (in arguably 1802, but
first published in 1832), which is usually attributed to Gauss, Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and
Riemann, a revolutionary shift in what was considered rigorous mathematical inference oc-
curred. Specifically, this shift rocked confidence in the reliability of geometrical intuition for
understanding “continuum” in analysis. With this shaky feeling of geometrical intuition in
place, it wasn’t until later in the same century when Cantor, Weierstrass, and Dedekind made
inroads into fully understanding the idea of the continuum. The result these mathematicians
arrived at was to identify the continuum with actual infinity.
This episode is important because due to various criticisms lobbed by Kronecker and his
followers, Cantor gave an early formulation of the underlying mathematical attitudes that
ultimately inspire the Division Problem – not to mention he also predicts Hilbert’s Formalist
Program! To use Cantor’s (1883) words directly:
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The actual material of analysis is composed, in this opinion, exclusively of finite
integers and all truths in arithmetic and analysis already discovered or still to be
discovered must be looked upon as relationships among the finite integers; the
infinitesimal analysis and the theory of functions are considered legitimate only
in so far as their theorems are demonsrtable through laws holding for the finite
integers.
The idea alluded to in this passage is that when proving a theorem of analysis we must replace
all uses of infinitary terms and expression with finite versions. Moreover, such a method, re
Cantor, is the only way to legitimately prove theorems in analysis. This is because of the
worries that Cantor and his contemporaries felt in regard to understanding anything that
occurs in the infinite. So, if one is able to prove a theorem of analysis using finite means,
then they have proven the theorem.
Cantor was both suspicious and uncertain about the paradoxes that plagued his under-
standing of the transfinite. Even though he himself was not overly concerned with such
paradox, Cantor’s own solutions in analysis were not understood by the general mathemati-
cal community.4 Because of this confusion, a new foundation for analysis was sought. It was
Hilbert that took the reins of the transfinite. Hilbert celebrated analysis as “a symphony
of the infinite”, and, while he did not personally believe that transfinite numbers or sets
existed, he considered them a great tool for mathematical discovery. To this effect Hilbert
(1925) says that these tools are “the most admirable flower of the mathematical intellect
and in general one of the highest achievements of purely rational human activity.” Accord-
ingly, Hilbert sought to show that the set theoretic paradoxes underlying analysis stem from
4Giaquinto (1983).
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mistaken logical inference schema.
... Contentual logical inference has deceived us only when we accepted arbitrary
abstract notions, in particular those under which infinitely many objects are
subsumed ... we obviously did not respect necessary conditions for the use of
contentual logical inference (Hilbert (1925)).
For Hilbert, mathematics is only reliable when we use mechanical reasoning about sur-
veyable (finite) concrete mathematical objects. It is here that Hilbert makes his first philo-
sophically rich conception of the elements involved in the Division Problem. Mathematical
sentences become divided into two seemingly distinct classes. The first, those sentences
with content or meaning, are those which are mechanically decidable (provable) using only
finitely-many inference steps. To be included in this class are universal schema whose par-
ticular instances are all finitely decidable. The second class are those sentences without
meaning, i.e. those mathematical sentences that cannot be decided using finitely-many in-
ferences. Using Hilbert’s own (1925) example, we can see that the equation 1 + n = n + 1
with n ∈ N is an example of a meaningful, concrete mathematical sentence.
It should be clear that for any natural number one chooses, we can, in principle, determine
the truth value of the equation. However, the negation of the equation, namely 1+n 6= n+1
with n ∈ N is an example of a sentence that falls into the latter class of mathematical
sentences since we cannot check all possible natural numbers. In Giaquinto (1983) we get a
nice discussion about the rejection of the excluded middle that was defended by Hilbert. A
concern one may have is that without the ability to use logical inference in infinite domains
we may be inclined to abandon analysis still. Hilbert’s solution is that we should continue
55
to use sentences without finitary content as ideal elements in a formal system. With this
division, “Hilbert’s Program” had its motivation.
With this, we can develop an initial understanding of the Division Problem. In the divide
(represented in the table below) we can place on one side all real (finite) elements, and on
the other the ideal (infinite) elements.
Ideal Proof Non-Contentual Sentences; Infinite Inferences; Meaningless
Symbol Strings
Real Proof Content-rich Sentences; Finite Inferences; Finite Mechan-
ically (logically) Decidable; Finitely Decidable Universal
Schema
Table 1
While the Hilbert division is an excellent start, it will not suffice for a strong reading of
the Division Problem. This follows from the idea that, given the above discussion of the
BMI (basic metaphor of infinity), there exist methodologies that seem to span both real
and ideal proof. Before we muddy the waters, let’s add more to either side of the distinc-
tion. From Hilbert’s formulation we understand that only those inference patterns that
rely on finitistic reasoning can be considered real proof. Even though Hilbert himself was
suspicious of geometric intuition (as this suspicion forms the motivation for all work in the pe-
riod), there are many non-mechanical inference schemes that are commonly used by modern
mathematicians. These include (but are not limited to) geometric intuition, non-geometric
intuition, diagrammatic reasoning, deductive “gaps”, interpreted finite terms and formulae,
and “clearly evident” foundational axioms. On the ideal side, again, many techniques are
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used in the course of proof. These include mathematical induction, transfinite induction,
uncomputable computer induction, and infinitary logics, and higher order set theory.
Included in the division should also be the ubiquitous use of metaphor in both finitary
and infinitary reasoning. It is here that the Division Problem begins to emerge. For example,
how are we to make a non-arbitrary divide between the use of infinitary metaphors like BMI,
and others that are finite? Similarly, how are we to classify weak forms of induction that only
guarantee the truth of a proposition up to some large n ∈ N given that we are finite beings,
and that even with the use of the computers, such an n might not be finitely surveyable?
In any case, these additions allow for the development of a more fully characterized division
between real and ideal proof.
Ideal Proof Non-Contentual Sentences; Infinite Inferences; Meaning-
less Symbol Strings; Mathematics, Transfinite, and Uncom-
putable Induction; Infinitary Logic, Higher Order Set Theory;
Infinitary Metaphor
Real Proof Content-rich Sentences; Finite Inferences; Finite Mechan-
ically (logically) Decidable; Finitely Decidable Universal
Schema; Geometric Intuition; Non-geometric Intuition (Ev-
eryday Intuition); Diagrammatic Reasoning; Deductive Gaps;
Interpreted Finite Terms/Formulae; Evident Foundational
Axioms; Finite Metaphor
Table 2
We can now formulate a more robust statement of the Division Problem. What is below
labeled DP I use Hilbert’s language with the understanding that I intend to extend his
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original conception so as to include the sets of finite and infinite reasoning processes that
are indicative of modern mathematical practice.
DP – How do we non-arbitrarily construct a distinction between Real and Ideal
proof methodologies?
Now that we have a robust form of DP, let me briefly propose an answer to the problem. I will
go into great detail about what is to follow in the fifth chapter of this note. In anticipations
of the upcoming argument for an epistemic bridge between the two classes of proof, I claim
that both real and ideal methods are cognitively interrelated. In the following two chapters I
spill much ink on the characteristic traits of both proof methodologies in an attempt to suss
out the underlying cognitive processes responsible for the rigorous nature of the inferences
arrived at using such methods. This work, combined with the empirical evidence supporting
a link between the two, I will argue that both real and ideal methods rely on the same
cognitive processes. From this it follows that there is no distinction between either method
class.
2.4 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. Above we encountered overwhelming evidence that (i) both humans
and non-humans share a deep evolutionary lineage in non-verbal mathematical ability, (ii) as
humans develop mathematical ability there is a definite shift from formal reasoning to largely
perceptual, formally irrelevant reasoning process, and (iii) much of the cognitive foundations
of higher level mathematics involves the use of complex metaphor. With this we were able to
develop a definition of “objectivity” that both satisfies the social constructivist metaphysics
58
founding all of mathematics as well as consistently reflects what the best empirical research
reports. At last, we saw a development of the Division Problem, which informs the work to
come. Furthermore, I have offered a brief solution that entails an epistemic bridge between
both real and ideal proof methodologies.
Moving forward, I turn now to characterizing ideal proof methods using case studies from
both historical and contemporary episodes in the history of philosophy. Following this, I give
similar time to real methods. These paired chapters will ultimately offer firm foundation for




“[Cantor’s theory of the transfinite is] the most admirable flower of the mathe-




At the end of the previous chapter I developed a distinction between real and ideal
elements, which was heavily influenced by the many ways in which the distinction (or dis-
tinctions that exhibit the same spirit) has been historically made. This distinction is the
basis for the Division Problem that asks whether a non-arbitrary distinction can be made
between the two major classes of mathematical proof. On the real side we place methods
that include (though not limited to) content-rich sentences, finite inferences, finitely me-
chanically decidable, finitely decidable universal schema, geometric intuition, non-geometric
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intuition, diagrammatic reasoning, deductive gaps, interpreted finite terms/formulae, evi-
dent foundational axioms, and metaphors of the finite. On the ideal side we have placed
non-contentual sentences, infinitary inferences, meaningless symbol strings, mathematical
induction, infinitary logics, higher order set theory, and metaphors of the infinite.
The difficulty comes in the attempt to distinguish between content-rich and contentless
modes of reasoning. For example, if I am reasoning about a set of natural numbers that con-
tains extremely many natural numbers, then at what point does understanding the contents
of this set stop being something that is countable in a finite amount of time, and begins to
be transfinite? If the answer is simply that we must stipulate such a condition on the set,
then we are again arbitrarily confining ourselves to dealing with one side of the division or
the other. Furthermore, even if we were to stipulate that the set contains, say, an infinite
number of elements in N, surely there is quite a bit of content in that subset of our example
set that is finite. So, we must wonder where the contentless nature of the set begins and the
content-rich subset begins. Such a concern is then applicable to any finite/infinite pair of
mated concepts within the division.
Before we are able to find a solution to the division problem, we must first become clear
about the constituent parts of the distinction between real and ideal elements. As has already
been intimated, the overall goal is to argue that there exists an epistemic between real and
ideal elements. Such an epistemic bridge resolutely answers the division problem with the
solution that there is no non-arbitrary division between either class of proof methodology.
However, this is not a negative result. Instead, the epistemic bridge supports the conclusion
that both real and ideal methods are cognitively interrelated. This is to say that we can
move back and forth between using both methodologies without loss of generality nor loss
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of understanding. Even though we are unable to give a principled distinction between either
side of the division, we will be in the position to show that such a division is unnecessary.
Now that we have our metaphysical foundation as well as strong empirical reasons to
think that mathematics is in the head (and nowhere else), we can finally begin down the
road to arguing for an epistemic bridge principle. This chapter investigates the class of ideal
proof. The next investigates real proof. As these two chapters can be seen as a related pair,
I here argue for an instrumentalist perspective on ideal methodologies (i.e. what motivation
is there for the development of this class of reasoning) as well as for a cognitive conception
that underlies all infinitistic reasoning. I will do so similarly in the following chapter on real
proof.
In what follows I begin in §2 by developing three examples that are commonly associated
as ideal proofs. These three – logical proof, inductive proof, and computer proof – all seem
to share similar characteristics that place them within the manifold of the ideal category.
The shared characteristics will be the topic of §3 where I argue that such characteristics
are indicative of all ideal proof. Following this in §4 I present results from recent cognitive
scientific literature that accounts for each of these characteristics under a single flag of
metaphorical reasoning.
3.2 Case Studies
As just announced, in this section I develop three case studies of suspected ideal proofs.
However, before we investigate logical proof, inductive proof, and computer proof, respec-
tively, more needs to be said about the motivation behind accepting the ambiguous notion
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of ideal proof as a rigorous mathematical method. First, I have been using the notion of
mathematical proof without careful consideration. One might think pragmatically, for exam-
ple, that mathematical proof is simply whatever it is that mathematicians perform in their
daily practice. While not a terrible understanding of the notion, it will not suffice if we are
interested in carefully connecting both ideal and real proof since “whatever mathematicians
perform” could be defined so narrowly as to exclude much of the interesting work taken on
by mathematicians. Or, worse still, such an understanding could be broadened to encompass
reasoning performed by mathematicians when deciding which kind of coffee to get at their
preferred coffee shop (or other similarly irrelevant choices made throughout the day).
So, by mathematical proof 1 I mean “a sequence of thoughts convincing to a sound mind”
(following Go¨del (1953)). We can think of pro(ving)of as that activity in which a reasoner
justifies a conclusion through a series of inferences. This activity consists in both carrying
out inferences from one statement to the next as well as discovering the connection between
two statements. A result of this activity, then, is an artifact2 – the aim of which is to
convince others that the conclusion does indeed follow from the premises and intermediate
inferences. The artifact is convincing when the inferences from each step to the next follow
immediately. Immediacy is, then, the hallmark of mathematical proof as differentiated from
other kinds of daily or even academic reasoning.
My understanding of immediacy is inspired by the account of the epistemology of in-
ference from Descartes’ Regulae. Descartes argues that even though deductions give us
1I focus here on the general category of mathematical proof instead of the fine grained category of logical
deductive proof. Even though I am concerned with instrumental proofs, which are partially characterized
by what looks like purely logically deductive methods, I intend to extend what “counts” as mathematical
proof beyond logical deduction in this chapter and the following.
2The entries in journals, textbooks and the like are not agreeable to Kristin.
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knowledge, in order to have greater certainty in our knowledge we must form an intuition of
each of the inferences. The certainty we get when we form these intuitions leaves no room
for error or doubt in our reasoning. The method for developing certainty in knowledge from
deductions to intuition follows from his Rule 11.3
“If, after intuiting a number of simple propositions, we deduce something else
from them, it is useful to run through them in a continuous and completely
uninterrupted train of thought, to reflect on their relations to one another, and
to form a distinct and, as far as possible, simultaneous conception of several of
them. For in this way our knowledge becomes much more certain, and our mental
capacity is enormously increased.” [CSM1, p.37]
In the passage we see that we arrive at intuition only after moving completely through
deductions, reflecting on the relations of each of the inferences and forming simultaneous
conceptions of them. Given that ideal proofs or deductions involve more inference steps
than one may survey in a reasonable amount of time, I am not here concerned about the
requirement of working completely through a deduction. Instead, my notion of immediacy
draws on an analysis of “simultaneous conception” of inferences.4 It follows from the method
for forming intuitions from deductions that we must move through an inference many times
until we are certain that no error could be lurking in the transition. Then, when we are
presented with two statements between which there is such a relation, we at once conceive
3This rule relies on conclusions drawn from Rules 3, 7, 9, and 10, but for brevity’s sake I here only present
the culmination of these previous rules
4Descartes argues that we should form intuitions of entire chains of reasoning so that we may not rely
on memory when deducing some conclusion. So, “simultaneous conception” may be read as having all the
inferences together in the mind at once. Given that ideal deductions take the form of very long chains of
inferences, I leave this reading of “simultaneous” aside. Instead, I here focus on the idea that an inference –
together with the conjoined statements – can occur at the same time.
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that the second statement follows from the first.
For example, consider an application of the rule “conjunction introduction”. In the case
of the predicate logic, when we are presented first with P , then Q, and finally the inference to
P & Q, it is clear that the conclusion follows from the previous statements. The conclusion
follows because we have convinced ourselves that such an inference leaves no room for error
by running through nearly identical inferences a great many times during our philosophical
development. So, when presented with the first two premises then the conclusion we are able
to immediately understand that the inference is sound. This analysis of immediacy will be
central to what is below.
We want our mathematical proofs to be convincing. Our working conception borrowing
Descartes’ notion of immediacy works well for understanding the convincing nature of some
mathematical proofs. The failure of immediacy of intuition is uncovered when we require
more from proof. We might think that a convincing proof is in part one that is rigorous.5
The notion of rigor has changed throughout the history of mathematics, especially so during
the development of axiomatic systems of proof in the 19th century. Mathematicians of the
time were losing confidence in geometrical intuition, which founded conceptions of geometric
rigor since the emergence of Euclid’s Elements. The problem was that arguments drawn
from geometrically intuitive (from now on I use intuition to mean geometrical intuition)
sources were found to be faulty or outright false. So, the Cartesian reliance on intuition
seems to fall apart in areas where geometrical intuition yields false results.
The 18th century mathematician Johann Lambert realized that “lapses in rigor were
5There are more aspects to convincing proof than just the rigor of the resulting proof. There also include
both certainty and various psychological factors (among others) that will be addressed in the fourth chapter.
For now I just want to focus on the rigor component of convincing proof.
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principally due to the tacit smuggling of undeclared ... elements of our intuitive grasp of
geometrical figures into the inferences of geometric proofs” (Detlefsen (2005)). The solution
was obvious to him: “[geometric] proof should proceed solely on the basis of ... the syntactic
character of the expressions occurring in it, and in abstraction from its subject matter” (ibid).
Lambert was an early influence on mathematicians working in the 19th century concerned
with mathematical rigor (ibid).
These writers, e.g. Pasch, Frege, or Peacocke, moved away from intuition and toward
syntactic proof methods so as to formulate gap-free proofs. For example, Pasch’s axiomatiza-
tion of projective geometry allows a deduction from axioms to conclusions without geometric
intuition. The same goes for Frege’s Begriffsschrift, in which he developed a second order
logic and using which he attempted to prove various mathematical propositions. The idea,
beginning around the time of Lambert and continuing through to contemporary times, is
that when we can give an explicit proof that is free of intuitive gaps (or any other gap for that
matter), the resulting proof will be rigorous. These intuition-free proofs are both convincing
and allow us to gain mathematical knowledge.
These mathematicians above heavily influenced the works of Hilbert, Gentzen, and Car-
nap6 – all of whom would hold up ideal methods (though each had differing ideas about this
notion) as a vanguard of mathematical rigor. This can be seen in the following:
“[I]t is part of the essence of pure deduction that every proof can be ‘atomized’,
i.e., resolved into steps of certain kinds, or that it consists of a single such step.”
(Pasch, 1917)
6(and many many more, of course!)
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“[Ideal proofs] are carried out according to certain definite rules, in which the
technique of our thinking is expressed”, and these “... are rules according to
which our thinking actually proceeds.” (Hilbert 1967)
“[Ideal proofs maintain] a close affinity to actual reasoning”, and they “[exhibit]
as accurately as possible the actual logical reasoning involved in mathematical
proofs.” (Gentzen 1969)
The passages indicate that mathematicians from the late 19th and early 20th centuries held
ideal methods as a means for making content-rich proofs accord to clearly defined rules.
Pasch, for example, held that once we formalize our empirical understanding of geometric
concepts we are able to develop rigorous proofs. Hilbert saw ideal mathematics as an efficient
way of increasing real mathematics. I should be clear here that none of them thought that
the only method of mathematics is this idealist conception. Again, it is not even clear
that they shared similar understandings of ideal. Instead, each writer, given that they
were all practicing mathematicians, understood that the actual practice of mathematics
took differing forms. Most day to day mathematics involves the use of real expressions
and methods informing the myriad mathematical operations and objects. So, the uses of
ideal by these writers is meant to be distinct from the real methods also used by working
mathematician.
However, it should be relevantly clear that ideal methods are those methods by which we
are guaranteed rigorous and convincing mathematical proof. Ideal methods, then, represent
a major area of mathematical research whose results seem to be the closest to the best
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mathematical reasoning possible. By “best” here I mean simply mathematical reasoning
that (if anything is universally true) yields results that are indisputable – those that are
fully beyond reproach from anyone working in the field. Given that such high value is placed
on ideal methods of proof, we should be careful about what it is that (i) ideal methods
produce, and (ii) how we can possibly have an understanding of infinitistic results from such
methods. What follows in §2.1 – §2.3 are case studies of proof methodologies that exemplify
the letter and spirit of ideal proof. Following the development of each of the three – logical
proof, inductive proof, and computer proof – we will see how they are all interrelated as well
as how we can possibly understand the results of each.
3.2.1 Logical Proof
Our first case study is that of logical proof. I here reproduce a proof from propositional
logic of one of the DeMorgan’s Laws, namely ¬(P ∨Q) ≡ (¬P ∧ ¬Q). While I have chosen
a simplified version of the full First Order Logical language, given that both propositional
logic and First Order are complete theories, what is said of the former holds for the latter.
While not a method of proof that involves infinitistic reasoning, logical proof has many
characteristics indicative of ideal proof, namely the use of axioms and logically valid rules
for making inferences that are guaranteed to be rigorous. So, along with a standard logical
proof, I produce a proof for finding the greatest common divisor of two algebraic statements,
which requires the same kind of logical reasoning. Insofar as the logical reasoning applies
to this particular case, we will see that it can be generalized to all such cases of algebraic
formulae. In this way logical proof, as an ideal methodology, will work for all possible
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instances. Now, consider the following (ideal) proof of ¬(P ∨Q) ≡ (¬P ∧ ¬Q):
1 · · ·
2 ¬(P ∨Q) Assm.
3 ¬(¬P ∧ ¬Q) Assm.
4 P Assm.




9 P ∨Q ∨I, 8
10 ⊥
11 ¬Q ⊥E
12 ¬P ∧ ¬Q ∧I, 7, 11
13 ⊥
14 ¬P ∧ ¬Q ⊥E
15 ¬(P ∨Q)→ (¬P ∧ ¬Q) ⇒I, 2–14
16 ¬P ∧ ¬Q Assm.
17 P ∨Q Assm.
18 ¬Q ∧I, 16
19 P DS, 17, 18
20 ¬P ∧E, 16
21 ⊥
22 ¬(P ∨Q) ⊥E
23 (¬P ∧ ¬Q)→ ¬(P ∨Q) ⇒I, 16–22
24 (¬(P ∨Q)→ (¬P ∧ ¬Q)) ∧ ((¬P ∧ ¬Q)→ ¬(P ∨Q)) ∧I, 15, 23




First we need to show that the claim “it is not the case that either P or Q is true” implies
the claim that “it is not the case that P is true and it is not the case that Q is true”. If we
assume that the first claim is true, then we have established that the disjunction of P with
Q cannot be true. Since a disjunction is only false when both of the disjuncts are false we
can conclude both that it is not the case that P is true and it is not the case that Q is true
(our first goal).
Secondly, we need to show that the implication in the opposite direction holds. When
we assume that both P and Q are not true we can infer that the disjunction of both P and
Q must be false. It then follows that the negation of such a disjunction must be true (our
second goal).
Hence, we have shown that “it is not the case that either P or Q is true” is equivalent
to “it is not the case that P is true and it is not the case that Q is true” since they imply
each other.

Presented here is both a standard logical proof of the selected DeMorgan’s law using a
“Fitch-style” formalism as well as a seemingly less rigorous real proof. Even though both
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methods of proof are sufficient for understanding that the two statements are logically equiv-
alent, the ideal proof lays bare every step required for understanding the equivalence whereas
the real proof relies heavily on underlying semantic content (such as truth of a particular
sentence). The real proof is convincing insofar as one has a reliable notion of the underlying
semantic content as well as a grasp of the underlying inferences employed. However, the
ideal proof uses mere syntactic manipulation of the various well-formed formulae. The ideal
proof is then convincing just in case each inference step follows immediately from the prior.
The inferences in the ideal proof are so stripped of potentially murky content, and we
are left with only syntactic manipulations of sentence strings. For example, consider the
inference to line 24 using lines 15 and 23 in the ideal proof above. This inference is immediate
because to arrive at this intermediate conclusion we used a syntactic operation of joining two
sentences using the conjunction introduction syntactic rule. For the result of this inference
step to be convincing all that is required is operation of the rule. The inference itself is
known with certainty to preserve truth. Comparatively, the same step in the real proof is
suppressed, and yet we are still convinced that we can conjoin the two conditional sentences
(since if two sentences are true individually, then they will be true when conjoined). However,
this suppressed inference is a gap in the real proof. The immediacy inherent in ideal proof
convinces us of the relevant conclusions whereas the informal proof is convincing for other
(content-rich) reasons.
From the discussion above we can now see that ideal methodologies have the following
values. (i) They allow us to complete a deduction without making errors. That is, through
the use of syntactic inferences we do not import geometrical intuition or any other source
of potential error into the reasoning process. (ii) By abstracting away from the content-
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rich mathematics we become capable of making claims about related, though seemingly
disparate, mathematical objects (and so we can generalize both our methods and our results
in all similar cases). (iii) Our formalisms allow us to do what we want to do at much faster
rates of speed. In §3 I dwell on these points at greater length. For now, let’s consider an
algebraic example that adopts logical reasoning as a way to arrive a generalizable conclusion.
Example – Compute the greatest common divisor of f(x) = x6−3x5+6x4−6x3−3x2+9x+4
and g(x) = x4 − 2x3 + 4x2 − 6x+ 3.
Solution
x6 − 3x5 + 6x4 − 6x3 − 3x2 + 9x+ 4 = (x2 − x)(x4 − 2x3 + 4x2 − 6x+ 3)
+(4x3 − 12x2 + 12x− 4)





)(4x3 − 12x2 + 12x− 4)
+(4x2 − 8x+ 4)
4x3 − 12x2 + 12x− 4 = (x− 1)(4x2 − 8x+ 4) + 0

We see that the g.c.d.(f(x), g(x)) = (4x2−8x+ 4). To arrive at this result we repeatedly
use the Euclidean Algorithm, which says that given polynomials f and g, with deg(g) ≤
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deg(f), there exist unique polynomials q and r such that f = qg+r with 0 ≤ deg(r) ≤ deg(g).
Then, in order to know that we have found a greatest common divisor of the two polynomials
we rely on the following theorem:
Theorem (G.C.D. of Polynomials) – Any two nonzero polynomials f, g ∈ Q[x] have a
greatest common divisor, which is an element of I(f, g).
Let Q[x] be the set of all polynomials with coefficients in the rational numbers, and
I(f, g) = {af + bg : a, b ∈ Q[x]}. So, d = g.c.d.(f(x), g(x)) = (4x2 − 8x + 4) is in I(f, g)
since d can be written as a linear combination in the form af + bg for a, b ∈ Q[x]. As this
example shows, a proof using only syntactic manipulation is convincing. After all, it seems
that to give a convincing proof we need only use abstracted variables, multiplication rules
for exponents, division of polynomials, and set membership (in I(f, g)). Then, using these
basic relations and methods for symbol manipulation we arrive at our conclusion, and we do
so very quickly. The underlying method of logical proof has allowed us to move efficiently
through this solution without the use of gaps anywhere in the proof. Let’s now consider our
second case study, inductive proof.
3.2.2 Inductive Proof
I turn now to another form of proof common to ideal methodologies, namely inductive
proof. Proof by induction has become a staple of contemporary mathematical research – so
much so that without its use we would not be nearly as advanced in our mathematics as
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we currently are. For that matter, much of what is considered to be fundamental research
relies on induction. Then, upon these foundational theorems and lemmae, we have built
up the great mathematical structures currently studied. Given that induction plays such a
crucial role in our collective mathematical understanding, I develop a famous proof by Paul
Erdos (1932) of Bertrand’s Postulate (formulated in 1845). This will serve as a very good
indication of the power of induction as both a method and as a vehicle for our mathematical
understanding. Before I do so, however, let me first remind the reader how mathematical
induction works.
Induction is a way of showing that if (i) a result holds in a particular case, and (ii) if the
result holds up to a given n ∈ N then it will hold for n+ 1, then the result will hold for all
n ∈ N. Clearly induction is a powerful inference mechanism as it allows us to prove that a
given result will hold in all possible cases to which it is applied. Consider the following easy
algebraic example:
1 + 2 + 3 + · · ·+ n = n(n+ 1)
2
.
Mathematical induction allows us to show that such a formula will be true for all n ∈ N.
The proof goes as follows:
Proof (By Induction on n ∈ N)
Base Step – Suppose n = 1. Then the formula reads 1 = 1(1+1)
2
, which is true.
Inductive Step – Suppose the formula holds up to some n ∈ N. Now we need to
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show that it will hold for n+ 1. If we plug this into our formula we get:




+ (n+ 1) =
(n+ 1)((n+ 1) + 1)
2
n(n+ 1) + 2(n+ 1)
2
=
(n+ 1)((n+ 1) + 1)
2
(n+ 1) + (n+ 2)
2
=
(n+ 1)((n+ 1) + 1)
2
(n+ 1)((n+ 1) + 1)
2
=
(n+ 1)((n+ 1) + 1)
2
.
From this it follows that the formula holds for n + 1. Hence, the formula holds
for all n ∈ N.

Because we have proven this simple formula for all possible natural numbers, we will be
justified in using it to perform other, more complex, calculations in the future. Such is the
power of induction. Now that we have a working understanding of the way that induction
is used to prove simple mathematical statements, let’s see how induction works in a more
complex case.
An excellent professional example of the use of induction is the famous proof by Paul
Erdos of Bertrand’s Postulate from 1845. Erdos proved this postulate (that should actually
be named a theorem) in 1932 when he was only age 19! However, the postulate was first
proven in 1850 by Chebyshev, and then again in 1932 (independent from Erdos) by Ramu-
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najun. The typical statement of Bertrand’s Postulate is:
BP – For every n ≥ 1, there is some p where n < p ≤ 2n, with p prime.
This is to say that there exists some natural number n ≥ 1 such that a prime number p
exists between n and 2n. Erdos’ proof – the major inferences of which are given below –
uses bounds on the magnitude of a central binomial coefficient to prove BP for n ≥ 4002.
He then left the smaller values for checking by hand. However, this turns out to not be that
difficult a task. Using Erdos’ own examples we see that
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 23, 43, 83, 163, 317, 631, 1259, 2503, 4001
all satisfy BP in that each consecutive number is less than twice its predecessor. So we see
that for any n ≤ 4002 there will be a prime satisfying BP (in this case there are 15 of them).
Hence, by Erdos’ proof and empirical verification below a reasonably small natural number
we can conclude that BP holds for all n ∈ Z.
We should be confident that BP holds for all positive integers given that there are areas
below in the proof that rely on inductive methods to reach such lofty goals. More will be
said in §3 about why induction is convincing to a sound mind, but let’s first see the proof in
action. Erdos’ proof takes the form of first proving 5 lemmae that will ultimately be required
for the proof of BP. Importantly, the proof of Lemma 5 introduces the first use induction
while the main proof of BP uses a second.
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Lemma 1 – For all integers n > 0,
 2n
n
 ≥ 4n2n+1 .
Proof 2n
n
 is the central binomial coefficient:
 2n
n
 = (2n)!n!n! . It is the largest of all coefficients
in the expansion of






This shows that 4n = 2n ≤ (2n+ 1)
 2n
n




, which requires the following lemmae:

Lemma 2 – For integers a, b we have that vp(a ·b) = vp(a)+vp(b), and vp(ab ) = vp(a)−vp(b).
Lemma 3 – If 2n
3





Lemma 3 says that p does not divide
 2n
n
. So, if 2n3 < p < n, (2n)! has two factors of





) = vp((2n)!)− 2vp(n!) = 2− 2 · 1 = 0.
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because for x ∈ R, b2xc − 2bxc is either 0 or 1.

























where the first product is bounded by the inductive hypothesis, and the bound for the second
product comes from the fact that
 2m+ 1
m
 is divisible by every prime p in the range
m + 2 ≤ p ≤ 2m + 1. The required inequality then follows from
 2m+ 1
m
 ≤ 22m. The














 = (1 + 1)2m+1.

BP – For every n ≥ 1, there is some p where n < p ≤ 2n, with p prime.
Proof of BP




 has at most √2n prime factors smaller than √2n. The
contribution of each of these factors to
 2n
n
 does not exceed 2n. On the other hand, by
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Lemma 4, it follows that every p ≥ √2n satisfies vp(
 2n
n
) ≤ 1. When we combine these
we get:  2n
n
















2n42n/3, which can be rewritten as
4n/3 ≤ (2n + 1)(2n)
√
2n. This inequality fails for n ≥ 468, and is as such a contradiction.
Hence, for every n ≥ 1, there is some p where n < p ≤ 2n, with p prime.

We have now completed Erdos’ proof of Bertrand’s Postulate. It turns out that this rel-
atively straightforward theorem is incredibly useful in various areas of contemporary math-
ematical research. Most notably, BP is directly applicable to the ongoing “Finding Primes”
project, which seeks to resolve a version of the conjecture that says that there exists a de-
terministic algorithm that is guaranteed to find a prime of at least k digits in length of time
polynomial in k. BP guarantees that such a k-digit prime exists for any k. Similarly, there
are results using BP that show that every integer strictly greater than 6 is the sum of distinct
primes. Given that BP is fundamental to a wide assortment of mathematical results, we may
reasonably worry about the status of induction as a means through which we can develop
convincing mathematical proof. After all, what are we to make of the claim that induction
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supplies information about the nature of numbers at infinity? In §3 and §4 we will see what
kind of understanding we can have of such important concepts. For now, however, let’s turn
to the third case study, namely computer proof.
3.2.3 Computer Proof
One of the major methodological shifts in the late 20th century, and now into the 21st,
is the heavy use of computers in the assistance of proofs of great length, e.g. the proof of
the Four Color Theorem, the day to day use of programs, e.g. Mathematica, to assist in
complex calculation, and the generation of new proofs through automated theorem proving.
This shift has lead to concern that the use of these tools in completing chains of reasoning has
somehow denigrated the convincing nature of ideal proofs in which machines are involved.
Following Schlimm we witness that at any time our mathematical journals contain roughly
80% error-free proofs, and that proofs utilizing computer yield greater than 99% accuracy,
the use of computers are far stronger guarantees of the truth, say, of mathematical proofs.7
Consider the example of “squaring the square”, which in the course of its proof relies en-
tirely on the use of computers in order to generate the sheer volume of objects necessary to
guarantee near certainty as to the truth of the theorem given below that claims the existence
of only 2 squares of order 25.
The problem of “squaring the square” was first formulated in 1902 by Henry Dudeney.
The general problem asks if it is possible to decompose a square into finitely many sub
squares, all of which are of different size. So, a squared square is a square that can be
dissected into smaller squares. The problem to be considered in this example is if it is
7This is from a private conversation with Dirk Schlimm at the Phil Math Intersem in Paris 2014
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possible to obtain a particular compound perfect square, and how many of those possibly
exist. A square is perfect if no two sub squares are equal in size. A square is compound if
there is a subset of squares that form a rectangle (usually found in one of the corners of the
main square). So, a compound perfect square is one in which no two sub squares are equal in
size and there is a subset of squares that form a rectangle.8 Consider the following theorem
of compound perfect squares (CPS) :
(CPS) – There are at most 2 compound perfect squares of order 25.
The task of constructing compound perfect squares “is still intractable to any direct
general theoretical treatment” (Duijvestjin (1982)). This fact guarantees the use of computer
assistance in order to complete the proof. The brute force method used to construct the
squares goes as follows:
A square is dissected into unequal squares and one rectangle ... Then a squared
rectangle, simple or compound, having the same ratio of sides as the rectangular
space is sought, to be fitted into this space. Six is the lowest possible order for
a deficient squared square (the square divided into squares and one rectangle),
D6, with no equal elements.
This procedure, then, consists in three parts. The first is to list all the essential D′s.
The second is to establish a list of compound perfect squared rectangles from order 9 to
18, and then make a comparison between the first and second parts. It turns out that this
procedure gives a list of all possible compound perfect squares up to and including order 24.
8The first lowest-order compound perfect square (order 24) was constructed by Willcocks in 1948
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To carry out the procedure to its fullest extent, Duijvestijn, Federico and Leeuw programmed
a computer to construct such squares. The computer constructions then proved CPS by only
being able to construct 2 compound perfect squares of order 25 over the period in which the
program was run.
Figure 1: The Smallest Compound Perfect Square (24 sub squares)
The standard compound perfect square of order 24 is seen in Figure 1. This computer
construction is one of the many produced in the original proof of CPS, but the only way to
prove that it is the only compound perfect square of order 24 is to run the procedure over
and over again until one is relatively sure that there are no lower order constructions. “[The]
total number of compound perfect squares to order 33 <are> now known. There are none
below order 24 and only one of order 24. The number for order 25 is probably only 2, but this
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has not been shown” ([57], p. 29 my emphasis). I mean to emphasize that giving this proof
amounts to allowing a computer to literally construct as many compound perfect squares
and then comparing them to one another to check for novelty. This proof by computer is
widely held to be definitive and convincing for CPS.
Detlefsen in [54] responds to the claim made in Tymoczko’s [145] that the use of computer
in the proof of the Four Color Theorem represents a convincing proof, though it is not
an ideal proof. Among the worries raised by Tymoczko was that the computer worked
through more inferences than could ever be reasonably surveyed in a reasonable human
time scale. And in this way, we are forced to accept the conclusion of the computer since
we will never be able to check literally every line to make sure the error-free status of the
proof. To this Detlefsen rightly rejected the claim as inconsequential given the nature of the
computer used. At the outset all a computer does when computing a problem is to run a
recursively axiomatizable program that takes in particular inputs and outputs a particular
coded statement. The computer seems to be running an ideal mathematical proof.
The inputs, outputs and programs used by a computer are then all completed in some
syntactic language or other. And, at base, computers operate at the level of electrical switches
being in either an “on” or an “off” state. At this level there is no geometric intuition involved;
there are no content-rich expressions. The computer is running a specified algorithm that
manipulates symbols given to it via inference rules. Proofs of this kind are no different than
the syntactic manipulation found in ideal or logical proof. Further still, computers allow
for abstraction from particular mathematical concepts to myriad general concepts. This is
because the computer operates purely by means of the relations between terms, and not
from the particular meanings of the expressions. Finally, the speed at which computers
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can complete extraordinary amounts of inferences is immense. In the case of the Four
Color Theorem the computer used performed more operations than is possible in a human
timescale. In the case of CPS the computer did the same thing. The use of computers, then,
serve to multiply our reasoning ability beyond anything we could ever hope to achieve using
mere human mental power.
3.3 Epistemic Instrumental Aims
We have now seen three major case studies that are all indicative of ideal proof. While
each of them seem to use different means for achieving proofs of their respective claims, they
all share an underlying set of characteristics that allow them to serve as convincing means
of proof. While there may be many characteristics shared, I here will focus on only three.
These are the characteristics of flawlessness, abstraction, and efficiency (or speed).
By flawlessness I mean that our reasoning proceeds without any gaps in inference. Flaw-
lessness allows us through ideal methods to produce error-free convincing proof. By abstrac-
tion I mean that each of the ideal proof examples above either immediately abstract away
from the particular meanings of the various mathematical terms or otherwise are methods
that can be applied to any broad number of mathematical statements. Through abstraction
we are able to move from particulars to general (infinite) sets. Then, by efficiency I mean
that characteristic whereby through ideal methods we can move quickly from truths of a fi-
nite nature very quickly to infinitistic truths. So, these ideal cases extend our finite abilities
into the infinite with little to no extra effort on the part of the mathematical reasoner.
Shortly I will argue how each of the methods above exhibit each of the identified char-
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acteristic traits, but first it may be helpful to see why these traits are characteristic of ideal
proof generally. After such an argument we will then be in the position to say that if each
of the case studies satisfies the characteristics, then they are ideal proof methodologies. The
claim to be defended, then, is that ideal proof methodologies are instruments – the aim of
which is to extend our finitistic reasoning to claims requiring infinitely many inference steps.
By instruments I mean to identify methodologies which enable a reasoner to extend her
finite abilities to claims beyond her reach. Furthermore, like any reliable tool, we require
that these instruments not merely extend the reach of the reasoner, but also do so in such
a way that what is now achievable be on as solid a foundation as those finitely reachable
elements. This is to say that insofar as we want our mathematics to have rigorous proof,
if our finite proofs are rigorous, then our infinitistic instruments should also yield rigorous
results.
This claim is evidently the case. We might wonder, then, what about ideal methods
satisfies the strong requirement of mathematical instruments. Our first characteristic, flaw-
lessness, partially exemplifies such a status. Flawlessness, or otherwise the procession of
inferences without gaps, takes the gap-free part of real proof (by eliminating any geomet-
ric intuition) and extends it to infinitistic cases. Furthermore, given that at least one of
Hilbert’s (and before him, Cantor’s) initial reasons for distinguishing between real and ideal
was that inferences with content-less statements within ideal methods were only able to
proceed through gap free syntactic manipulation. Take our case studies above as excellent
examples of this characteristic.
In the case of logical proof, we immediately see the characteristic of flawlessness since
the first order logic appealed to was developed with the express purpose of providing such
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a framework for proof. Given that such logical methodologies are applicable to so much of
mathematics – from finite real proof all the way up to infinite ideal proofs – it follows that
logical proof is a shining example of the class of instruments used to extend our reasoning
into the infinite. Now, consider the example proof that asked us to find the greatest common
divisor of two algebraic statements. I claimed above that the solution used an iterated logical
methodology akin to that witnessed in the logical proof case. In this example we are only
arguing by using definitions and axioms, which have the same status as the logical rules of
inference. So, logical proof combined with the axioms and definitions of abstract algebra
yield a convincing and rigorous real proof. Then, given that neither logical proof nor proofs
within abstract algebra are confined to the finite, their flawless status will be applicable in
infinite cases as well.
Now, consider the case study of inductive proof. Initially, we saw a very basic case for
the use of induction in which I proved that a certain formula held for all natural numbers.
In it we start with a base case where we check whether the formula is true for 1, the first
natural number. Then, we are challenged with the case where after picking some particular
natural number, we must show that the formula will hold for the next element following
that natural number. Insofar as the number chosen in the inductive step was arbitrary,
we should be convinced that the formula will hold true for all natural numbers. Induction
satisfies the characteristic of flawlessness since between any two steps in an induction we
do not import any extraneous information other than what immediately corresponds to the
formula in question. In this way, we have a method of proof similar to that of logical proof
insofar there will be no gaps in between any two given natural numbers. Now, induction
belongs to the class of ideal elements since induction very quickly moves from a finite case
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(the base step) to infinite cases (the induction step). So, along with a finite step and the
gap free characteristic of inferences, we are able to make claims about the infinite (in the
case of the simple induction) this occurred for the set of all natural numbers. In the more
complex case of Bertrand’s Postulate, induction plays a key role in the proof of Lemma 5
as well as the main proof of BP. In Lemma 5, for example, we use induction as a method for
developing primes. Again, given that the induction works for all natural numbers, we can
be certain that the proof of BP after will hold in all cases.
In the case of computer proof, all that is occurring is extended iteration of finite proof
methodologies. This is to say that whenever proof methods in the finite are flawless, the use
of computer to extend that finite reasoning will also be finite. It follows, then, that computer
proof satisfies the characteristic of flawlessness. Of course, in the event that a computer is
used to extend a proof whose finite methods are not of the flawless kind, the computer will
not somehow add flawlessness to the proof methodology. Instead, the computer is merely a
method through which we can extend to the near infinite.
By now it should be clear that each of logical proof, inductive proof, and proof by com-
puter satisfy the characteristic of flawlessness. We can now determine whether these methods
satisfy the second characteristic trait of mathematical instruments, namely abstraction. If
ideal methods satisfy abstraction as well as the final characteristic, efficiency, we will be on
firm footing for claiming that ideal methods are mathematical instruments.
So, our second characteristic, abstraction, which is the characteristic that ideal methods
immediately abstract away from the particular meanings of any given mathematical term
and that ideal methods are applicable in a wide variety of mathematical contexts, allows for
a reasoner to avoid any potentially problematic underlying content. Thus for an ideal proof
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method to satisfy abstraction, the method must not be reliant on any given underlying se-
mantics, and be applicable to all areas of mathematical discourse. This notion of abstraction
falls in line with Hilbert’s own criteria for distinguishing between real and ideal methods.
In the distinction (and by subsequent critics of his program), ideal methods are the ma-
nipulations of meaningless symbol strings. These syntactic mathematical statements were
to be manipulated using infinitistic methods that themselves did not impart any meaning
to the symbolic strings. We see that Hilbert’s understanding aligns with the characteristic
of abstraction since ideal methods will make no appeal to the meaning of any particular
statement or term, and as such will be applicable any result requiring infinitistic means.
The characteristic of abstraction, then, allows a reasoner to focus on the syntactic relations
between mathematical objects instead of the potentially murky underlying content. So, ab-
straction is a characteristic that helps to guarantee that a infinitistic result will be achieved
rigorously.
Consider again the case of logical proof. As traditionally developed, the first order
calculus abstracts away from any particular meaning of a sentence. This occurs in the
formalization of natural language into the formal language of logic. Then, without appeal to
the forgone meaning of statements, we are able to produce valid proofs. Hence, logical proof
is an ideal method that satisfies the characteristic of abstraction. One might worry, however,
that the application of logical proof to broader areas of mathematics secretly ushers with it
underlying semantic content. For example, in finding the greatest common denominator of
a pair of polynomials, we were working in the set, Q, of rational numbers. Here is where
logical proof satisfies the second condition of abstraction. Even though I specified that the
polynomial be in the setQ[x], it could have been the case that I specified that the polynomials
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have coefficients in R[x] (the reals), C[x] (the complex), or Z[x] (integers). In this way our
formalism allows us to abstract to a level at which solutions can be found for many sets of
numbers instead of a particular set. So, logical proof methods satisfy abstraction fully.
The method of induction similarly satisfies the characteristic of abstraction. As we in-
vestigate whether a given statement holds in the inductive step of an induction, we are not
concerned with any particular number satisfying the statement in question. Instead, we check
whether a statement will hold at some n ∈ N generally, and then show that such a statement
holds for the succeeding number. The use of induction can then be applied in nearly every
area of mathematics to prove claims requiring infinite means. So, induction clearly satisfies
abstraction. Computer proof similarly satisfies abstraction since, at the most fundamental
level of computing, all that is happening is the manipulation of 1’s and 0’s. The language of
a computer is such that there is no reliance on semantic content when moving from one step
to the next in an inference. Instead, the computer is reasoning through syntactic parsing
and manipulation. Furthermore, proofs using computers are increasingly being applied to
more and more varied areas of mathematics. As such, the method of computer proof may
satisfy abstraction most fully among the examples of ideal proof considered.
To take stock, we have good reason to think that each of our case studies satisfy both
abstraction and flawlessness. We will see next that each ideal method also satisfies efficiency.
With these three characteristic traits satisfied, we can conclude that ideal methods are
indeed mathematical instruments. Let’s now consider the characteristic of efficiency. When
an ideal method of proof is efficient, we are able to move from results that are finitely
provable very quickly to results only provable on an infinite level. The reason efficiency is a
characteristic of ideal proof, which places these methods under the umbrella of mathematical
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instrument, is that a method that requires a similar level of time commitment as finite
methods will never achieve the infinite results desired. So, efficient ideal methods extend our
rigorous reasoning abilities to the transfinite.
We may rightly wonder whether logical proof actually increases the efficiency of any
proof. After all, when we teach a logic course, we often hear complaints from our students
that logical proof requires the lugubrious and tedious spelling out of every single inference
step. How can a method that requires such tiresome legwork really be an efficient means
to our proof goals? We want our mathematical instruments dealing in the transfinite to be
as rigorous as our finite results. If a method is available that gives us rigorous infinitistic
results without a concern that any problematic steps are present, then that method is a
good candidate for being identified as efficient. As it turns out, logical proof yields rigorous
proof without hidden sources of error. Hence, we should consider it a candidate for efficiency.
Given that no other method of proof is available that gives such strong guarantees of rigorous
result, logical proof must satisfy the characteristic of efficiency. So, even though a novice
logician may balk at the requirements of logical proof, it is the most efficient means through
which we can achieve our rigorous transfinite results.
Induction is clearly an efficient means through which we can prove statements involving
the infinite. After all, we start with a simple finite case and then immediately show that
a given statement will hold for all natural numbers. While perhaps not on the same level
of rigor as logical proof, induction nevertheless is an efficient means through which we can
prove things about the infinite. Computer proof, on the other hand, is a revolutionary
means through which we are able to perform more inferences and calculations than we
previously thought were even possible by a mathematician working on a human timescale.
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For this reason, the use of computers have ushered in a huge step in the efficiency of our
mathematical proof. And, because of this, it is clear that computer methodologies satisfy
the characteristic of efficiency.
The characteristics flawlessness, abstraction, and efficiency are traits of ideal proof since
they allow a reasoner to extend rigorous reasoning to the infinite without loss of rigor or the
convincing nature of a proof. As we have just seen, logical proof, induction, and proof by
computer each exhibit these characteristic traits. So, it is plausible that any method of proof
that is a candidate as ideal proof will share these same characteristics. Furthermore, each of
these traits exemplify my understanding of instrument, namely as a means through which
we can extend our finite reasoning abilities. Hence, ideal proof methods are instruments of
mathematical reasoning.
3.4 Ideal Proof and Metaphor
In order to get from a characterization of ideal proof methodologies to the goal of an
epistemic bridge principle we need to have an underlying cognitive conceptual structure.
As has been announced throughout I am largely influenced by the work from Lakoff and
Nu´n˜ez (1999) whereby our mathematical cognition is found in a detailed theory of concep-
tual metaphor. So, what follows in the rest of this section is the identification of a few
key conceptual metaphors that do the work required from ideal methods for mathematical
cognition.
To begin let’s consider some (though not all) of the metaphors that are involved in
ideal reasoning. These include Container Schemas, the Classes are Containers metaphor,
92
Boole’s Metaphor, and the Basic Metaphor of Infinity. Containment Schemas are based in
the notion that the notion of containment is not only central to much of mathematics, but,
indeed, to a wide variety or ordinary, non-mathematical, embodied concepts of everyday
life. In mathematics, in particular, we think of objects like sets, bounded intervals, and
the like. These schema, then, are ways given our particular neural development that allow
us to understand that a group of objects are in some sense contained in a single object.
Container Schemas, argue Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez, have a logic very much like a simple Boolean
Logic, which seems to originate in our visual and imaging systems in the brain. Then, in
the Classes are Containers metaphor, we build on pre-theoretical Container Schemas (since
Container Schemas are used in so much of our understanding). The idea is that in order to
conceptualize some class of mathematical objects we think in terms of bounded regions of
space where all members of a class are “inside” and all non-members are “outside” a given
bounded region. Classes then become metaphorical conceptual containers.
Then, building from the Classes are Containers metaphor, we arrive at Boole’s Metaphor.
Boole in the 1850’s conceptualized classes as though they had algebraic structure. By con-
ceptualizing classes as numbers as well as conceptualizing operations on classes as operations
on numbers, then some fundamental operations of arithmetic hold for classes. Then, with
the need to complete his metaphor of an arithmetical theory he introduced the conceptual
mapping of 0 onto the intuitive understanding of the empty class. Similarly, Boole mapped
1 to the class of the “universe of discourse”, i.e. a unified whole. Boole’s Metaphor, then
links one branch of mathematics (namely classes) to another (arithmetic). By then taking
the final step of symbolizing each of the mappings he created, he arrived at an arithmetic
theory. The jump to First Order Logic takes exactly these same steps with the exception
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that instead of mapping onto arithmetic, classes map onto propositions. This allows for the
syntax and semantics of propositions to be preserved via conceptual metaphor.
Finally, let’s consider the Basic Metaphor of Infinity or BMI. To reiterate my earliy
characterization, the BMI begins with the acknowledgment that since ancient times two
understandings of infinity have been motivated. The first, potential infinity, starts by
counting the natural numbers and then imagining that you proceed counting without stop-
ping. So, potential infinity is the understanding of infinity without end. The second, actual
infinity, asks us to consider the set of all natural numbers, or, in symbolic notation, N. So,
even though we could never ultimately enumerate all of the natural numbers, actual infinity
is the understanding of an infinitely completed object. Our use of metaphor allows us to
conceptualize the set of all natural numbers. We can conceptualize a process with an end!
We are able to understand actual infinity is by mapping an iterative process with end
onto the domain of processes without end. That is, we map our understanding of finite
iteration onto potential infinity. The result is actual infinity. In other words, we form a
conceptual mapping from Containment Schemas, the Classes are Containers metaphor, and
our understanding of an iterative process without end (which falls out of Boole’s Metaphor),
and the result is a contained notion of the infinite, namely actual infinity.
It should be noted – before we investigate how ideal methods are grounded in these (and
other similar) metaphors – that each of the metaphors specified are stacked on the “lower”
metaphors. That is, conceptual metaphors do not merely stand alone. Instead, as we move to
more and more infinitistic metaphors, we rely on the previous and less complex metaphor.
In the case of logic proof, it is clear that we utilize Boole’s Metaphor, the Classes are
Containers metaphor, and Container Schemas. Using these we are able to carry out logical
94
proof. Applied to determining a greatest common divisor of two polynomials we combine the
BMI with the previous listed metaphors. This is because we need an understanding of the
set of rational numbers Q in order to carry out our investigation. So, each of the metaphors
work together in logical proof.
Cases that utilize the method of induction will similarly use each of the identified
metaphors. For example, in the base case of an induction we use Boole’s conceptual map-
ping of 1 to the universe of discourse. Then, when moving to the inductive step we use
the full power of Boole’s Metaphor in order to have the succession of the natural numbers.
Then, in order to conclude that some result will hold for all natural numbers we employ the
BMI, which maps practical infinity and Container schemas onto actual infinity. Hence, our
results will hold for all natural numbers. Finally, computer proof is iterated logical proof,
but at finite points that are not readily achievable in human time frames. Then, with a
modified form of the BMI we can understand that our mathematical results will hold at
some practically infinite point.
Now, in chapter 5 I delve into the cognition that allows us to not only map one conceptual
area to another, but how each of the metaphors discussed above as well as the metaphors
implicit in real methods are cognitively interrelated. This will be the primary means through
which I develop an epistemic bridge between real and ideal methods. For now, however,
we are in the position to conclude that if our ideal methods are grounded in conceptual
metaphors, then these conceptual metaphors are themselves epistemic instruments in the
service of extending our mathematical abilities. Since it has been shown that such conceptual
metaphors ground ideal methods, we can then see that conceptual metaphors are epistemic
instruments for mathematical reasoning.
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3.5 Conclusion
Taking stock, we have just encountered why mathematicians felt the need to employ
ideal methods. Using case studies as prime examples of the sort of work that is achievable
using ideal methods, we see that characteristic traits of ideal methods do indeed extend our
reasoning capabilities in the rigorous way originally intended. From this, I developed a set
of conceptual metaphors that are responsible for our ability to use ideal methods. Insofar
as these conceptual metaphors are themselves epistemic instruments, conceptual metaphors
developed over the last 200 years of mathematical research enjoy the status of supplying
rigorous mathematical proof. In the next chapter I present a similar line of argumentation
for real methods. Then, using the results from these sister chapters, we will be in good
standing for developing the long promised epistemic bridge between both methods. The
result will be that the Division Problem will be dissolved since there will be no identifiable








In the previous chapter I argued for both an epistemic notion of instrument for ideal
proof as well as for the underlying conceptual schema utilized in employing the associated
methods. In chapter 2 I developed a distinction between real and ideal elements, i.e. the
Division Problem. Before we can solve the Division Problem we must now turn to real
methods of proof. On the real side of the Division Problem we place methods that in-
clude (though not limited to) content-rich sentences, finite inferences, finitely mechanically
decidable, finitely decidable universal schema, geometric intuition, non-geometric intuition,
diagrammatic reasoning, deductive gaps, interpreted finite terms/formulae, evident founda-
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tional axioms, and metaphors of the finite. Real methods have the further characteristic of
being the kinds of reasoning found in the so-called back end of mathematical research. So,
by investigating both the epistemic instrumental aims of real proof along with an analysis of
the many metaphors used in the process, we should be able to finally answer the challenge
posed from Dirk Schlimm as well as be on solid ground for developing the long promised
epistemic bridge between both methods.
Recall that the ultimate aim of this dissertation is to argue for an epistemic bridge from
real proof to ideal (and back again) without losing any of the content (from real proof)
nor the far reaching epistemic abilities of ideal proof. So, given that I have announced
previously that both chapters 3 and 4 are a twin pair, what is to follow mirrors the overall
structure and argument of the previous chapter. In what follows I begin in §2 by developing
case studies that are commonly associated as real proofs. These three – diagrammatic
reasoning, proofs exhibiting geometric intuition, and proofs requiring only finite inferences
– all seem to share similar characteristics that place them within the class of real proof.
The shared characteristics will be the topic of §3 where I argue that such characteristics
are indicative of all real proof. Following this in §4 I present results from recent cognitive
scientific literature that intimates some conceptual metaphors that are shared among all real
proof methodologies.
4.2 Case Studies
In this section I develop three case studies, which I will argue in section 3 all exhibit
similar characteristics that appropriately locate them in the class of real proof. These three
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case studies will be examples of diagrammatic reasoning, proof requiring geometric intuition,
and an algebraic proof requiring only finite inference. In a similar vein to the previous
chapter, I will spend this section developing such cases without analysis. Having our boots
on the ground, so to speak, will enable the analysis that follows to have more robust and
immediate consequences for understanding this project.
At the outset it may be worried that – as I have developed the Division Problem – we
stand to lose a degree of rigor in our methods of real proof. That is, recalling the shift to
ideal methods in the early and mid 19th century, mathematicians of the time were suspicious
of the results stemming from proof methodologies like geometric intuition. Given that I
have identified this very method as a member of the real class of proof, then one would be
reasonable in being similarly suspicious of the rigorous capacity of such a method. While
a reasonable worry, it will become clear that the rigor found in ideal methodologies will be
identical to the rigor of real methods.
To reiterate Go¨del once more, I am taking “mathematical proof [to be] a sequence of
thoughts convincing to a sound mind”. The cognitive picture emerging thus far takes higher
mathematics to be a process of cross domain mappings that result in conceptual metaphor. In
Chapter 3 I identified a small group of metaphors that are employed in ideal reasoning. In the
last major section of this chapter I do the same. The upshot of such a pairing of identifications
of metaphors for both real and ideal methods will be that all of the metaphors together will
be cognitively interconnected. This, part of the argument in Chapter 5, effectively introduces
a robust link between real and ideal methods. Hence, however rigorous our ideal proof may
be, so too will be our real methods. The application of this result is that whatever can
reasonable be included in real proof will enjoy a level of rigor not previous considered. So,
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we need not worry whether methods like geometric intuition are rigorous just in case the
method is a member of real proof.
4.2.1 Diagrammatic Reasoning
Our first case study is diagrammatic reasoning. Diagrammatic reasoning is the process
through which we reason given primarily visual means. This is in seemingly stark contrast to
reasoning through largely linguistic or algebraic means. However, as was briefly discussed in
Chapter 2, even when we a proving mathematical statements requiring syntactic inferences,
there is evidence that suggests we rely on heavily idiosyncratic internal visual representations
of notions like growing or distance or visual representations of the number line. At this point,
then, there is adequate evidence to suggest that reasoning via diagram is not wholly unrelated
to more formal, algebraic or linguistic reasoning. Now, by diagram I mean to specify a 2
dimensional symbolic/metaphorical representation of information. Diagrams usually come
in the form of either technical illustrations that somehow stand in as a representative for the
perfected accurate notion (think geometric drawings on a chalkboard), or as a visual display
of the actual object. Below I consider a case exemplifying each horn of the diagrammatic
possibilities.
Mutilated Chessboards
The first example is the problem of the Mutilated Chessboard. This falls into the category
of technical illustration since there seem to be more than one solution to the problem. As
such, any particular diagram of the problem, which I state precisely below, stands in as
a representative of the most accurate version. The Mutilated Chessboard problem can be
100
identified as the following:
Mutilated Chessboard – Suppose that a standard 8× 8 chessboard has two diagonally
opposed white squares removed (so leaving 62 squares). Is it possible to place 31 dominoes
of size 2× 1 in such a way to cover all the squares?
..
Figure 2: Mutilated Chessboard Problem
The solution to this problem is a resounding No! The Mutilated Chessboard problem
was originally posed by Max Black (1946) and later by John McCarthy as a hard problem
for automated proving. According to these and other authors, the solution has primarily
“conceptual solutions”. The idea is that we “see” the solution in mathematical intuition
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that there will remain 30 white squares and 32 black squares covered by the dominoes
with one domino left over. This solution is convincing, and yet is “exponentially hard” to
complete using symbolic reasoning. By exponentially hard to complete I mean to distinguish
the notion from easy to complete. A solution is easy to complete using computer methods
if there exists a solving procedure whose running time grows AT MOST polynomial with
the size of the problem. Then, a solution is exponentially hard to complete if no at most
polynomial algorithm is believed to exist and the best procedure requires the possibility of
exponential time to complete.
So, to say that the Mutilated Chessboard problem is exponentially hard to complete
through symbolic methods AND we have a mathematically intuitive solution, is to hold that
(i) the human mathematical mind is more than a machine, and (ii) we have real methods
of proof that yield rigorous solutions! Given that mathematical intuition in this case is
reliant on visual representations of the problem, diagrammatic reasoning yields rigorous
mathematical proof. Of course, the Mutilated Chessboard problem is one of many so-called
“covering problems” where we are asked whether a set of objects fully covers a given area
or region of space. Insofar as the mutilated chessboard problem is solved using primarily
diagrammatic means, it is my contention that so too will the many other covering problems
in, say, topology or set theory.
The Old San Francisco Mint
I now turn to the second kind of proof by diagrammatic reasoning, namely a visual display
of the actual object of inquiry. In the below example, which asks for a particular location
of a historic building in San Francisco, we rely on primarily visual and spatial information
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as well as a set of background knowledge of actually being in San Francisco. So, let’s now
consider the problem of the Old Mint:
The Old Mint Problem – Is the Old Mint building north of Market Street in San
Francisco?
..
Figure 3: Map of San Francisco
To prove the claim that the Old Mint Building is NOT north of Market (because it is
south), Etchemendy (1999) contends that the reasoning involved will not be fully translatable
into a syntactic system (so, the proof requires real methods). Instead, the use of the map in
Figure 2 will be used to find hypotheses that comport with the rest to prove the claim. The
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data received from the map will be of the relevant kind for a proof of the claim, namely the
use of directions, street names and intersections, and general knowledge of the layout of the
city. The hypotheses used will be convincing for the proof at hand. Even stronger, we will
arrive at a rigorous solution by diagrammatic means.
The evidence that we get to affirm the claim that the Old Mint is south of Market Street
is of a visual kind. We do not consider some intuitive representation of San Francisco in
our mind (like in the Mutilated Chessboard Problem) and then make rationalized inferences
about the likely location of the Old Mint given this intuition. Instead, we simply investigate
the map itself, notice where Market Street is on the map, notice where the Old Mint is
located, and then make the inference that the building is physically in SoMA. Of course,
there is quite a bit of requisite background knowledge required to complete this admittedly
oversimplified version of the solution, but my point is just that we are convinced about the
Old Mint’s location because of the visual evidence we attain from inspection of the map.
And, likewise for other real proof methodologies that rely on visual inspection, we are
justified in inferences made given this kind of evidence for the same reason scientists are
justified in their conclusions given empirical methodologies. One might worry, however, that
even if such visual methodologies do yield convincing information, the inferences made from
these methods will fail to be consistent with the other hypotheses made in the course of
some broader proof. That is, when we rely on visual information for a mathematical proof,
it is often the case that minute details are not precise in the presented visualization. So, it
could be the case that there are bits of information present in the visualization that do not
actually occur in real life. From this we may be prone to obvious mistakes. Similarly, small
details are often omitted in visualizations. So, we may be reasoning without a full set of
104
information needed to correctly arrive at a conclusion.
My solution – keeping in line with my constructivist metaphysics for mathematics – is
that in these cases we must rely on our background knowledge to supply the missing details
in the visualization. So, for example, after having lived in San Francisco for a few years I
have had the actual experience of walking south from Market Street to arrive at the Old
Mint Building on 5th Street. Hence, I can be sure that the map as drawn is sufficient for the
purposes of this argument. We can make similar claims about more complex visualizations in
higher areas of mathematics. By relying on our background indoctrination into the relevant
mathematical field, upon inspection of a (not complete) visualization we should be able to
fill in (or at least identify) bits of information that may be either missing or incorrect.
4.2.2 Geometric Intuition
In this next section, we turn now to proof using geometric intuition. These cases all use
an underlying set of geometric intuitions, which play critical roles in the convincing nature
of the proof. In order to understand the cases (and the underlying intuitions involved) we
must take into consideration the notion of mathematical proof available to Aristotle and
later Peripatetics.
Aristotle did not explicitly consider mathematical proof in the development of either
his Prior Analytics or Posterior Analytics (Meuler 1972). Then, following Lukasiewicz we
know that Aristotle’s logic was itself formal without being overly formalized (1951). This
is to say that valid inferences in both logical and mathematical proofs were dependent on
their form, but Aristotle was rather liberal with what constituted the form of an argument.
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Hence, he could call an argument formally valid without specifically relying on a reduction
to any of the syllogisms. However, we have learned from Meuler’s (1972) that the later
followers of Aristotle, the Peripatetics, took this liberal attitude as a means of paraphrasing
mathematical proofs to fit into syllogistic form.
Aristotle is thoroughly aware that the validity of an argument depends on its
form, but he is not very strict in his determination of the form of a statement in
an argument. The freedom of paraphrase which he allow himself in representing
statements may well have been a major factor in his conclusion that a proof
is always of a categorical statement ... All the theorems in Euclid could be
transformed into categorical statements.
Aristotle’s (and, later, the Peripatetics’) strategy was to take a statement of the form
“on a given finite line...” and paraphrase into a categorical statement of the form “on all
finite lines”. This kind of paraphrasing relies on a number of underlying intuitions that will
be brought to bear below. Now, to see an example of the Peripatetic methodology in action
consider the following proof of Proposition 1.1 from Euclid’s Elements.




Figure 4: Construction of an Equilateral Triangle
Proof
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Let AB be the given finite straight line. With center A and distance AB let the circle
BCD be described; again, with center B and distance BA let the circle ACE be described;
and from the point C, in which the circles cut one another, to the points A, B let the straight
lines CA, CB be joined. Now, since the point A is the center of the circle CDB, AC equals
AB. Again, since the point B is the center of the circle CAE, BC equals BA. But CA
was also proved equal to AB; therefore each of the straight lines CA, AB, BC are equal to
one another. Therefore the triangle ABC is equilateral; and it has been constructed on the
given finite straight line AB.

The proof theory adopted by the Peripatetics was to take propositions of the form “On
a given finite straight line construct an equilateral triangle” and from their proof assert
the categorical form “From all finite lines there can be constructed an equilateral triangle”.
Then, we assert the existence of a finite straight line AB (say, the one from above). Finally,
from the categorical statement along with the assertion that a particular straight line exists,
namely AB, we can conclude that an equilateral triangle can be constructed from AB. This
fits perfectly into the schema of an Aristotelian syllogism, and, hence, the proof of Proposition
1.1 constitutes a rigorous mathematical proof for both Aristotle and the Peripatetics.
Before we consider the many underlying intuitions involved in this kind of geometric rea-
soning, notice how messy this paraphrasing method becomes. It is not clear what is being
proven when paraphrasing and reducing the complete proof of Proposition 1.1 into syllogistic
form. So much of the actual construction is suppressed. Which inferences should be para-
phrased categorically? Which inferences should be suppressed? While I do not have explicit
textual evidence, these worries seem to be a primary motivation for the Stoics, primarily
Chrysippus, to be more systematic about the reduction of proofs to formal statements. To
do so Chrysippus relied on the following five indemonstrable forms of argument that were
themselves not open to proof.
1. p → q; p; therefore q (modus ponens)
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2. p→ q; ¬q; therefore ¬p (modus tollens)
3. ¬(p ∧ q); p; therefore ¬q
4. p ∨ q; p; therefore ¬q
5. p ∨ q; ¬p; therefore q
While my intention in this section is not to analyze these five indemonstrables in detail,
I would like to point out curiosities that arise about them. The first two are the common
logical forms that we all learn in the first year logic course, and so can are uninteresting.
Form 3, however, relies on an application of one of the DeMorgan’s rules, and so is not
indemonstrable. This is interesting because the reasoning involved in form 3 allowing the
valid inference seems somewhat sophisticated. Both a notion of disjunctive syllogism and
distribution are assumed in the valid inference form. Each of the notions are themselves
open to further analysis!
Next, the similarity of reasoning involved between form 3 and forms 4 and 5 suggests
that the Stoics consider the disjunction to have an exclusive reading, i.e. only one of the
two disjuncts can be true for the disjunction to be true. Assuming this reading for the
connective amounts to denying the use of disjunctive syllogism involved in form 3. That is,
when reasoning about the truth of a disjunction, one only needs to come up with a proof for
one of the disjuncts for the disjunction to be true. Reasoning in this way is just what gives
rise to the contemporary discussion of intuitionistic logic.
We see here that an underlying intuitive understanding about the nature of negation
is assumed in these indemonstrables. As contemporary discussions in logic show, a proper
treatment of negation is required when dealing with categorical statements, identity etc. The
reliance on this intuitive understanding leaves at least four of the five indemonstrable forms
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open to further analysis. Either way, using these forms, Chrysippus argued that we will be
able to reduce all of the proofs in the Elements to strict formalisms (a protoversion of ideal
reasoning). Consider the following proof of Proposition 1.19:
Proposition 1.19: Given two unequal angles of a triangle, the side opposite the greater
angle is greater than the side opposite the lesser.
B
CA
Figure 5: Scalene Triangle
Proof
(1) Let ABC be a triangle having the angle ABC greater than the angle BCA; I say
that the side AC is also greater than the side AB. (2) For, if not, AC is either equal to AB
or less. Now AC is not equal to AB; (3) for then the angle ABC would also have been equal
to the angle ACB; (4)but it is not; therefore (5) AC is not equal to AB. Neither is AC less
than AB; (6) for then the angle ABC would also have been less than the angle ACB; (7)
but it is not; therefore (8) AC is not less than AB. And it was proved that it is not equal
either. Therefore (9) AC is greeter than AB. Therefore in any triangle the greater angle is
subtended by the greater side.

Following Meuler, we can see that “much of the argument here can be analyzed in terms
of Chrysippus’ [five indemonstrable forms]. Thus (5) follows from (3) ... and (4) ... by the
second [indemonstrable form]. And (8) is related similarly to (6) and (7). If (2) is taken as
an expression of trichotomy, then (9) follows from (2), (5), and (8) by two applications of
the fifth [indemonstrable form]” (Meuler 1972). We can see how this reductionist program is
preferable over the paraphrasing methodology used by the Peripatetics. It mirrors much of
109
what we consider logical analysis to be today, and it relies on a notion of logical consequence
that has as logical constants the five indemonstrable forms. Given that we have already
seen a reasonable account of the cognition of logical inference, we might prefer Chrysippus’
indemonstrables.
In the above development of mathematical methodologies from Aristotle through to the
Stoics, a move toward formalism evolved. However, there was at least the use of intuitive
negation present in each of evolving methodologies. Of course, more geometric intuitions
were at play beyond an intuition of negation. Zeno was one of the first to point out that an
intuition of straight line, intersection, and the intersection of the circumferences of two circles
are all presupposed in the proof of Proposition 1.1 above. In the following fragment Zeno
gives a proof that shows that even with the admission of the first principles of geometry, we
are not able to construct an equilateral triangle without additional presuppositions about
the nature of the circumference of two intersecting circles or shared segments of straight
lines. The image below gives a visual approximation of Zeno’s claim.
That Zeno who was mentioned before says: even if one concedes the principles
of geometry, what follows would not be established, unless it were admitted that
two straight lines cannot have a common segment. If that is not granted, the
construction of the equilateral triangle is not demonstrated. For, he says: let AB
be the straight line on which we have to construct the equilateral triangle. Let
the circles be drawn, and from their point of intersection draw the lines CEA
and CEB having CE as a common segment. It follows that although the lines
from the point of intersection are equal to the given line AB, it is no longer the
case that the sides of the triangle are equal; no, the two others are shorter than
AB. But if that is not granted, what follows could no longer be granted either.
Therefore, says Zeno, even granted the principles, the consequences do not follow
unless this too is first presupposed: neither circumferences nor straight lines can




Figure 6: Zeno’s Equilateral Triangle
In consideration of the image above, when we suppose that CE is the common segment
for both CEA and CEB, it must be the case that segments AE and BE are shorter in
length than AB. From this it follows that the triangle constructed in the intersection of the
two circles cannot be equilateral. Zeno’s point is that for Proposition 1.1 to be a proof we
must presuppose that two independent straight lines cannot have shared line segments, and
neither can the circumferences of circles. Otherwise, we form triangles like that in Figure 5,
which are clearly not equilateral triangles.
The force of this argument is that even given the set of axioms available in the Elements,
we are required to assume facts about the nature of the circumference of circles and straight
lines in order to even begin the proof of Proposition 1.1. If we are to give demonstrations of
these facts, then, complains Zeno in F47E, there will always be undemonstrated assumptions
in any proof of any proposition. Hidden in Zeno’s complaint is a claim about rigorous
mathematical proof. Given his insistence upon only using those axioms which are either
demonstrated or previous assumed as first principles, he insists that the only legitimate
proofs are those which contain inferences involving only demonstrable or basic axioms and
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truths, respectively.
While Zeno had good intentions in wanting to eliminate all of the spooky assumptions
involved in many of the proofs in Euclid’s Elements, we will see below that Euclid, Aristo-
tle, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics were all justified in their widespread use of geometric
intuition. For now, however, it is enough to note that traditional proofs of these geometric
claims all heavily rely on the use of intuition in the course of their respective rigorous proofs.
4.2.3 Finite Inference Proof
Let’s now turn to a case in which we employ heavy mathematical machinery in order to
prove a case about finite mathematical objects. Below I give a proof of a Structure Theorem
for Finitely Generated Modules of a Principle Ideal Domain. This kind of proof features
heavily in areas such as modern abstract algebra. A note to the reader: if one is so inclined,
please feel free to quickly browse this section as I go into great mathematical detail before
finally proving the theorem. The import of this case study is that (i) both real and ideal
methods are used in the course of proof, (ii) the result hold for finitely generated objects,
and (iii) much of mathematics incites this interplay between the real and ideal. However,
this proof (and those similar) share in the characteristics incited below for all real proof
methodologies.
So, to begin, I consider a few definitions that are relevant in the course of the proof of
the structure theorem.
Definition 1. A ring is a nonempty set R with two operations, addition and multiplication,
satisfying the following:
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1. Under addition, R is abelian,
2. Multiplication is associative
3. a(b+ c) = ab+ bc, and (b+ c)a = ba+ ca, ∀a, b, c ∈ R.
Examples of rings include (Z,+, ·) the set of integers together with addition and multi-
plication of integers, (Q,+, ·) the set of rationals with addition and multiplication of ratio-
nals, and (K[x],+, ·) the set of polynomials with a single variable along with addition and
multiplication of polynomials.
Definition 2. A ring R is an integral domain if 0 6= 1 and whenever r, s ∈ R and rs = 0,
then either r = 0 or s = 0.
Examples of integral domains include Z, any field, any subring of an integral domain,
and if R is an integral domain then so is R[x].
Definition 3. Let R be an integral domain. Then, a Euclidean Function is a function
d : R\{0} → Z≥0 s.t.
1. d(fg) ≥ max{d(f), d(g)}
2. ∀f, g ∈ R\{0}, ∃q, r ∈ R s.t. f = qg + r and either r = 0 or d(r) < d(g).
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Examples of Euclidean functions include:
1. R = Z, where d(n) = |n|
2. R = R[x], where d(f) = deg(f)
3. R = Z[i], the Gaussian integers
Definition 4. Let R be an integral domain. R is an Euclidean Domain if it admits a Eu-
clidean function.
Definition 5. Let R be a ring. An ideal of R is a subset I ⊆ R s.t. I is a subgroup under
addition, and if x ∈ I, r ∈ R, then rx ∈ I and xr ∈ I.
Examples of ideals include the following:
1. nZ ⊆ Z where nZ is an ideal and Z is a ring.
2. Let R = Mn(R), and Z(R) = {aI|a ∈ R}. Then Z(R) is a subring of R, but it is not
an ideal. The only ideals are either all of R or 0.
3. Let R = R[x], and I = {f(x) ∈ R[x]|f(0) = 0}. I is then an abelian subgroup under
addition, and it is an ideal of R.
Definition 6. An ideal I in a ring R is principal if it is equal to (r) for some r ∈ R. Then,
a principal ideal domain is a domain in which every ideal is principal.
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Lemma 1. Euclidean domain ⇒ Principal Ideal Domain
Proof. Let I be an ideal of R, a Euclidean domain. Then let q ∈ I be a minimal element.
From this it follows that I must be generated by q since for any f ∈ I we get that f = qg+r
for some g, r with d(r) < d(g). Then, r = 0 since otherwise r would be a nonzero element
smaller than q, which contradicts our assumption. Hence, Euclidean domain implies PID.
Definition 7. Let R be any ring. A nonempty set M is said to be an R-module if M is an
abelian group under operations M ×M → M where (m,n) 7→ m + n and M ×M → M
where (r,m) 7→ rm satisfying:
1. 1 ·m = m
2. r(m + n) = rm + rn
3. r(sm) = (rs)m
4. (r + s)m = rm + sm
for all m,n ∈ M and r, s ∈ R.
Examples of R-modules include:
1. Let R = Z, and either M = Z, M = Zn for n ∈ N, or M = Z/nZ for n ∈ N.
2. For Kn and X an n×n-matrix with values in K, if f(x) ∈ K[x] and v ∈ Kn, then f ·v =
f(X)v ∈ Kn. Then, if f(x) = ∑di=0 aixi, then f(X) = a0I + a1X + a2X2 + · · ·+ adXd.
We can then check that this makes Kn a K-module.
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Definition 8. For R an ring, let S ⊆M be a subgroup of the R-module M. Then S is called
a submodule of M if whenever r ∈ R and s ∈ S, then rs ∈ S.
Definition 9. If M is an R-module and if M1, ...,Ms are submodules of M, then M is said to
be the direct sum of M1, ...,Ms if every element m ∈ M can be written in a unique manner
as m = m1 + · · ·+ms where m1 ∈M1, ...,ms ∈Ms.
Definition 10. An R-module M is said to be cyclic if there is an element m0 ∈M s.t. every
m ∈M is of the form m = rm0, where r ∈ R.
Definition 11. An R-module M is said to be finitely generated if there exist elements
a1, ..., an ∈M s.t. every m ∈M is of the form m = r1a1 + · · · rnan.
Definition 12. For M an abelian group with a finite generator set, the generating sets hav-
ing as few elements as possible are called minimal generating sets. The number of elements
in such a minimal generating set is called the rank of M.
The Structure Theorem
Before we give a proof of the structure theorem for finitely generated modules over a
principal ideal domain, let me first explain how the division algorithm (recall from Chapter
3 in the case of the set Q) applies in the case of Z and K[x]. Using the Euclidean algorithm
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and Lemma 1 we can then prove that both Z and K[x] are PID. Furthermore, the use of the
division algorithm will be explicit in the proof of the structure theorem to follow.
I will not prove the following two propositions here, but I instead explain their applica-
tions in the case of integers and polynomials.
Proposition 1. Given a, d ∈ Z, with d ≥ 1, there exists unique q, r ∈ Z s.t. a = qd+ r and
0 ≤ r < d.
This proposition tells us that we can find the greatest common divisor of two integers by
repeated use of division with remainder so long as the remainder is strictly not greater than
the smaller of the two integers compared. So, for example, we can find the greatest common
divisor of 1734282 and 452376 using the algorithm (as I cannot simply intuit the solution by
merely looking at these two integers) as follows:
1734282 = 3× 452376 + 377154
452376 = 377154 + 75222
377154 = 5× 75222 + 1044
75222 = 72× 1044 + 54
1044 = 19× 54 + 18
54 = 3× 18
From our use of the algorithm we have arrived at GCD(1734282, 452376) = 18. This
result tells us that we can find a smallest positive integer that divides all elements of a given
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set, namely multiples of 1734282 and 452376 in our example. Next, consider the division
algorithm for polynomials. It is very similar to Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. If f, g ∈ K[x], with deg(f) ≥ 1, then there are unique polynomials q(x), r(r)
with g(x) = q(x)f(x) + r(x) and 0 ≤ deg(r(x)) < deg(f(x)).
Using this we can arrive at the greatest common divisor of two polynomials in much the
same way that we did so with the integers. This, in turn, allows us to find the smallest
polynomial with positive degree that divides all elements in the set containing multiples of
our specified polynomials. Now that we see how to find the GCD of two integers and two
polynomials, respectively, we are ready to prove the following pair of corollaries.
Corollary 1. Z is PID.
Proof. Let I ⊆ Z be an ideal of the integers. It I = 0, then we are finished. If I 6= 0, then
there exists an n, the smallest positive integer in I. Then, for any m ∈ I, we can divide m
by n with remainder so that m = qn + r where 0 ≤ r < n. Then r = m − qn ∈ I, which
forces r = 0. So m = qn ∈ (n). So, I = (n), and hence Z is PID.
Next we see that nearly the same argument can be made for the case of the ring of
polynomials K[x] with a single variable over a field with coefficients in K.
Corollary 2. K[x] is PID.
Proof. Let I ⊆ K[x] be an ideal. To show that K[x] is a principal ideal domain we need
to show that I is principal. So, if I = 0, then we are done. However, let I 6= 0 with
f(x) ∈ I, a polynomial with minimal degree. Then, for any g(x) ∈ I we can divide g(x)
by f(x) to get a remainder. We write this as g(x) = q(x)f(x) + r where 0 ≤ r < f(x).
118
Then r = g(x) − q(x)f(x) ∈ I. Since f(x) is minimal in I it follow that r = 0. So,
g = q(x)f(x) ∈ (f(x)). Because g(x) was chosen arbitrarily it follows that I = (f(x)).
Hence, K[x] is a principal ideal domain.
Now that we have a list of all the necessary definitions, propositions, and lemmas, we
can now give a proof of the structure theorem.
Theorem 1 (Structure Theorem). Let R be a PID. Then, any finitely generated R-module,
M, is the direct sum of a finite number of cyclic submodules.
Proof (By Induction on the order of generators of M). Here I only prove the theorem in the
special case of Euclidean rings.
.
Let M be a finitely generated R-module.
Base Case : Suppose M is generated by a single element. So, it is cyclic. Hence, our
result follows.
Inductive Step : Suppose that the result is true for all abelian groups up to an element
with order n− 1, and that the order of a generating element b ∈M is n. Given any minimal
generating set b1, ..., bn of M there must be r1, ..., rn ∈ Z s.t. r1b1 + · · · + rnbn = 0, and in
which not all of r1b1, ..., rnbn are 0. Among all possible such relations for all minimal generat-
ing sets there is a smaller possible positive integer occurring as a coefficient. Let this integer
be s1 and let the generating set for which it occurs be a1, ..., an. Then, s1a1 + · · ·+ snan = 0.
119
Claim 1 : If r1a1 + · · ·+ rnan = 0, then s1|r1 for r1 = ms1 + t with 0 ≤ t < s1.
(Proof of Claim 1) Then, multiplying s1a1 + · · · + snan = 0 by m and then subtracting
the result from r1a1 + · · · + rnan = 0 we get ta1 + (r2 −ms2)as + · · · + (rn −msn)an = 0.
Since t < s1 and s1 is the minimal possible positive integer in such a relation, it follows that
t = 0. So, s1|r1 for r1 = ms1 + t with 0 ≤ t < s1. 
Claim 2 : s1|si for i = 2, ..., n.
(Proof of Claim 2) Toward contradiction, suppose s1 - si. Then s1 - s2, so s2 =
m2s1 + t for 0 < t < s1. Now, let a
′
1 = a1 + m2a2, a2, ..., an also generate M , but
s1a
′
1 + ta2 + s3a3 + · · · + snan = 0. From this it follows that t occurs as a coefficient in
some relation among elements of a minimal generating set. This forces (through our choice
of s1) that either t = 0 or t ≥ s1. The latter is a contradiction. Hence t must be 0, and so
s1|s2. 
Now, let a∗1 = a1 +m2a2 + · · ·+mnan and a2, ..., an be the generators of the cyclic module
M . Furthermore, s1a
∗
1 = s1a1 + m2s1a1 + · · · + mns1an = s1a1 + · · · + snan = 0. Next, if
r1a
∗
1 + r2a2 + · · · + rnan = 0 and substituting for a∗1, then it follows that we get a relation
between a1, ..., an so that the coefficient of a1 is r1. So s1|r1 and r1a∗1 = 0. If M1 is the cyclic
module generated by a∗1, and if M2 is the submodule of M generated by a2, ..., an, then we
have shown that M1 ∩M2 = (0). But M1 + M2 = M from above. So, M is the direct sum
of M1 and M2. And, since M2 is generated by a2, ..., an its rank is n − 1. By the inductive
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hypothesis it follows that M2 is the direct sum of cyclic modules. Hence, it follows that we
have decomposed M into a direct sum of cyclic modules.
Now that we have seen a comprehensive proof of the Structure Theorem, we can now
turn to the case that each of the case studies presented in this chapter satisfy properties that
unite them under the banner of epistemic instrument.
4.3 Epistemic Instrumental Aims
In Chapter 3 I identified three characteristic traits that are ubiquitous in proof method-
ologies that legitimately place them under the banner of ideal proof. We saw that the traits
of flawlessness, abstraction, and efficiency were all characteristic of methods that make them
epistemic instruments in our mathematical reasoning. These, however, will not suffice as
characteristic traits of real methods since the first two case studies are neither flawless nor
abstract since they heavily rely on geometric intuition or visual inspections – both of which
are prone to mistakes and a lack of abstract applicability. Similarly the first two cases, as
well as the third, are not necessarily the most efficient way of understanding a given math-
ematical statement since they all need to be observed by a mathematician working on a
human timescale.
Which characteristic traits might we then observe for each of the cases of real methods?
We can start with Hilbert’s own characterization of real methods, namely as those being
finitely observable. That real methods are finitely observable gives them a status as an
epistemic instrument of mathematical understanding since (i) the inferences involved exist
on a finite timescale, and (ii) we are capable of observing each of the inferences so as to check
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whether each statement follows from the prior. It seems, then that a notion of finite can be
pulled apart from a notion of observability. Our real methods should be finite since we, as
human mathematicians, are relegated to only a reasonably short amount of time in order
to give our proofs. So, the characteristic trait of finitude accounts for our limited ability to
never understand or have epistemic access to infinitely-many inferences.
The notion of observability is our ability to check each of the inferences of a proof to
determine whether a latter statement follows from a former. What does it mean to “check”
that an inference is legitimate? For example, in the case of the proof of the Structure
Theorem, to check whether the inferences indeed follow we need only look to the employment
of the previous definitions and lemmae in the course of the proof. However, in the case of
the Old Mint to check whether someone has reached the correct solution we cannot simply
look into the background knowledge of the original prover. Instead, we must examine our
own background beliefs and in some sense prove the solution again to our own satisfaction.
This is to say that real proofs involving diagrammatic reasoning – or even, likely, geometric
intuition – will have many varied methods through which a solution can be found. Given
that we are not in a position to directly “see” the precise solution of a given mathematician,
we cannot as straightforwardly check whether their solution maps onto our own.
I propose, then, that the notion of observability itself can be split into two parts – direct
observation of constituent parts and the observation of the background societal metaphors
used in inference. Direct Observation is the direct comparison of what is written, say,
in the course of a proof. We can determine whether something follows from a particular
definition, for example, by checking how the definition is applied to the situation in question.
Background Observation is then the characteristic whereby one must through introspection
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determine if a particular prover has the relevant socially developed mathematical knowledge
in order to carry out a particular proof. That is, the trait of background observation is akin
to checking whether someone is your epistemic peer.1
Now that we have our characteristic traits of real proof, let’s determine whether each of
our indicative case studies above satisfy them. For the trait of Finitude it should be obvious
that each of diagrammatic reasoning, proof using geometric intuition, and finite proof all
share the characteristic of being finite. After all, in the case of diagrammatic reasoning the
method of proof relies primarily on visual information that itself is immediate to a viewer.
Hence, any proof using such information will not take an infinite amount of time. Similarly
for proof using geometric intuition, we rely on our underlying intuitive understandings of
various geometric concepts, which contribute to proofs that are often no longer than a
paragraph. Finally, for finite proof, it is itself defined by only using finite amounts of time
to find a solution. Hence, each of our case studies, and indeed all real proof, satisfy the
characteristic trait of finitude.
In the case of Direct Observation, diagrammatic reasoning is a somewhat obscured matter.
However, if we consider that diagrammatic proofs must be communicated to others, we can
directly check whether the stated inferences follow from one to the next. This is to say that
one purpose of a mathematical proof is to communicate to others in order to, among other
things, give others an understanding of the legitimacy of the proof. It is this communication,
whether verbal or written, that we can directly check for a convincing proof. Similarly for
1Determining whether someone is your epistemic peer is a massively difficult problem faced in epistemol-
ogy, generally, and formal epistemology, more specifically. I don’t mean to here give an account of what
it means to be someone’s epistemic peer (as it would seriously divert the purpose of this letter). Instead,
I mean to call forth the machinery of epistemic peer as a way in which we can think about observing the
background of our mathematical cohorts.
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the case of proof using geometric intuition, even though there will be significant underlying
intuitions employed in the course of a proof, we are nevertheless capable of directly observing
whether the explicit statements follow from one to the next. Finally, proof using finite means
is itself explicit in each of the moves made in the respective proofs. So, as a matter of
definition, proofs using finite methods are directly observable.
Finally, the trait of Background Observation is not as obvious as the preceding two traits.
Observing the background set of developed mathematical knowledge of a given reasoner in
a particular proof presents many known challenges. The idea of this trait is that when
the background assumptions in real proofs are observable, the proof is only rigorous when
societally appropriate metaphors are used in the process. In the next section I make ex-
plicit metaphors commonly used in real proof. Of course, however, I do not investigate all
metaphors that may be appropriate for a given real proof. Instead, I show that those spec-
ified are enough for our case studies above. This does not take away from the larger point
that observing the metaphors used in a proof will be enough for the proof to be rigorous.
Anyone inducted into a mathematical community will have available an understanding that
such metaphors are used in the proof.
Now, what background observation must be made in the case of diagrammatic reasoning?
After all, in reasoning about situations such as the Old Mint case, any number of background
assumptions could be utilized in the process of finding the correct solution. Before answering
this more difficult question it may be helpful to start first with the case of the Mutilated
Chessboard. To recall, the problem begins by presuming that a standard 8 × 8 chessboard
is arranged in such a way that two opposing white squares from the board are removed or
“off limits”, i.e. there are 62 remaining squares. Then, we are challenged with covering the
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remaining open squares with 31 dominoes of size 2 × 1. As is apparent in Figure 1 above,
there is no way to arrange the dominoes so that the 31 cover all remaining spaces. Instead,
we are left (in one arrangement) with twin opposed squares in the center of the board that
are left open. Hence, any solution to the problem shows that only 30 dominoes can be used
– not 31!.
According to both Max Black, John McCarthy, and others, we come to this conclusion
by “seeing” the solution in mathematical intuition. So, to observe the background of the
reasoner in this case we must somehow peer into one’s intuition. At first, this may seem
both mystical and improbable. However, if we consider the foundations of such mathematical
intuition in the mind, we can start to chip away at the great mystery. In the next section I
identify plausible metaphors used widely in reasoning using real proof. The idea is that as
we develop our mathematical cognition in a society, we all gain a stock of metaphors required
for mathematical reasoning. Then, in cases such as the Mutilated Chessboard (or, as may
now become more obvious, the Old Mint problem) we are able to observe the background
by testing in our own mathematical intuition whether the stated steps for solving a given
diagrammatic problem follows. So, observing the background amounts to a kind of test of
shared intuitive epistemic instruments in proof.
Diagrammatic reasoning will ultimately rest on various spatial metaphors, and so dia-
grammatic reasoning satisfies the trait of background observation. Let’s now turn to the case
of reasoning through geometric intuition. In the examples above wherein one is tasked with
proving that an equilateral triangle may be constructed from a given line, we saw (through
Zeno’s criticism) that notions such as line, circumference, and point all involve geometric in-
tuition. Specifically, Zeno worried that the construction of a equilateral triangle was heavily
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dependent on where and how two lines meet at a given point. Given that an understanding
of line (nor for that matter of point or circumference) is ever made explicit in Euclid, we can
see Zeno’s puzzlement as predicting this very worry of observing background assumptions in
proof employing geometric intuition. Because of this, it seems that any proof utilizing such
methods are suspect as regards the rigor of such a proof.
Posidonius, himself, has given us insight into why we may not be swayed by an attack
such as Zeno’s. Posidonius focuses on the implied information given by the postulate of line.
As we will see, it is enough to know that CEA and CEB are not two distinct lines sharing
a segment given that the postulate of line teaches us that “a straight line is a line that lies
evenly with all points on itself”.
But Posidonius says that a proof like that occurs nowhere in any elementary
treatise on mathematics, and that Zeno is adopting sharp practice against math-
ematicians of his own day by implying that they use a bad proof. But there is
an account to give even of this proof. For, however you look at it, there is a line
at right angles to each of the two straight lines, for any two straight lines can
form a right angle. And that was presupposed in the definition of right angle.
For it is only from such an inclination that we establish a right angle. So let it be
this one which we have erected. In addition, Posidonius adds, Epicurus himself
agrees and all other philosophers agree to entertain many hypotheses that are
possible and many that are materially impossible in order to contemplate their
consequence. (F47H)
Posidonius begins the passage with an ad hominem attack on Zeno that is not of any
import here. However, he does point out just what I alluded to above, namely that there
can be no proof for a hypothesis (definition) as that is how we have come to understand the
notion of right angle. Right angles have the properties they do only through their definition,
which themselves arise out of our shared conceptual mathematical metaphors. Posidonius
then ends the passage with a remark about the state of actually doing mathematics. “...
Posidonius asserts that one has to accept some hypotheses (definitions) ... and implies
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that Zeno was against accepting any at all” (Posidonius 1973). This remark distinguished
Posidonius’ view that mathematics was not, like the Epicureans maintained, an empirical
science. Instead, in conjunction with his logical standpoint, valid inferences were to depend
on “the implied force of an axiom” (Meuler 1972).
It is from these early musings on the nature of definition that we may conclude that
diagrammatic reasoning satisfies the characteristic trait of background observation just in
case the proofs made utilizing such inferences are informed by the socially constructed set
of conceptual metaphor. Let’s now turn to the case study of proofs requiring only finite
inference. In this case study I gave my proof of a Structure Theorem for Finitely Generated
Modules of a Principle Ideal Domain. In order to do so I relied on definitions of rings,
ideals, R-modules, submodules, etc. Each of these rest on an understanding of set, subset,
arithmetic operations, and containment (to name a few). As we saw in the previous chapter,
each of these can be partially explained by the supervenience of Containment Schemas. Given
that Containment Schemas are necessary for the later (inductive) proof of the designated
Structure Theorem, we see that proofs using finite inferences will satisfy the characteristic
trait of background observation since the convincing nature and rigor of the proof depends
on our having such schema.
We should note how my proof of the Structure Theorem also includes an induction. One
may be worried that I slid in an ideal proof in real clothing. We need not worry about this
accusation since the induction ranges only over finite cyclic submodules. So, we are safe in
the announcement that the proof is finite. In any case, we are now in a position to notice
that all of the identified forms of real proof (with the understanding that there are various
others) all satisfy the characteristic traits of real proof. These characteristic traits are then
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indicative of a class of proof whose methodologies are epistemic instruments helping us to
achieve mathematical knowledge and understanding. They are epistemic instruments since
their finite nature allows them to be comprehended by someone on a human timescale, and
their observability – both direct and background – will prove fruitful in convincing us of the
relative rigor assigned. In the next section, we will investigate which metaphors give us the
transparency of observation.
4.4 Metaphor in Real Proof
In a similar vein as the last section of the previous chapter, I in this section identify
some of the conceptual metaphors that ground both the real proofs in the case studies above
as well as many other forms of real proof. The goal, of course, will be to show in the next
chapter that we can develop an epistemic bridge between real and ideal methods. With
the next piece of the puzzle presented below, we will be in good standing for a legitimate
epistemic bridge.
Let’s now investigate some of the metaphors. These will again include Container Schemas,
and the Classes are Containers metaphor. However, we must also utilize the Space-as-Set-of-
Points metaphor, and a special case of the Basic Metaphor of Infinity (BMI). Containment
Schemas, again arise from a wide variety of non-mathematical embodies concepts in every-
day life. The mathematician then takes mathematical objects such as sets, subsets, and
bounded intervals as embodying this natural containment schema. And again, the Classes
are Containers metaphor builds on the pre-theoretical Container Schema in order to bound
some region of space or other and then determining whether some element or other is inside
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or outside the bounded region.
Image Schemas are expanded versions of Container Schemas. Some of these Image
Schemas include the Above, In, and Landmark schemas (to name a few). Image schemas
are interesting because they pair visual processes with conceptual processes in reasoning.
These schemas identify various aspects of, say a diagram, as having partial structure about
which we can reason. So, the Above schema adds directional structure, the In schema makes
a distinction between what is within a boundary and what is without, and the Landmark
schema adds level structure to our Container Schemas. These Image Schemas are how we
are able to conceptualize images given to us visually as well as tools for how we may start
to reason about entities found within the visual representations.
Turning now to the Space-as-Set-of-Points metaphor, the conceptual picture painted here
takes space as merely a set of elements. So, building off both Container Schemas and the
Classes are Containers metaphor, we can view points as the elements in the set of space with
the understanding that any object that can be a member of a set may act as a point in space
(in virtue of them being members of a given set). Then, objects like planes, lines, circles
(and other geometric figures) are simply sets which contain points arranged in particular
ways. All that identifies the set line is that the constituent points are aligned in such as a
way as comport with axioms of a line in, say, Euclidean Geometry. The same goes for, say,
circles, which are identified by a suitable distance function between any point in the figure
and the center of the figure. For example, suppose that we have a point located at (a, b) on
a plane, with another point located at (x, y). Then the distance r =
√
(x− a)2 + (y − b)2
shows us that all other points with that distance, r, from (a, b) describes a circle. Hence,
our understanding of circle is of the set consisting of all points with distance r from (a, b)
129
(or, equivalently, |r − (a, b)|) in the plane of real numbers R.
Finally, real methods (especially ones relying on geometric or diagrammatic reasoning)
will be founded on a special case of the BMI. That is, when reasoning about objects in
space we seem to have the natural expectation that space is continuous. However, discrete
mathematics, e.g. points, lines, etc., is the primary domain in which finite real reasoning
operates. So, the challenge uncovered by Lakoff and Nu˜n´ez was how we can conceptualize
continuous space as discrete given that the two concepts are polar opposites. Naturally
continuous space is our everyday embodied conception of what we take space to be. However,
in mathematics, we have developed a completely unrelated notion of space, discrete space,
which – it is argued – takes the Space-as-a-Set-of-Points metaphor combined with the BMI
to form an infinitely contained set of points. Space is then a kind of very large set with
infinitely-many points that themselves have neither length nor breadth. The reason that
this special version of the BMI is necessary for real mathematics is that, like sets, we are
able to find subspaces of the entire discretized space.
For example, consider the set J = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. This set contains subsets M ⊆ J =
{2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and B ⊆ J = {4, 5, 6}. And, further, there is a natural containment relation
J ⊇ M ⊇ B where J contains all the elements of M , and M contains all the elements of
B. Similarly, our conceptual understanding of discretized space takes space as described
by the BMI, and then sets the bounds of a subspace large enough for operations of, say,
geometric constructions. In the previous chapter we saw how the Classes are Containers
metaphor can be mapped onto various algebraic operations. So, it is the case that our set
of discretized space will exhibit similar algebraic manipulations. Hence, we are able to find
a subset suitable for a given (geometric) task at hand.
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Let us now discern how each of the case studies above necessitate one or more of the
identified conceptual metaphors. In diagrammatic reasoning we are presented with visual
representations that seemingly contain all of the information needed to arrive at a convincing
solution. Our task is to identify through visual processes the conceptual resources needed to
find a solution. As such we will employ any many Image Schemas in our reasoning process.
Insofar as we all are capable of adding this kind of structure to our Container Schemas, it
should come of no surprise that the solutions arrived at will be available to all who have
developed a suitably complete structure to their Container Schemas. So, diagrammatic
reasoning at least relies on Image Schemas (if not others).
Reasoning using geometric intuition will rely on a host of conceptual metaphors. In
order to construct any of our geometric figures we must utilize our conceptual resources of
Container Schemas, the Space-as-Set-of-Points metaphor, and the special case of the BMI.
Then, when we construct our geometric figures we have as justification for our intuition about
the nature of a line, for example, the relation of points to a given distance function. This
will hold for all such geometric figures that we wish to construct, and so Zeno’s criticism of
Posidonius’ construction of an equilateral triangle from a given finite line will no longer hold.
From this it follows that the at one time seemingly spooky nature of using geometric intuition
of proof falls away with the development of discretized space and all of the algebraic structure
therein. Finally, the case study of finite proof, which gave a proof of a Structure Theorem
in abstract algebra using many notions of set containment, spaces, and distance functions,
uses the robust conceptual metaphor of the BMI as well as each of Container Schemas,
Space-as-Set-of-Points metaphor, and Classes are Containers metaphor. For example, the
notion of a submodule rested on the notions of subgroup, R-module, and ring. A ring is a
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subspace of discretized space along with two algebraic operations. A group is a collection of
elements along with either addition or multiplication, and so a subgroup is a special kind of
subset of a group. Finally, a R-module is a kind of group that includes an identity elements,
an algebraic operation, and the elements satisfy further algebraic properties. Each of these
notions are then all conceptualized under the Classes are Containers metaphor. The other
concepts involved in the proof of the Structure Theorem will be similarly conceptualized
using one of the metaphors identified above. Hence, finite proofs such as my own will be
beholden to the metaphors above (as well as possibly many others).
4.5 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. Above, we developed three primary case studies that were suspected
of being real methods of proof. It was then in the third section that we saw that each
of the case studies satisfied the characteristic traits of real methods. These characteristic
methods were evidence that real proofs are epistemic instruments through which we can
gain convincing, rigorous mathematical proof and understanding. Following this I identified
a number of conceptual metaphor, which are responsible for our abilities to use real methods.
In the next chapter we will finally be ready to see the result of all that has come before,
namely the development of an epistemic bridge principle between real and ideal methods.
The principle will take as evidence the deeply shared cognitive conceptual metaphors that
are used in both real and ideal methods. From there, in chapter 6, we will use the newly
minted bridge principle to offer a way of dissolving both the Division Problem as well as the
chokehold that Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems pose for Hilbert’s Program.
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Chapter 5
An Epistemic Bridge Principle
“... mathematics is a motley [cru¨e] of techniques and proofs.”
– Ludwig Wittgenstein
5.1 Introduction
We have arrived at the long awaited (and long promised) chapter where an epistemic
bridge between real proof and ideal without losing any of the content from real proof nor the
far reaching epistemic abilities of ideal proof is finally laid bare. To get here I have developed
a social constructivist ontological picture that exhibits all of the features we require out of
a metaphysics of mathematics as well as one that does not fall prey to epistemic worries
like other ontologies on the market.1 This metaphysics then paved the way for cognitive
account of mathematics, which relies on many conceptual metaphors as an analysis of where
mathematics comes from in the mind.
1To be clear, and has been the case throughout, I do not mean to align with the usual understanding of
Constructivist, but instead with that as developed in Chapter 1.
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Assuming that my readers are still on board with the project, this chapter makes use of the
cognitive picture developed above. I then argue that – given the deeply interrelated nature
of conceptual metaphor – an epistemic picture can be developed which shows that when
reasoning using real methodologies we rely on non-finitary concepts, and when reasoning
using ideal methodologies we rely on a multitude of underlying finite concepts. Then, insofar
as both real and ideal methods are complicit in both real and ideal reasoning, we are able
to employ the epistemic power of ideal methods in real proof, and we employ the deep
mathematical content from real methods in ideal proof. This deep connection between the
methodologies will be the brick and mortar of an epistemic bridge operating between the
two.
This epistemic bridge principle (EBP) has implications for both mathematical reasoning
and rationality as well as for mathematical knowledge. Taking the latter first, one implication
for mathematical knowledge is that insofar as real and ideal methods are so connected, we
will be in the desirable position of knowing that proofs resulting from either method will be
both convincing and rigorous. I make a case for this in §5.4.2 below, but (for now) the idea is
that our ideal methods – seemingly problematically – do not appear to contain concepts that
can be held in some concrete way. In the literature we find evidence that humans reliably
attain knowledge from concrete ideas. The case for ideas attaining concreteness is far more
suspect. However, as I have above argued, ideal methods (via the EBP) are compositions
of real methods. With this we – mathematicians – are reliable at attaining knowledge using
ideal methods!2 Toward the former, mathematical reasoning and rationality, through the
EBP, no longer confines us to real methodologies for infinitary proofs (as Hilbert was so
2I would like to thank Jennifer Carr for her helpful insights pointing out this contentious assumption!
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deeply concerned). Not only can we reason in the ideal, but also the results will hold on a
human time scale.
In what follows I begin in §2 with an analysis of the foundations of conceptual metaphor
in mathematical cognition. It is here that we discover the complex foundations for the
connections of conceptual metaphor. Following this, in §3, I analyze a way in which our
mathematical metaphor exhibit a structure of increasing complexity. This will give a natural
ordering of conceptual metaphor. In §4 I argue from §2 & 3 for EBP. Contained within will
be implications of EBP for both mathematical reasoning and mathematical knowledge.
5.2 The Grounding of Conceptual Metaphor
As we have seen in Chapter 2, basic cognitive capacities for mathematical ability is not
special among animals, generally speaking. However, what has been shown in depth from
the many studies presented is an evolutionary lineage of for the capability of non-verbal
arithmetic. To recall, non-verbal arithmetic can be characterized as the ability to recognize
differences in magnitudes given a pair of nonidentical sets of, say, dot arrays. So closely
are we tied evolutionary to our cognitive brethren that rhesus monkeys perform admirably
similarly to undergraduate students. However, it is not until we make the leap to humans
that advanced abilities in mathematics – what we can rightfully call advanced mathematics
– becomes possible. This advanced ability may be attributed to a set of cognitive capacities
that outstrip the capacities of non-human animals. This section investigates which capacities
are crucial to the development of conceptual metaphor in mathematics.
Various capacities have been identified in the cognitive scientific literature over the past
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decade and a half. Some of these capacities include (but are not limited to) grouping,
subitizing, pairing, and symbolizing. So, the grouping capacity allows us to distinguish what
is being counted. Subitizing allows us to quickly recognize small numbers, pairing allows
for the sequential pairing of numbers and objects, and symbolizing allows for associating
symbols with numbers (or other mathematical objects. These capacities and others all
underlie our more advanced mathematical capacities, namely metaphorical and conceptual
blending capacities. The ability to group, subitize, and pair are all evident in non-human
animals. It is with the rise of the ability to symbolize that we can use metaphorical reasoning
and blending. The metaphorical capacity is a kind of generalization of symbolizing since
metaphorical thinking is the conceptualization of our symbolizations of things like numbers
and arithmetic operations onto higher order structures such as groups or distance functions.
While these capacities have been identified in more or less generalization in previous
chapters, it is our capacity of conceptual blending that will be of utmost importance for
what is to follow. Conceptual blending is our capacity to form correspondences across various
metaphorical domains with the intent to develop more complex metaphorical domains. As
an example of what it means to form complex metaphors consider the conceptual blending
example of the Space as a Set of Points metaphor from the previous chapter. This metaphor
takes space as a set of elements, which are denoted as points. The notion of point blends
container schemas with the classes are container metaphor to form a correspondence to
elements in a set, which we can generalize as a space. In developing a notion of space we
have effectively blended lower metaphors (in a sense to be defined below) in service of the
correspondence to a set that contains elements. We need not stop here, of course. In order
to gain an understanding of a geometric figure such as a circle, say, we blend our capacity
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for grouping with the Space as a Set of Points metaphor to identify a correspondence to a
so-called distance function. This newly formed distance function then gives rise to notions
like distances between two points or the set of all points equidistant from a given point. The
blends of conceptual metaphors give rise to the ability for understanding circle, which exists
in space.
When our conceptual blends consist of previously developed conceptual metaphors, we
call them metaphorical blends. Once we move beyond ideas such as number, point, or
basic arithmetic, we become engaged in an activity of metaphorical blending. As it turns
out, understanding mathematics can then be understood as the mastering of the complex
networks of metaphorical blends. We are getting ahead of ourselves somewhat. While it
is the case that conceptual blending, and then metaphorical blending is what grounds our
ability to do higher mathematics, we still need an explanation of what it is that grounds
our most basic mathematical abilities, arithmetic and number theory. Well before the recent
cognitive scientific exploration of mathematical cognition, Moritz Pasch – in 1882 – predicted
the grounding of our most basic geometric and arithmetic understandings in commonplace
physical phenomena. According to Pasch, when we symbolize a proof we develop basic
axioms from semantic content. This is to say that he distinguished between the empirical
and the deductive aspects of proof. Pasch held that we must start with empirical core ideas of
mathematical objects before being able to rigorously develop mathematical theories. This is
to say that before we can deductively reason about polygons, for example, we must first have
experience of (some) polygons. The same goes for any other simple geometric or arithmetic
object. It is only from a grounded experience of physical phenomena that we can develop
our geometric and arithmetic ideas in the first place.
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“In fact, if geometry is genuinely deductive [given its empirical core], the process
of deducing must be in all respects independent of the sense of the geometrical
concepts, just as it must be independent of figures; only the relations set out
between the geometrical concepts used in the propositions ... concerned ought to
be taken into account.” (Pasch, 1882a)
A rigorous proof, for Pasch, involved developing the fewest core empirical ideas that are
the simplest possible so that the deductions that proceed from axioms built upon these ideas
retain the epistemological status of the core ideas themselves.3 Pasch explains that we retain
understanding of mathematical ideas through a list of features that the core ideas must have.
Moving away from Pasch’s terminology, mathematical proof – on this picture – occurs in the
move from observation to propositions. We repeatedly observe the objects whose contents
fully characterize our core ideas, and from the iterated viewing we express propositions that
describe the relations between core ideas. Pasch holds that any regularity that occurs must
be kept track of using non diagrammatic or intuitive syntactic means, and then no recourse
to empirical notions is necessary for the remainder of a proof. As the above quote highlights,
proofs then carry on independently of core concepts of mathematics.
Of course, I here part ways with Pasch. My thesis is that we can’t but involve core
mathematical concepts in mathematical proof. However, this historical aside very nicely
illustrates the current understanding of the grounding of some of our simple mathematical
ideas. A current hypothesis (from Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez) is that we begin conceptualizing various
arithmetic (geometric) operations at a very early age without the use of symbolization. For
3Of course, there may be issues surrounding the way in which Pasch developed his empirical conceptual
schema, but this would take us too far astray.
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example, when given a collection of three objects in front of a child, the hypothesis implies
that the child correlates addition with adding objects to the collections. As this and similar
correlations aggregate regularly, neural connections between sensory information becomes
connected to basic arithmetic operations like addition.
Pasch predicted such a connection in his position that empirical core ideas of mathe-
matical objects were necessary before being able to perform rigorous mathematical proof.
So, for example, before we can reason about geometric figures, we must first correlate the
manipulations of blocks or triangles with fitting blocks into a square grid game. As these
correlations aggregate, the hypothesis above implies that neural connections between these
kinds of sensory information are then connected to geometric operations like rotation. Such
neural connections constitute the most primitive conceptual metaphor at the neural level,
namely, in the case of arithmetic anyway, the Arithmetic is Object Collection metaphor.
There is much evidence for this kind of neural-level conceptual metaphor given how we
teach mathematics at a very low level. When we first learn to add and subtract a standard
method for teaching the operations are through an application of adding to and taking away
from a given group of objects. We assume that a physical corollary exists before any formal
training, and then we build upon the concept to develop higher level concepts.
Now that we have these two resources, namely capacities for the development of concep-
tual metaphor in mathematics and evidence that our most primitive metaphors are reliant
on sensory-motor physical phenomena, we can move to the next section where I take the
important capacity for conceptual blending and impose a gradually increasing structure on
our higher level metaphors. By gradually increasing structure I mean that there will be
levels of conceptual metaphor corresponding to the method of proof for which they are re-
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sponsible. The conceptual metaphors will be increasing along the dimensions of complexity
– where complexity may be a measure of the number, say, of other metaphors used in the
development of a given novel metaphor. The connection between physical phenomena and
conceptual metaphor will not be lost in this structure, which will ultimately ground EBP.
5.3 A Natural Ordering on Conceptual Metaphor
In this section I argue for an ordering of conceptual metaphor, which places primitive
metaphors lower in cognition than more advanced metaphors. In order to place such an
ordering relation, we need define < and ≤ as relations of cognitive complexity, and we need
a way of discerning which features make a given metaphor higher or lower in the ordering.
In what follows in this section, I will take on the latter problem first as it seems a clearer
task given the work of chapters 3, 4, and the section above. I follow this investigation by
returning to the order relation in kind. To begin, consider a representation of the kind of
ordering I have in mind:
M1 = φ1 ≤ φ2 ≤ · · · ≤ φn−1 ≤ φn = Mn
In this representation we take Mi with i ∈ N to be a conceptual metaphor, each of the
φi with i ∈ N to be metaphors of increasing complexity, and the ordering relation ≤ to
mean either < or = as well as to identify metaphors of differing levels of complexity. It
is important that the ordering relation not be strictly increasing (decreasing) nor strictly
equivalent. In order to achieve a more realistic ordering among metaphors it seems plausible
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that some metaphor be strictly more complex than its predecessor, but it could also be the
case that two metaphors share the same level of complexity. In this case we want to be sure
that our ordering relation can handle either state of conceptual relation.
A note of warning before we begin: We should not confuse the ordering relation under
development as excluding content from a metaphor of lower complexity to a metaphor of
greater complexity. That is, the ordering relation will be constitutive of more metaphorical
resources needed to differentiate metaphors of greater complexity from those of less. It will
not be the case that those conceptual resources with more complexity are in some sense
more general, and hence lacking of particular detail or content. Avoiding this pitfall saves
us from a one way bridge principle like that of Hilbert’s original position concerning the
relation between real and ideal methods.
There are at least two ways of characterizing the notion of complexity. Given how I
have set up the problem of ordering conceptual metaphor, I have assumed that conceptual
metaphors follow a kind of “ordered complexity” following Weaver (1948). To understand
ordered complexity it may be helpful to first consider its antipole, namely disorganized
complexity. A disorganized complex system is one in which we must treat the phenomena
of a system using probability theory and statistical analysis. As an example consider a
particular gas contained within a sealed container. When first introduced into the container,
the gas is a dense cloud located in one part of the container. In that moment the gas is well
organized, but over time the gas molecules spread out over the volume of the container in
highly random distributions. The only way to analyze the movement of an individual gas
molecule is to use probability theory to track its trajectory. We may worry that anything
worthy of being a complex cognitive system may be prone to this kind of statistical analysis
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of complexity. However, as we have seen over the past few chapters, even though there are
various characteristics of a given metaphor, we have correlations that reduce the number
of variables into a more manageable and uniform differentiable structure. As we will see
shortly, we can identify the characteristics inherent in a given conceptual metaphor, which
implies that such characteristics are not random. Insofar as these characteristics are not
random, our notion of complexity need not be disorganized.
Instead, I claim that conceptual metaphors of mathematical cognition can be analyzed as
a system of organized complexity. As an example of an organized complex system consider
the example of a mechanical watch. A mechanical watch works when the main spring (the
bit you are winding when you turn the crown) drives a series of gears that power the balance
wheel (the bit that moves back and forth). The force of the balance wheel then enables the
escapement to move more gears at discrete intervals. These discretely moving gears yield
the regular movement of the hour, minute, and second hands (See Figure 1 below). The
non-random correlation between each of the organized parts of the watch then manifests
properties that are not inherent in any of the particular gears or springs. The emergent
property of the internal parts of the watch working together is that of organization as well
as of keeping time.
Conceptual metaphor should not be viewed as a disorganized system even though there
are many variants among the metaphors. This is because once we have the grounding of
metaphors as above, there is not a random distribution of grounding metaphors as more and
more complex metaphors are developed. This is to say that unlike the random movement of
gas particles in a container, conceptual metaphors enjoy a systematic development. As we
will see shortly, conceptual metaphors have an organized structure similar to that of the me-
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Figure 7: Mechanical Watch Movement
chanical watch example. It will become evident that each metaphor occupies a certain place
in the hierarchy of complexity. This ordering will then manifest mathematical cognition,
and so an emergent property of the organized system of mathematical conceptual metaphor
is mathematical cognition.
Now that we have a rough understanding of the kind of complexity we are after for
conceptual metaphor, let’s discern which features of conceptual metaphor locate the corre-
sponding level of complexity. One such characteristic is the aggregated correlation of physical
phenomena with low level mathematical abilities, which then form neural connections in the
mind. On the cognitive view I have so far developed, our fundamental conceptual metaphors
located at the neuronal level has the adverse effect (for organized complexity, anyway) of the
need to spell out the organization of neural pathways. Given that such an identification is
hard problem (in the computational sense from Chapter 4), were we to require that neural
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pathway identification is a necessary characteristic for our natural ordering of complexity,
we would never get off the ground with an attempt to order our conceptual metaphors.
Instead, our first positive characteristic for identifying complexity, we need only guarantee
that our conceptual metaphors are grounded in the right sort of ways. That is, the first
characteristics trait of complexity is being Properly Grounded in the aggregated correlation
of physical phenomenon to mathematical ideas. This has two implications for our developing
structure. The first is that if our conceptual metaphors are grounded in the right sort of
phenomena, then a given metaphor so grounded can be located on our increasing scale of
complexity. The second is that if a given metaphor is not grounded in the usual way, then we
may rightfully locate the metaphor as on the upper end of complexity. This follows from the
fact that our usual routes of developing the metaphor will not be available. Hence, there will
be some other, less obvious method for grounding the metaphor that does not comport with
our typical cognitive development and so will be of a much more sophisticated metaphorical
kind.
A second characteristic trait is the Use of Conceptual Blends. Conceptual blending, as
has been discussed above, is a primary method for both developing the elements existing
within a low level conceptual metaphor as well as in the development of metaphors which
employ the resources from a number of other conceptual metaphors. This entails that the
trait of Use of Conceptual Blends can be subdivided into smaller subtraits such as (i) Level
of Conceptual Blends, or (ii) Number of Conceptual Blends. We can parse the Level of
Conceptual Blends as the trait that discerns at which rank the blending is occurring. For
example, a neural level conceptual metaphor blends the aggregates of physical phenomena
with our symbolizing capacity, and the Space as a Set of Points metaphor blends metaphors
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such as the BMI with the Classes are Containers metaphor. So, the characteristic subtrait of
Level of Conceptual Blends places more complex metaphors as those that blend conceptual
metaphors, and basic metaphors as those that blend physical correlations. Then, the sub-
trait of Number of Conceptual Blends distinguishes among metaphors that may or may not
have the same Level of Conceptual Blends. Quite simply, in order to distinguish between
two metaphors that may be at the same level of blend we need only count the number of
metaphors or resources blended to determine rank.
A final measure of complexity is the Ubiquity of the metaphor. By Ubiquity I mean to
specify how often a particular metaphor is used in the development of other metaphors. That
is, a metaphor of lower complexity will be one in which a great many of other metaphors
must involve the lower complexity metaphor in the developmental conceptual blending that
constitutes higher level conceptual metaphors. From this it follows that a more complex
metaphor will be one in which few other metaphors utilize it in conceptual blending. So, we
see an inverse relationship between the ubiquity of a metaphor and its relative complexity.
Now that we have both traits that determine the complexity of conceptual metaphors,
let’s turn now to defining the epistemic ordering relation ≤ from above. By ≤ I mean that
relation which assigns the complexity of conceptual metaphor (whether epistemic, cognitive,
or conceptual) with regard to a complexity calculus. So to say that conceptual metaphor X
is less than conceptual metaphor Y , I mean that X has a lower level of complexity than Y .
Both equivalency and greater than follow in similar fashion.
Let’s now turn to the complexity of the BMI. The BMI is a conceptual mapping of an
iterative process with end onto the domain of processes without end. That is, we map
our understanding of finite iteration onto potential infinity. The result is actual infinity.
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In other words, we form a conceptual mapping from Containment Schemas, the Classes are
Containers metaphor, and our understanding of an iterative process without end (which falls
out of Boole’s Metaphor), and the result is a contained notion of the infinite, namely actual
infinity.
This can be seen when we consider the evaluation of the Space as a Set of Points (SSP)
metaphor, which relies on a particular case of the BMI. Along with the score given to
the BMI, the SSP metaphor will have even higher value given the blends of various other
conceptual metaphors required. Hence, we have an ordering of conceptual metaphors that
will appear as follows:
α1 ≤ α2 ≤ (AOC) ≤ · · · ≤ (BMI) ≤ · · · ≤ (SSP ) ≤ · · ·
One may wonder about the value of such a natural ordering on conceptual metaphor. The
ordering is an important feature of conceptual metaphor for at least two reasons. The first is
that this ordering gives insights into the nature of mathematical knowledge. As I will argue
in the next section, the lower the complexity of a particular metaphor, the easier it is to
understand. Hence, any results stemming from the use of a lower ranked metaphor will be
more readily accessible to mathematical reasoning. The second reason is that the surprising
ordering relations between metaphors used in real proof and ideal proof suggest routes of
contentful expression in ideal metaphors, and epistemic utility in the case of real metaphors.
In other words, this ordering relation gives rise to an epistemic bridge principle! Let’s now
turn to the development of such a bridge principle.
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5.4 An Epistemic Bridge Principle
Let’s take stock. At this point we have encountered both how low level conceptual
metaphors in mathematics are grounded in the aggregated correlation of physical phenom-
ena to symbolic representations. From this we were able to develop a natural ordering of
complexity of our conceptual metaphors. This ordering effectively locates various metaphors
at various levels of epistemic complexity. Given that our notion of epistemic complexity
is of an ordered kind, we get the welcome implication that for a metaphor to have higher
complexity, it must build on the preceding metaphors for its development. The surprising
development from the calculus above is that some metaphors underlying ideal reasoning have
lower complexity ratings than those grounding real methods. Similarly, metaphors used in
real proofs rely on underlying metaphors associated with ideal reasoning. These two de-
velopments along with our understanding of the the physical phenomenal grounding of all
metaphors leaves us in good position for developing an epistemic bridge between real and
ideal methods.
In this section I develop and defend an epistemic bridge principle between real and ideal
methods of mathematical proof without losing any of the content from real proof nor the far
reaching epistemic abilities of ideal proof. To do so I begin with a reminder of the difficult
Division Problem between the two methods. After I have suitably expanded the EBP, we will
see that the correct solution to the Division Problem is to dissolve it. Following this I show
implications of EBP for both reasoning and rationality, and for mathematical knowledge
generally.
To begin, let’s consider the troubling Division Problem. In the divide (represented in
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the table below) we can place on one side all supposedly real elements, and on the other the
supposed ideal elements.
Ideal Proof Non-Contentual Sentences; Infinite Inferences; Meaning-
less Symbol Strings; Mathematics, Transfinite, and Uncom-
putable Induction; Infinitary Logic, Higher Order Set Theory;
Infinitary Metaphor
Real Proof Content-rich Sentences; Finite Inferences; Finite Mechan-
ically (logically) Decidable; Finitely Decidable Universal
Schema; Geometric Intuition; Non-geometric Intuition (Ev-
eryday Intuition); Diagrammatic Reasoning; Deductive Gaps;
Interpreted Finite Terms/Formulae; Evident Foundational
Axioms; Finite Metaphor
Table 3
From Hilbert’s original formulation (c.f. Chapter 2), we understand that only those in-
ference patterns that rely on finitistic reasoning can be considered real proof. Even though
Hilbert himself was suspicious of geometric intuition (as this suspicion forms the motivation
for all work in the period), there are many non-mechanical inference schemes that are com-
monly used by modern mathematicians. These include (but are not limited to) geometric
intuition, non-geometric intuition, diagrammatic reasoning, deductive “gaps”, interpreted
finite terms and formulae, and “clearly evident” foundational axioms. On the ideal side,
again, many techniques are used in the course of proof. These include mathematical in-
duction, transfinite induction, uncomputable computer induction, and infinitary logics, and
higher order set theory.
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Included in the division should also be the underlying use of metaphor in both finitary
and infinitary reasoning. It is here that the Division Problem begins to emerge. For exam-
ple, how are we to make a non-arbitrary divide between the use of infinitary metaphores like
BMI, and others that are finite? Similarly, how are we to classify weak forms of induction
that only guarantee the truth of a proposition up to some large n ∈ N given that we are
finite beings, and that even with the use of the computers, such an n might not be finitely
surveyable? To the rescue comes the following epistemic bridge principle (EBP):
(EBP) – Let R be the set of all real methods, and I be the set of all ideal
methods. Then, if R ⊆ I and I ⊆ R, we have that R ≡ I.
Immediately we see that if EBP holds, then the Division Problem will be dissolved since it will
turn out that the set of ideal methods and the set of real methods will be indistinguishable.
We are getting ahead of ourselves, however. Let’s start by unpacking the content of EBP. As
stated the bridge principle reads more like a theorem than a principle. In fact, I will proceed
as if it is a mathematical theorem, but EBP will serve as a foundation for mathematical
reasoning and knowledge (and so, is properly a principle in the strongest sense).
Now, to unpack the statement of EBP, I mean for R and I to be the sets of both real
and ideal methods, respectively, in the sense defined above in the formulation of the Division
Problem. Assuming this, we may say that R ⊆ I, for example, when real methods are a
subset of ideal methods. The epistemic subset relation is the important notion that when
ideal methods have as a subset real methods, ideal methods contain all of the content of real
149
methods. So, ideal methods will not be contentless symbol strings utilizing mere syntactic
manipulation in the course of proof. Instead, ideal methods are content rich methods of
proof. In the other direction, when real methods contain ideal methods as epistemic subsets,
real methods retain the far reaching epistemic benefits of ideal proof. In order to argue for
the conclusion of EBP it must be the case that R ⊆ I, and that I ⊆ R. Then, from (at least,
naive) set theory we know that if two sets contain all the elements from both, then they are
equivalent. In the case of EBP, the conclusion will be that both R and I are epistemically
equivalent. Epistemic equivalence is the bridge to be built. By epistemic equivalence I mean
to identify that ability to use real methods without the loss of the far reaching capabilities
of ideal methods, and to use ideal methods without loss of mathematical content.
Let’s begin with the first containment relation, namely R ⊆ I. To show that R ⊆ I it is
enough to show that if any conceptual metaphorical element x ∈ R, then x ∈ I.4 I take this
to hold given the standard definition of subset found in nearly any mathematical textbook
dealing in set theory:
Definition – For any sets X and Y , X is a subset of Y , denoted X ⊆ Y , if and only if
∀x(x ∈ X → x ∈ Y ).
I begin by arguing that this relation holds for a particular conceptual metaphor, namely
the BMI, and then generalize to include all ideal metaphors. Suppose that Container
Schemas, counting without end, and the Classes are Containers metaphor are elements of
4One may wonder if all mathematical proofs contain only conceptual metaphor. Following Lakoff and
Nun´ez, everything from pre-theoretical mathematical ability all the way up to the highest level of mathe-
matical reasoning involves only conceptual metaphor.
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the set of real methods. It should be clear that such a supposition follows immediately from
Chapter 4. In the case of Container Schemas, we know that these are grounded in expe-
riences of everyday life. That is, Container Schemas are aggregated correlations between
situations such as a jar containing sugar. Of course, there are so many more examples of
container correlations in normal life, that our aggregations quickly multiply. Then, from
this aggregation we correlate the notion to symbolic elements. The correlation founds the
Classes are Containers metaphor as particular physical elements become correlated with
symbolic representational elements, and the containers underlie our notion of set. Then,
counting without end is an analogue of the way we are able to look out to world and carry
on counting everything that we see. From these elements it follows that the BMI, which
is a conceptual blend of the schema, ability, and metaphor contains each of the underlying
grounding principles. Given that the BMI is an ideal metaphor, it follows that the identified
conceptual schemas all are elements in the set of ideal elements.
Now that we have shown that the containment relation holds in a particular case, let’s
consider the situation for all members of the ideal class. To do so consider again the natural
ordering of conceptual metaphor. Even though conceptual metaphors in the ideal class will
not be the least complex (I claim) of all conceptual metaphor, they all rely on metaphors of
lower complexity in order to be formulated. This is the same situation as exhibited above
in the case of the BMI. And, since, if, for example, some element x ∈ Y (for some set Y ),
and Y ⊆ Z (for some set Z), then x ∈ Z, then any elements that happen to be in the set of
real methods will also be in the set of ideal methods. Hence, any ideal conceptual metaphor
will contain as its elements at least some members from the set of real methods. So, we see
that the set of real methods are an epistemic subset of the set of ideal methods. From this
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it follows that R ⊆ I.
Let’s now turn to the second containment relation, namely I ⊆ R. As above, I will start
with a particular case, namely the Space as a Set of Points metaphor, and then generalize
to the set of all real methods. The Space as a Set of Points metaphor contains as members
of its particular conceptual blend Container Schemas, the Classes are Containers metaphor,
the BMI, and perhaps Boole’s Metaphor. Suppose, then, that the BMI is a member of the
set of ideal methods (again incontrovertible). The BMI is necessary for the our metaphor
under consideration as it gives foundation for a notion of space that accommodates all of
the interesting geometric and algebraic operations that we need out of a notion of space.
But, the BMI is only one member in the conceptual blend of the Space as a Set of Points
metaphor. Given that this metaphor is an element of the class of real methods, it follows
that the BMI is a member of the class of real methods.
Let’s move to the generalized case. Again, we will use the results from our natural
ordering on conceptual metaphor. As was demonstrated in the section above, there exist
complex real metaphors, which have a higher ranking than other ideal metaphors. Assuming
that there are more real conceptual metaphors than ideal metaphors, then it is plausible that
there will exist a real metaphor with a higher complexity ranking than any ideal metaphor
(perhaps because a significant portion of mathematical activity occurs in the finite and so
more conceptual metaphors are needed). From this it follows that for every real metaphor
there will be an ideal metaphor used in the conceptual blend constituting the real metaphor.
From this it follows that every element in the ideal class will be an element in the real class
of conceptual metaphors. Hence, I ⊆ R.
We now have that both R ⊆ I and I ⊆ R. From this it follows that the class of real
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methods is epistemically equivalent to the class of ideal methods, R ≡ I. This completes the
argument for EBP. An immediate consequence of this result is that the Division Problem
should be dissolved. That is, the Division Problem poses the challenge to find a non-arbitrary
distinction between real and ideal methods. Given that there is no epistemic distinction to
be made, to find a distinction between the two methods is misguided. At best, we may want
to distinguish between the methods for the sake of discourse, but beyond than the need to
communicate in informal contexts, there is no reasoned or practical difference to be found.
Let’s turn to two more immediate consequences of EBP.
5.4.1 Implications for Reasoning and Rationality
First, another note of warning. Even though I have been using instrumental as a
means to talk about the epistemic capabilities of real and ideal methods, I do not mean to
invoke the notion of instrumental rationality that is popular in the literature on practical
rationality. Instead, my view is that real and ideal methods are epistemic instruments useful
in our mathematical reasoning. The traditional notion of instrumental rationality has it
that someone may display instrumental reasoning “insofar as she adopts suitable means
to her [reasoning] ends” (Kolodny & Brunero (2013)). Instead, real and ideal methods
are distinguishable as the only means through which to achieve convincing and rigorous
mathematical proof. In this way, these epistemic instruments represent not practical means
to an (actionable) end, but as theoretical reflection concerned with the entire edifice of
mathematics and its convincing explanation.
From this perspective, EBP has the interesting implication that while reasoning in math-
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ematics, all of our notions will have at its core physical content. In other words, there is
content to all mathematical claims, which begins in the aggregated correlation between real
phenomena and symbolic representations. One benefit of this “boots on the ground” kind
of foundation is that seemingly unknowable mathematical propositions, such as propositions
dealing with points at infinity, are now immediately accessible to anyone who has formed
the relevant conceptual framework. This is to say that what was previously thought to be
at best mysterious is now brought to Earth with a bright light shining on it. Instead of
the mystery of infinite sums or infinite points as something beyond our limited (human)
reach, they become concepts that are entirely conceivable as products of human cognitive
functioning.
More generally, the EBP implies that all of mathematical reasoning can be characterized
as the accurate formulation of relevant conceptual metaphors.5 Insofar as all humans have
the abilities from above (grouping, subitizing, pairing, symbolizing, etc.) we all have an
ability to reason mathematically through the building up of numerous conceptual blends.
This implies that mathematics and mathematical reasoning are uniquely human traits.6
Consider next the implications of EBP for mathematical knowledge.
5.4.2 Implications for Mathematical Knowledge
As broadcasted in the beginning of this chapter, I bring on as an (super contentious)
assumption that there is reason to think that we humans are reliable when formulating
contentful thoughts as well as attaining knowledge. This is the case insofar as the concepts
5Where accurate is understood as the accepted use of a given metaphor in a particular inference scenario.
6By this I mean that mathematics (as we understand it) is a uniquely human creation.
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contained in the formulations are concrete. Given that the EBP argues that both real and
ideal methods are composed out of concrete concepts, the assumption grants that we are
reliable when formulating contentful thoughts and attaining knowledge using both real and
ideal methods.
This assumption has been defended in the literature on the principle of charity by David-
son, Grady, Lewis, and Williamson. One formulation of the principle, due Davidson (1974),
is that “Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand others,
we must count them right in most matters”. From Williamson’s (2008) we have good rea-
son to think that Davidson’s variant of the principle of charity fails in important respects.
Instead, Williamson offers a maximization version, which says that “we should interpret
others in such a way that maximizes what they know”. This is to say that we should treat
the thoughts and verbalizations of our epistemic peers as that content that would maximize
what they know. This reformulation avoids many of the problems faced in the previous
Davidson/Grady/Lewis versions. One such avoidance is that of inherited knowledge.
That is, if one were to have many beliefs due to contact with some thing α, but the
beliefs were only true if interpreted as beliefs about some β (with which one has had no
causal contact), Williamson’s principle does not require us to interpret α-beliefs as β-beliefs.
This result follows since such an interpretation (even though it may maximize one’s true
beliefs), would not maximize one’s knowledge. It would not maximize knowledge because
one had never encountered β in the first place.7
Regardless the fine-grained details, the point is that with a principle of charity we can
7This can also be found (outside of Williamson’s (2008)) in Williamson’s (2004) “Philosophical ‘Intuitions’
and Scepticism about Judgement”.
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take on board the assumption that there is reason to think that we are reliable when formu-
lating contentful thoughts and attaining knowledge. Moving forward, the traditional view
of mathematical knowledge is that (mathematical) knowledge is acquired through deduction
from basic principles. This can be pulled apart as saying that mathematical knowledge is
attained by starting with axioms or definitions that are either assumed to be true or that
cannot but be true – they are logically necessary, say. From these axioms and definitions, we
then proceed using deductive methods which are themselves not open to doubt. Remember,
however, that a guiding notion of mathematical proof throughout the course of the mono-
graph has been that proofs are sequences of thoughts convincing to a sound mathematical
mind.
The EBP again implies a demystification of this process of deducing from basic principles
to a conclusion so commonly found in work on mathematical knowledge. What is required is
that the deduction be convincing to a sound mind. A sound mind, on the picture developed,
is one in which all relevant conceptual metaphors for a given area of mathematics have
been developed. The basic axioms or definitions will have concrete correlates, and each of
the affirmed deductive methods will all be based in some moderately complex conceptual
metaphor or schema. Hence, EBP implies that mathematical knowledge, which is based on
mathematical reasoning, is attained through the correct application of conceptual metaphor.
Given that conceptual metaphors are grounded in concrete concepts, we are reliable when
formulating contentful (mathematical) thoughts and attaining (mathematical) knowledge.
There are also interesting sociological implications for the study of mathematical knowl-
edge. A major source of sociological study about mathematics has been to investigate the
local sources of mathematical knowledge and style across political and geographical bound-
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aries. The EBP both legitimizes such an approach to investigating mathematical knowledge,
but it also predicts that regardless of the geographic location or political climate, there will
always be similar kinds of mathematical knowledge. Of course, the methods used to approach
such knowledge may differ according to location or government, but the EBP predicts that
the same kind of mathematical knowledge will be evident in all groups studied.
5.5 Conclusion
From grounding conceptual metaphor in physical phenomena, and the development of
a natural epistemic ordering on conceptual metaphors, I have argued for an epistemic bridge
from real methods to ideal and back again that retains both content and utility in either
direction. Following this we dismantled the Division Problem, and we saw that EBP has
very interesting implications for both mathematical reasoning and mathematical knowledge.
While we have arrived at the stated goal of the dissertation, there is one final problem to
which we must attend. In the next and final chapter, I argue that Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorems cannot apply to ideal methods. The take away is that the EBP saves Hilbert’s
Program from the death nail that many writers over the past 80 years have seen as ushered








In this, the final chapter of the dissertation, we turn now to one of the most important
results in 20th century mathematical, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics, namely
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems. More specifically, we have up to this point been working
toward the EBP, an epistemic bridge principle with epistemic consequences between real
and ideal methods of mathematical reasoning and practice. Given that we have successfully
achieved such a bridge principle as well as discovered some of the implications of the EBP, I
here argue that the EBP reduces the force of Go¨del’s Theorems so that they may not leave
all of mathematics on shaky foundation.
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That mathematics rests on shaky foundations follows from both the first and second
Incompleteness Theorems. The first says (in general terms) that in any consistent formal
system G within which a certain level of arithmetic is developed, there will exist statements
of the language G that can never be proved or disproved in G. The second theorem (following
from the first) says that such a formal theory as G cannot prove that the system itself is
consistent. The implications from these two theorems are that no suitably robust theory
will be complete (the property of being able to prove the truth or falsity of every statement
formulable in the theory), and that no such theory can prove its own consistency (the notion
that the theory will not contain contradictions). Instead, taking Peano Arithmetic, PA,
as an example, the Incompleteness Theorems hold that PA is neither complete nor can
prove that it contains no contradictions. Instead, we must move to a “higher” theory such
as Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (ZFC) to prove the consistency of PA. The question arises,
however, whether ZFC is complete and consistent. The Incompleteness Theorems entail that
any answer is not possible given that a proof of the consistency of ZFC requires yet a more
general theory, and so forth ad infinitum. Given that we do not have a theory of greatest
generality in which to prove the consistency of the rest of our mathematical theories, there
remains the possibility that any (or all) of mathematics contains numerous contradictions!
To suggest that the Incompleteness Theorems are not applicable to Hilbert’s program, i.e.
using real methods to prove ideal ones, has serious implications in logic and the philosophy of
mathematics. Most notably (though I will not directly address any of these here), denying the
applicability of the Incompleteness Theorem gives new insight into Tarski’s Theorem and
the Undefinability of Truth, Undecidability results, Reflection Principles, Lo¨b’s Theorem,
and concrete unprovable statements (to name a few). Given that these implications are left
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for future research, the point here is that there is a greatly motivated call to have such a
proposed solution.
In what follows, I begin in §2 with both the development of the Incompleteness Theorems
as well as how the EBP dilutes the impact of the Theorems. Then, given that this is the final
chapter of this dissertation, I spend §3 concluding the entire project as well as directions for
future research. Following this, the dissertation will come to an end.
6.2 Against Go¨del
In this section I first present abridged version of the proofs for both the First and
Second Incompleteness Theorems. The important steps to notice in the First Theorem are
both the ω-consistency result as well as the Diagonalization (or Self-Referential) result, both
of which will be spelled out below. In the proof of the Second Theorem, we should also note
the strict use of Diagonalization. Following the development of these two proofs, I argue that
the EBP implies that Representability and Diagonilzation are not strictly possible. From
this it will follow that Go¨del’s Theorems do not apply to ideal methods, and hence that the
Theorems do not pose a real challenge to Hilbert’s Program.
6.2.1 The First Incompleteness Theorem
To make more clear what is being proved, let’s explicitly lay out the First Incomplete-
ness Theorem. It says that:
First Incompleteness Theorem – Assume that G is a formalized theory that
contains Robinson Arithmetic Q. Then, a sentence DG of the language of G can
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be mechanically constructed from G such that:
(i) If G is consistent, then G 0 DG.
(ii) If G is ω-consistent, then G 0 ¬DG.
To understand how this proof works, let’s first notice that Go¨del employed the notion of
ω-consistency, which says of a formal system G that it is not the case that for some formula
P (x), both G ` ¬P (n),∀n (¬P (n) is provable in G) and G ` ∃xP (x). Importantly, ω-
consistency is a purely syntactic notion that applies only to meaningless strings of symbols.
Next, the proof of this Theorem requires the notion of representability, which says that for
a set N of natural numbers in G, if there is a formula P (x) of the language of G such that
for every n ∈ N, then n ∈ N ⇔ G ` P (n).
The next step in the proof is to take the language of a formal system, and then fix a
correspondence between an expression in that language to the system of natural numbers
(thereby encoding the statements). These Go¨del numbers (as they are called) have the
property that the mapping be effective, i.e. in principle is possible to mechanically pass
from a statement to its encoding and from the encoding to the statement. Following this,
the next step is known as the Diagonilization Lemma. This lemma says that if P (x) is an
arbitrary formula in G with only a single free variable, then a sentence D can be mechanically
constructed such that F ` D ↔ P (dDe). In words, this formula says that given a property,
which is denoted by P (x), the sentence D is a self referential sentence that says of itself that
it has property P , where (dDe) is the Go¨del Number of D.
To complete the proof we apply the Diagonilzation Lemma to the negated provability
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predicate, ¬ProvG(x) (x is not provable in G), which yields a sentence DG such that:
G ` DG ↔ ¬ProvG(dDGe)
This sentence, which is commonly referred to as a “Go¨del Sentence”, show that even inside
G, DG is true if and only if DG is not provable in G. This completes the proof of the
First Incompleteness Theorem since it shows that for a consistent theory G there can be
mechanically constructed a sentence that is true but unprovable (or in informal discourses,
a sentence that says of itself that it is unprovable). Hence, through ω-consistency and the
Diagonalization Lemma, we arrive at a very unintuitive result about so-called undecidable
statements. Let’s now move to an abridged proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
6.2.2 The Second Incompleteness Theorem
As in the case of the Theorem above, let’s first consider an explicit version of the Second
Incompleteness Theorem. Following this I will lay out a hand wavy proof of the Theorem.
Second Incompleteness Theorem – Assume that G is a consistent formalized
system, which contains elementary arithmetic, then G 0 Cons(G).
The proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem follows fairly easily from the proof of the
First Theorem above. Given our provability predicate ProvG(x) above, we can construct a
consistency predicate Cons(x). Then, to get from the provability predicate to the consistency
predicate we arithmetize (construct a Go¨del Numbering) of an obviously inconsistent formula
of arithmetic, namely 0 = 1. We can denote this statement by ⊥. We can then give
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the definition of the consistency of a system by ¬ProvG(d⊥e), and then abbreviating the
definition by Cons(G). We then can formalize the proof of the First Theorem inside of G
itself to yield the following: G ` Cons(G)→ HG where HG is a Go¨del sentence for G as in
the First Theorem.
Then, if Cons(G) were provable in G, then so too would be HG. However, this contradicts
the First Theorem, and so Cons(G) cannot be provable in G. From this follows the Second
Incompleteness Theorem. Now that we have brief outlines for both the First and the Second
Incompleteness Theorems, let’s turn to the central argument of this chapter, namely showing
that these results are not applicable to ideal methods.
6.2.3 Against Diagonalization and ω-consistency
To begin, we must first note that the Incompleteness Theorems are – by Go¨del’s own
lights – not applicable to real methods. This is because the generation of the definition of
ω-consistency as well as the proof of the Diagonalization Lemma are only “about” meaning-
less syntactical mathematical statements. Then (for the moment forgetting about the last
five chapters) since Hilbert’s classification of the Division Problem sets semantically rich real
methods as distinct from the meaningless strings of symbols in ideal methods, the Incom-
pleteness Theorems attack the set of ideal methods. The problem presented for mathematics
by the Incompleteness Theorems then becomes a problem for the set of ideal methods and
elements, which have all of the epistemic characteristics noted in Chapter 3. Specifically,
one implication is that our ideal methods and elements no longer enjoy their rigorous and
convincing position in mathematical proof since at any time a contradiction could arise.
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My argument against the applicability of the Incompleteness Theorems to ideal methods
and elements takes the form of a reductio. Specifically, I will show that the construction of a
provability predicate, and, consequently, a consistency predicate, contradicts the EBP. Let’s
investigate how it is that we actually construct the provability predicate, ProvG(x), as it
features heavily in the Diagonalization Lemma. To develop the provability predicate we pair
primitive symbols of a given language, G, to distinct natural numbers. From this we can
code sequences of numbers as by distinct single numbers. Then, we can code entire proofs
as a distinct number given that proofs (in this conception) are merely sequences of symbol
strings. As we have seen, the Go¨del Number of some sequence P is denoted as dP e. We
are then in the position to define relations, properties and operations as functions mapping
Go¨del Numbers to Go¨del Numbers. Finally, given that a proof is decidable in G, say, we
can map the binary relation of “x is the Go¨del Number of a proof of the formula with Go¨del
Number y” as ProvG(x).
We see that the result of applying the Diagonlization Lemma to the negated provability
predicate gives us G ` DG ↔ ¬ProvG(dDGe) as well as the result from the Second Incom-
pleteness Theorem, G 0 Cons(G). Cons(G) is similarly a binary relation between a formal
theory and the consistency of that theory. If we allow that such arithmetization (or coding)
is an acceptable feature of any formal system, then the Incompleteness Theorems follow.
However, the result of the Second Incompleteness Theorem as well as the arithmetization
of a formal system contradicts the EBP. To see why, consider the implication of viewing
ideal elements as merely meaningless syntactic strings.1 By assuming that G is a consistent
1This, of course, is the crux of Go¨del’s claim against Hilbert’s program since Hilbert thought that all
ideal reasoning was mere meaningless syntactic string manipulation. If EBP held the same, then Go¨del’s
Theorems would be just as devastating.
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formalized system containing elementary arithmetic, but the that G 0 Cons(G) (the Second
Theorem), we have not said anything contradictory. This is because, in the first case we are
ascribing a deeply semantic property to a theory, but in the second we are merely formulat-
ing a well-formed formula within the theory with the understanding that the sequence has
no meaning.
However, we have seen in the previous chapter that all ideal conceptual metaphors con-
tain real conceptual metaphors – both of which are properly grounded in the aggregated
correlations of physical phenomena. This entails that our ideal methods are not merely
meaningless symbol strings. Instead, they are content rich. From this it follows that coded
predicates, such as Cons(G) cannot be formulated in a theory given that such a predicate
directly contradicts the statements of, say, the Second Incompleteness Theorem.2 Hence,
we cannot apply the Second Incompleteness Theorem to ideal proof methods. Similarly, we
will not be able to construct the sentence G ` DG ↔ ¬ProvG(dDGe) given that it directly
contradicts itself. Hence, the First Incompleteness Theorem is of no worry to ideal methods.
This concludes the argument that Go¨del’s Theorems do not apply to the class of ideal
elements. Now that we have this little lemma in hand, let’s now turn to the final section of
this dissertation, namely the conclusion.
2My claim is that even though we can very easily coding content-rich expressions into symbolic form, it
is not the case that the new coding will lose any of the information. If it did happen to lose content, then we
have effectively erased whatever it is that was being coded. The entire purpose of coding is not to do such.
Every encoding is merely a more efficient means through which we are able to package information/content.
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6.3 Conclusion
Whether you think the reductio above adequately refutes the applicability of Go¨del’s
Incompleteness Theorems rests on convincingness of the previous five chapters. In the first
chapter I argued for a social constructivist metaphysics of mathematics. This metaphysical
picture promises to deliver everything that we want out of a mathematical metaphysics
without any of the devastating problems faced by traditional Platonism, Nominalist, of
Fictionalist accounts of math. The constructivist framework has deeper implications for our
understanding of mathematics. That is, constructivism places all of mathematical activity in
the minds of the mathematical communities themselves. This denies any sort of mysticism
about mathematical objects. It also denies the possibility that mathematics or mathematical
objects don’t actually exist (like Nominalism or Fictionalism would have it). Mathematics,
while a product of human rational activity, emerges from any one mathematician to exist in
the combined effort of mathematicians over the millennia.
There is more to do on this metaphysical project. For example, in developing the theory
further, social constructivism about mathematics can answer all of the challenges posed
from Neo-Platonists, say, to similar accounts such as Nominalism. It is my contention
that constructivism has the machinery to handle all such worries. Furthermore, it is to be
seen whether the kind of constructivism here displayed can fully accommodate Naturalist
conceptions of mathematics (as this has been a common concern in the literature. Regardless,
I claim that there is room in my social constructivist account to successfully answer these
and other challenges posed.
Following this, I argued in Chapter 2 for an evolutionary account of mathematical under-
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standing. We saw that there is a link between human and non-human animals for completing
non-verbal arithmetic tasks. For that matter, it appears that rhesus monkeys are similarly
capable of completing such tasks as are college students. Beyond that, as humans develop,
there seems to be a heavy reliance on both visuospatial reasoning (even when reasoning
mathematically in highly theoretical ways) as well as a necessary connection between higher
mathematics and conceptual metaphor. Given the metaphysical picture from the previous
chapter, there is a connection between higher order mathematical ability and the develop-
ment of conceptual metaphor. That is, we develop our understanding of ever more complex
conceptual metaphors through our mathematical education. This education is an introduc-
tion into the way of reasoning present in our mathematical communities.
Following this, I argue for a conception of objectivity that satisfies, common sense no-
tions, the evolutionary story painted, and the needs of a constructivist metaphysics. It was
after this that I introduced the Division Problem, which asks for a non-arbitrary distinc-
tion between real and ideal methods. As has been made clear, this is one of the primary
motivations for the rest of what followed. Given that the Division Problem has been an
enduring challenge during the last 180 years of mathematics and philosophy of mathematics,
an adequate solution is reasonably called for. There is still much to do on the cognitive sci-
ence side of my project. I suspect that there will exist similar fundamental level conceptual
metaphors in non-human animals as there are in humans, and it is even possible that some
animals have the capacity to develop even more complex conceptual metaphors. If we were
able to devise a research program that could directly test for such conceptual metaphors,
then we may gain a better insight into the mathematical abilities of our closer evolutionary
cousins. Further, it would a great value to discover whether separate non-human animal so-
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cieties shared such complex metaphor (and if they came to similar conclusions using them).
This would certainly be more evidence for a constructivist metaphysics of mathematics.
The third and fourth chapters are a mated pair. In each of them I developed case studies
commonly indicative of both ideal and real methods, respectively. After developing these
case studies, I investigated which traits were characteristic among them as well as primary
conceptual metaphors responsible for our understanding in these cases. At the outset it
became clear that ideal elements have characteristic traits that help us to greatly extend our
epistemic abilities well beyond our limited human timescale capacities. Real methods, on the
other hand, were found to be deeply routed in our experience of the world around us as well as
the set of background knowledge that we gain in society. From the identified characteristic
traits there is work to do to investigate whether literally all ideal (real) methods can be
characterized using my identified traits. The development of such a unique set of traits may
be useful in mathematical education where an instructor can work to develop the requisite
set of background knowledge or the development of required conceptual metaphors to help
the students more readily glomb onto the relevant mathematical ideas.
In the fifth chapter we finally realized the stated goal of this dissertation, namely the
development of an epistemic bridge principle between real and ideal methods in mathemat-
ics. To get there, I began with an investigation into the cognitive foundations of conceptual
metaphors. Interestingly, and as Pasch predicted in the 1800’s, our most fundamental con-
ceptual metaphors are the correlation of aggregated experience with symbolic representa-
tions. This allowed us to develop a natural order of epistemic complexity on all conceptual
metaphors. Using the proposed calculus developed in the section we can accurately deter-
mine whether one metaphor is more complex than another. This had the interesting result
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that some metaphors primarily identified as ideal metaphors were less complex than others
associated with real methodologies. This result lead to the formulation of an epistemic bridge
principle where it was argued that the set of real conceptual metaphors was an epistemic
subset of the set of ideal metaphor, and the set of ideal metaphors were an epistemic subset
of the set of real metaphors. Following any standard set theory, this implies that they are
the same set.
Immediately, this result has important implications for mathematical reasoning and
mathematical knowledge. However, in what has been sketched above, we see that the EBP
implies that Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorems do not apply to ideal methods since ideal
methods cannot be mere syntactic sequences. Given that ideal methods have deeply routed
semantic content, the kinds of self-referential statements made in the course of the proof of
either of the Theorems are impossible since they are direct contradictions.3 There is much
more to be done, given the results of this and the last chapter. One such source of work
would be to fully develop an epistemic set theory that may have implications in research in
cognitive science or in other such hierarchical systems. The implications for mathematical
knowledge and reasoning open doors for everything from sociological research into societal
mathematical practices to viewing mathematics in its rightful place as a way for humans
to understand the world. Furthermore, the results from the denial of the applicability of
the Incompleteness Theorems to ideal methods have the many applications to issues such
as Tarski’s Theorem, the Undefinability of Truth, Undecidability, Reflection Principles, and
the like.
3Even though non-vicious self reference is possible, it is not the kind of vicious self-reference involved in
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